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Abstract


This report describes final experiments on pilot decision making


concluding the work performed under a series of NASA-Ames grants (NAS 2-10047,


NAG 2-75, NAG 2-112). The focus in this report is on the development of


models of pilot, decision making in critical in-flight events (CIFE). Analyses


reported here include development of: 1) a frame system representation


describing how pilots use their knowledge in a fault diagnosis task (developed


from an analysis of verbal protocols from an experiment involving twenty


instrument rated pilots); 2) assessment of script norms, distance measures,


and Markov models developed from computer aided testing (CAT) data involving


forty instrument rated pilots; and 3) performance ranking of subject data by a


group of six recognized expert pilots.


This research has demonstrated that interactive computer aided testing


either by touch CRT's or personal computers is a useful research and training


device for measuring pilot information management in diagnosing system


failures in simulated flight situations. Performance is dictated not so much


by flight hours, ratings and experience with in-flight problems as it is by


knowledge of aircraft subsystems, initial pilot structuring of the failure


symptoms and efficient testing of plausible causal hypotheses.
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I. Background


A critical in-flight event (CIFE) is a situation that either


develops quickly or over time. It is unexpected, unplanned, and


unanticipated, and is perceived by the pilot in command to threaten the


safety of the aircraft. In the CIFEs studied here, safety of the


aircraft depends more on the pilot's cognitive processes than on skilled


motor performance. This report covers the last of three studies directed


to CIFE research.


The objectives of the initial project effort were to:


1) Describe and define the scope of the critical in-flight event 
with emphasis on pilot management of available resources. 
2) Develop detailed scenarios for both full mission simulation and 
paper and pencil (P/P) testing of pilot response to CIFE's. 
3) Develop statistical relationships among pilot characteristics 
and observed responses to CIFE's. 
A subsequent grant focused on the use of computer aided techniques


to study pilot responses to CIFE's. Using touch CRT's, scenarios


developed from earlier paper and pencil tests were adapted to computer


testing using a PLATO"I system. This permitted an efficient, virtually


experimenter-free study of pilot diagnosis and destination diversion


decisions.


The rationale behind the research has remained the same through the


initial contract and subsequent grant, namely, to understand how pilots:


PLATO is a Control Data Corporation system involving interactive


computer operations with touch response.
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1 
d) detect CIFE's


b) obtain information on which to base diagnosis


c) make decisions about destination diversions and


d) execute these decisions.


A. Previous Results1


Figure 1-i depicts the overall project accomplishments.


The initial contract produced:


1) a test for pilot knowledge of aircraft systems and instrument 
procedures 
2) a series of CIFE scenarios for General Aviation Trainer 
(GAT) simulation 
3) the execution of GAT CIFE experiments 
4) the development of paper/pencil CIFE tests 
5) the development of paper/pencil destination diversion tests 
6) performance measurements of forty instrument rated pilots on 
the above tests. 
For more details on research findings, see "An Investigation Into


Pilot and System Response to Critical In-Flight Events," Final


Report, NASA, NAG2-10047 and NAG2-75, June, 1981.
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1 
Figure 1-1 
CIFE RESEARCH MILESTONES 
1) Development .of Knowledge Tests of Aircraft Subsystems 
2) Development of CIFE Scenarios for GAT Simulation 
3) Subject Testing with GAT Simulations 
4) Development of -Paper and Pencil CIFE Scenarios 
5) Development of Paper/Pencil Destination Diversion Tests 
6) Testing of Forty Subjects in Paper/Pencil Scenarios 
7) Adaptation of Paper/Pencil Tests to Interactive Computer-
Aided Testing, Including Knowledge, Diagnostic, and 
Destination Division Tests 
8) Testing of Forty Subjects in Computer-Aided Testing Format 
9) Within Session Learning Studies 
10) Combining Destination Diversion with CIFE Diagnosis in 
Computer-Aided Testing 
11) Descriptive Modeling of Test Results 
:3


The highlights of the GAT experiments were:


1) Cockpit managmement style varies widely among pilots, for 
example, some are extremely self-reliant, others want immediate 
and extensive help from ATC, while still others make the 
decision making process a joint effort with ATC. 
2) Good stick and rudder pilots seem to have excess capability and 
maintain good stick and rudder performance before, during and 
after the CIFE. More marginal stick and rudder pilots, on the 
other hand, show increased frequency and amplitude of heading 
and altitude excursions, and experience communication 
difficulties in the face of a CIFE. 
3) Pilots who score well on the knowledge test instruments tend to 
perform well in problem diagnosis and decision making. 
4


The paper and pencil test results were analyzed with respect to knowledge


and biographical data. The findings were:


1) Knowledge is inversely related to total diagnostic inquiries, 
e.g., knowledgeable pilots reach conclusions (right or 
wrong) more rapidly than others. 
2) Total diagnostic inquiries is inversely related to correctness. 
This implies that undirected experimentation is a poor 
diagnosis style. 
3) Diagnosis performance is correlated with knowledge scores. 
4) Knowledge score is correlated with pilot ratings held. 
5) Civil trained pilots place a higher worth on ATC service in 
diversion decisions than do military pilots. 
6) Private pilots place a higher worth on weather factors in 
diversion decisions than do commercial and ATP rated pilots. 
7) ATP rated pilots place high worth on time in diversion 
decisions. 
In general the pilots with good diagnostic performance were characterized


as knowledgeable about aircraft systems, employed few logic tracks to get


at an answer, used few inquiries per track, and emphasized time in their


destination diversion decision. They were not differentiated by flight


hours, ratings, training, or type of flying.
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B., 	 Results from the Second Study1


In order to avoid experimenter bias and to increase the efficiency


of CIFE testing, considerable efTort was devoted in the second study to


the adaptation of paper and pencil scenarios to computer aided testing
 

using PLATO® . Appendix A includes sample displays presented to the


subject in the course of testing. The router provides the display


mechanism to select the major program modules, namely:


1) biographical data 
2) knowledge tests 
3) practice with VORs and Autopilot (to be discussed below) 
4) six CIFE scenarios 
5) the destination diversion scenario 
6) the airport ranking exercise 
7) a combination CIFE diagnosis and destination diversion 
scenario 
The unique advantages of the PLATO® system include:


1) little experimenter interaction required, hence minimal


experimenter effects on subject performance


2) 	 use of touch response to eliminate the need for keyboard


activation - a special lexicon was developed to assist subjects


in specifying their diagnoses


For more details of research findings see "Use of Computer-Aided Testing


In the Investigation of Pilot Response to Critical In-Flight Events,


Final Report, NASA, NAG2-112, December 30, 1982.
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3) precise records for timing of inquiries and intervals between 
inquiries 
4) the ability to introduce dynamics such as altitude loss during 
a scenario involving power loss 
5) documentation ­ ability to call up any subject data and to add 
new test data for subjects previously tested 
6) the ability to test subjects at one of the many CDC PLATO® 
testing centers around the country with such data made 
available in Columbus for analysis 
Forty subjects have been tested to date using the PLATO® approach. A


list of the scenarios and appropriate diagnoses is shown in Appendix B.


Typical subject data are shown in Appendix C. Some subjects were used


for special purposes.- These included:


1) protocol analysis - having the subjects think aloud during


their information search
 

2) scenario order changes to establish learning within test


sessions


3) limiting the number of subject information inquiries while


relaxing the four minute time constraint


4) having subjects write out candidate hypotheses as their


diagnostic search progressed


While the original thrust of the research involved instrument rated


pilots, in this PLATO® testing phase a small sample of high and low
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time non-instrument rated pilots were tested as well. This was done to


estimate pilot rating effect on diagnostic strategies.


C. 	 Descriptive Modeling for Diagnosis of CIFE's


Figures 1-3 and 1-4 depict a way to view subject information seeking


patterns during diagnosis testing. Sources within logic tracks are


identified for each scenario. The pilot information plots (PIP's) are a


quick way to visualize:


a) the number of logic tracks employed 
b) the order of inquiries within and between tracks 
c) the time between inquiries 
d) the number of track returns and the information resampled 
Using these PIP's various management information seeking strategies


can be observed. For the suction failure problem as shown in Figure 1-2,


Figure 1-3 depicts a subject with a logical and efficient approach to


diagnosis. Figure 1-4 depicts an almost random inquiry.


Preliminary findings for the diagnosis portion of the PLATO® test


include:


1) Subjects are easily motivated using PLATO® testing.


2) 	 Learning within scenario test sessions takes place in terms of


reduced amount of time between inquiries. -The number of repeat


samples on tracks and the number of tracks sampled are scenario


dependent.
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SCENARIO


You are making a day trip from Augusta, ME to Lebanon, NH. You


fly out of Augusta at 9:00 a.m., cleared Victor 39 to Neets


intersection, Victor 496 to Lebanon. You climb to a cruising
 

altitude of 6000 ft. After 15 minutes of routine IMC flying in


instrument conditions, your instruments indicate an increase in


airspeed and steadily decreasing altitude while maintaining


level flight attitude. How would you identify your problem?


Our Diagnosis of the Problem Was the Following:


Your vacuum pump failed as indicated by the low reading of the


suction gauge. The vacuum pump drives the attitude and


directional gyros. As the artificial horizon lost its drive it


started to sag to the right and you compensated by turning


left, leveling the artificial horizon and putting the plane in


a slow, descending left bank. The airspeed increase was due to


the slight nose-down attitude.


Figure 1-2. Suction Failure Problem and Diagnosis
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PITOT


STATIC AS VSI ALT OAT A/ IT PITO


End 
ENGINE TACH MP MIX THROT PROP OIL T. OIL P. MAG


Start


ICING WdC SC FR


VACUUM -AH DG ( YOKE


OTHER 
RESPONSE: Gyro Broken


CONFIDENCE IN RESPONSE: 7


CRITICALITY: 5


TOTAL FLIGHT TIME: 100-300 Hrs.


TOTAL DIAGNOSIS TINE: 78 Sec.


RATING: Private


KEY TERM: N (D 
TOTAL NO. INQUIRIES: 9


KNOWLEDGE SCORE: 60%


Figure 1-3. Pilot Information Plot for Scenario #2, Subject #53
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Start 
STATIC AS ALT OAT A/S A/SO - PIT PITO


ENGINE T CP M mix HROT PROP OIL T. OIL P. MAG 
ICING Wd cc WC FC AC SC FR


VACUUM DO SUC End


RESPONSE: Elevator Control Pressure


CONFIDENCE IN RESPONSE: 7 
CRITICALITY: 1 
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME: 100 Hrs. 
TOTAL DIAGNOSIS TIME: 211 Sec. 
RATING: Private 
KEY TERM: 0 Y 
TOTAL NO. INQUIRIES: 20 
KNOWLEDGE SCORE, 50% 
Figure 1-4. Pilot Information Pilot for Scenario #2, Subject #67
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3) Instrument rated pilots perform better in general and are more


efficient than non-instrument rated pilots.
 

4) CIFE experiences of test subjects influence their information


seeking strategies.
 

Based on PLATO® and paper and pencil test results, idealized 
information searching can be hypothesized. The ideal pilot first 
confirms the symptoms given him. He then establishes whether his engine


status is threatened by whatever cause lies behind the symptoms. Usually


oil temperature and pressure and manifold pressure suffice to test this
 

condition. Next he generates two or more hypotheses as to the cause, and


makes a determination of the plausibility of these hypotheses with a


minimal number of inquires within the appropriate tracks. He rarely


needs to go over old logic tracks sampled. Finally, given a logical


cause of the symptoms (usually from the key information element), he will


often make sure alternative hypotheses are still not viable.


12


D. Combining Destination Division With Diagnosis


Scenario #5, described in Figure 1-5 was designed to meet two


purposes: 
1) It was a "no win" problem, i.e., no pilot would really be able 
to find the true cause from the symptoms presented. Hence, it 
would avoid a pilot stumbling into the key information item and 
force the pilot to examine all possible hypotheses. 
2) It combined on the touch CRT both the destination diversion 
decision and the problem of diagnoses. 
Appendix D shows the displays used in advanced PLATO® testing. This


includes a simulated low altitude chart. A program has been developed


for PLATO® which locates the aircraft relative to the map co-ordinates


allows heading changes and allows the position of the aircraft to be


determined from the VOR radials as the aircraft moves at some selected


speed: and heading. It should be noted that attempts'to develop pilot


positional awareness were used throughout. These included position


I 
reports to ATC based on dual VOR location assessment, auto-pilot heading
 

change requirements, new clearances and even a concerned passenger


requesting a return to the departure airport. Test scenarios employed


some dynamics, i.e., loss of altitude with neutral forces on the yoke and


attendant changes in VSI and airspeed with control inputs. As the flight


progressed, the VOR needle showed a deflection. The scenario permitted


communication with ATC and allowed for declaring emergencies.
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Scenario #5


Consult attached simplified low altitude chart.


You are on an IFR flight from Utah Municipal Airport to Haven County


Airport. You depart on V-110 at 6000 ft. in your Cherokee Arrow (N123B) which


is equipped with a 3-axis autopilot. There is a NOTAM out which reports that


Colorado VOR is out of service during the period you plan to navigate.


Navigate using Ohigh and California VORs. You have been enroute 60 minutes


from Utah Municipal Airport. You are on the gauges but the ride is smooth.


Weather briefing indicated that winds at 6000 were expected to be light and


variable.


You have one passenger aboard.


Weather at:


Haven County Airport = 2000 & 5
 

Ohigh = 1000 & 3
 

Wind Falls - 1000 & 3 by a C-172


(10 Minutes Ago)


Cleve Center calls and reports radar contact is lost. Please report present


condition.


Clearance


ATC Response:


NI23B, thanks for the position report.


Here is your new clearance:


proceed direct California VOR direct


Haven Count Airport at 6000.


There will be opposite traffic at 5000 . . . . mainttin 6000. 
Please confirm your new heading and altitude after your turn.


Scenario Change


While practicing hand flying with your autopilot disengaged, you notice that


increased nose-up trim is required to maintain a constant indicated altitude


and that your IAS has decreased 20 kts. from normal cruise.


Your passenger notes this prbblem, and suggests that you turn back to Utah


Municipal.


Determine the nature of the problem, and your destination decision.


Figure 1-5. Combined Diagnosis and Destination Diversion Scenario.
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Early tests suggest most pilots were preoccupied with diagnosis and


seemed to lose positional awareness; This result is supported by typical


experiences of pilots and ATC personnel.


E. Destination Diversion Descriptive Modeling


Appendix E presents the CRT displays given to the subject for the


destination diversion phase of testing. In this scenario the pilot loses


his alternator in IMC conditions beyond the range of his destination or


departure airports. Under time constraints he must choose between


alternate airports with different attributes. Such attributes include
 

ceiling, visibility, bearing and distance, navigation aids, presence of


ATC support and terrain. In this test there is no absolute answer.


Rather the test seeks to see how pilots weight attribute information


about alternative airports.


Table 1-I summarizes for twenty-two subjects the attributes selected


by airport. Note ceiling, visibility, and approach aids dominate the


inquires.


These graphs, called DIG's for destination information graphs, give


a quick picture of how pilots evaluate diversion airport attributes.


There appears to be no biographical or knowledge predictors for these
 

graphs. The relationship of DIG's to CIFE PIP's will require further


study.
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0. 
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i 
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I 
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H 
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 2 3
 4 5
 6 
Total
 
1 8 13 12 12 6 8 54

2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


3 14 15 15 14 11 11

4 0 1 1 1 0 1 4

5 91 18 17 13 9 9 75

6 10 13 12 12 6 6 59

7 2 2 2 2 0 0 8

8 10 15 14 12 9 10 70


9 9 13 13 8 5 4 52


10 3 8 8 5 2 6 32


11 3 5 3 4 1 1 17


12 2 4 4 1 3 3 17


13 1 1 1 1 1 1 6


14 8 15 11 10 6 9 59


15 0 0 0 0 0 01 0


16 1 3 4 2 2 3 15
Q
Total 10 116 95 61 72


Number of Subjects = 22


Table 1-1. Frequency of Information Type for Each Airport.
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II. Research Objectives for the Current Study


The basic aim of this third study was to add depth of understanding


to pilot information seeking and decision making in the face of critical


in-flight events. The past research program sought to apply human


factors concepts to pilot information processing and decision making in


order to:


a) ascertain the role of pilot background, experience and


knowledge in problem diagnosis and decision making,
 

b) describe problem solving paths in sufficient detail to permit


the identification of various general strategies used by


pilots, and


c) identify generalizable formal structures to describe CIFE


decision making and diagnostic behavior.


Experiments in the first two studies resulted in a wealth of data


from some eighty pilots who were subjected to a set of diagnostic and


decision making scenarios. Those data have been used to develop simple


graphical models to depict information gathering behavior and have been


subjected to an exhaustive set of statistical tests to demonstrate


relationships between pilot backgound and scenario test scores. The


major task remaining for this, the third phase, was to develop formal


structures to generalize behaviors observed in the graphical models


(PIP's) and more fully exploit available data.
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To accomplish a general description of pilot diagnostic behavior


concepts from cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence will be


employed as well as more traditional mathematical models from the theory


of stochastic processes.
 

Over the last decade, significant strides have been made toward


understanding how people acquire and utilize knowledge. Contributions


from the fields of cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence


emphasize the critical role that the organization of knowledge in the


mind plays in determining performance. Of particular interest to


understanding the diagnostic behavior of pilots are the (closely related)


concepts of frames (Minsky, 1975), schemata (Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth,


1979) and scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977).


The goal of this research is to develop a more formal description of


a pilot's diagnostic behavior. An operating hypothesis is that a pilot's


behavior in response to a given scenario will be mediated in part by the
 

relevant knowledge structures contained in that pilot's memory. This


hypothesis suggests three basic research questions:


1) What knowledge does a pilot have? This might be thought of as 
an unordered list of propositions. 
2) How is this knowledge organized in memory? Models of human 
associative memory (Anderson and Bower, 1980) and 
schemata-based theories seem most promising in answering this


question.
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3) 	 How are knowledge and organizing knowledge structures used by


pilots in attempting to diagnose the causes of critical


in-flight events? Commonly hypothesized cognitive structures


and processes such as control elements, activation thresholds,


push-down stacks, and priming may prove to be applicable.


Concepts borrowed from artificial intelligence research, such


as production and frame systems, may be useful.
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III. The Role of Knowledge Structures in Fault Diagnosis


-The study discussed below addresses the question of how


domain-specific knowledge is used in fault diagnosis (Rasmussen and


Rouse, 1981). The fault studied is the failure of the vacuum system in


an airplane. The domain-specific knowledge of interest is the knowledge


that instrument rated pilots have stored in their memories.


It is hypothesized that such knowledge is organized in a pilot's


memory as a frame system. The basic knowledge structure within such a


system is a frame. Minsky (1975) defines a frame as:


a data structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like


being in a living room or going to a child's birthday party.


Attached to each frame are several kinds of information. Some of


this information is about how to use the frame. Some is about what


one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these


expectations are not confirmed" (p. 212)


In an aviation setting one frame or "stereotyped situation" might be


a plane in a descent. Such a data-structure would contain information


about expected instrument readings (e.g., the altimeter should show


decreasing altitude). It could also contain labeled slots indicating


relevant pieces of information that should be collected (e.g., what is


the indicated airspeed?).- Associated with each such slot (Winston, 1984;


Schank and Riesbeck, 1981) is a set of permissible slot-fillers (e.g.,


increasing, constant or decreasing airspeed).


If a slot has several alternative slot-fillers, one of these may be


marked as the default value. It is the value most likely to be correct


if the situation described by the frame occurs.
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Within this framdwork, fault diagnosis consists of:


1) Focusing attention on a particular frame. 
2) Using the knowledge contained in that frame to generate 
information requests and to make inferences. 
3) Using the information collected to confirm or reject the 
activated frame as an appropriate representation of the 
situation. 
4) Using the contents of the frame to activate or focus 
attention on additional relevant frames. 
21


METHOD


Pilots were read a scenario that provided certain instrument


indications and background information pertaining to a flight over the


New England area. They were told that a problem existed at the point


in time described by the scenario, and were asked to try to diagnose the


cause of the problem. In order to perform this task they were allowed to
 

request any information that would normally be available to a pilot under


the conditions specified by the scenario. Requested information was


provided verbally by an experimenter.


Each subject was tested in a separate session. The entire session


was tape-recorded.


Subjects


Twenty-six pilots with instrument ratings served as subjects.


Pilots were paid $10 for a single session that lasted from one to two


hours. Additional biographical information is summarized in the Results


and Discussion section.


Procedure


The two primary tasks involved fault diagnosis (Task 1) and a memory


(recall) test (Task 2). In addition, four other supplementary tasks were


performed. Tasks were run in numerical order for all subjects. Since


Tasks 1 and 2 were always run first, there is a potential for confounding


of results on the remaining tasks. Consequently, the information


provided by these latter tasks will be presented only in so far as it
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supports or contradicts conclusions drawn from the two primary tasks.


Similar caution must be applied when interpreting results from Task 2.


Task 1. Each subject was asked to describe what "a pilot should do


in order to determine the cause of a problem that has developed while


flying a Cherokee Arrow, with a 200 horsepower, fuel-injected


Lycoming engine. This particular plane is not turbocharged and does


not have an autopilot."


The subject was asked to think out loud as he tried to diagnose the


problem, telling the experimenter not only what information a pilot


should collect but also why he should collect that information.


A sample verbal protocol was read to the subject in order to


illustrate what was meant by thinking out loud. This example involved


deciding how to get to work rather than fault diagnoses while in flight.


The pilot was then asked to practice thinking out loud using a


scenario involving selection of a restaurant. Thus, this practice did


not deal with fault diagnosis or with flying.


Pilots were told specifically not to try to correct the problem.


Their sole objective was to determine the cause of the problem. It was


pointed out that this was therefore a different task from the one faced


by a pilot who was actually flying under such conditions.


Pilots were further informed that this was a static "simulation,"


that the information provided in response to their requests referred to


the same point in time at which the'scenario was read. (The plane did


not continue to fly during the time taken to diagnose the problem.)


Quantitative readings were provided in response to information requests


whenever appropriate (e.g., the vertical speed indicator shows a descent
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at a rate of 600 feet per minute). Whenever appropriate, it was also


stated whether the quantitative reading would be a normal one for the


plane while cruising at the intended altitude (e.g., the oil temperature


gauge reads 1400 F, which is normal).


The responses provided were developed by an expert pilot and listed


for the experimenter to read in response to a subject's requests. The


accuracy of the responses was tested by simulating the scenario conditons


in an actual flight.


Two experimenters were present for each session. One provided the


responses to the information requests. The other gave the instructions


and prompted the subject to continue thinking out loud when necessary.


The prompts consisted of two questions:


1. What are you thinking now? (if the pilot became silent)


2. Why are you interested in that information? (if the pilot
 

asked for information without explaining why he wanted it)


The scenario (presented below) was one in which a plane's vacuum pump


failed. This fact was indicated by a zero reading on the suction
 

gauge. The vacuum pump drives the artificial horizon and directional


gyro. As the artificial horizon lost its drive, it started to sag to


the right and the pilot compensated (unconsciously) by turning left.


This leveled the artificial horizon and put the plane in a descending


left bank. The resulting nqse-down attitude caused an increase in


airspeed and a descent.


At the point in time represented in the scenario the plane


had faulty readings on the artificial horizon and directional gyro. The
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plane was descending nose-down and was in a left bank while these


instruments indicated straight and level flight.


The scenario is given below.


Imagine that this pilot is making a day trip from Augusta, Maine to


Lebanon, New Hampshire. He flies out of Augusta at 9 a.m. cleared


Victor 39 to Neets intersection, Victor 496 to Lebanon. He climbs


to a cruising altitude of 6000 feet.
 

After 15 minutes of routine flying in instrument conditions in the


clouds, the instruments indicate an increase in airspeed, a steadily


decreasing altitude, and zero pitch.


So, the instruments indicate an increase in airspeed, a steadily


decreasing altitude, and zero pitch.


How should this pilot go about identifying his problem?


After hearing the scenario, pilots began requesting information in


an effort to diagnose the fault. They continued until they arrived at a


conclusion or decided that, with the information available, it was


impossible to arrive at a conclusion.


Pilots stating a conclusion were asked to rate their confidence in


it on a scale from one to ten. A rating of one indicated the lowest


level of confidence while ten indicated the highest.


Task 2. Pilots were asked to recall everything they remembered about


this flight. They were told to be very specific about any instrument


readings or conditions they remembered.


Task 3. Pilots were given a knowledge test. They were asked to


describe the information they would collect in order to determine whether


a plane had one of the following problems:


25 
1. 	 Structural icing


2. 	 Directional gyro malfunction (mechanical failure)
 

3. 	 Suction gauge malfunction (mechanical failure)


4. 	 Vacuum pump failure
 

5. 	 Iced-up pitot tube


6. 	 Accidentally extended gear


7. 	 Iced-up static port
 

8. 	 Accidental change of the yoke position (with the pilot unaware


of this fact)


9. 	 Artifical horizon malfunction (mechanical failure)


10. 	 Reduction in power or thrust from the engine or prop.


They were told to assume the plane was cruising in the clouds at the time


one of these problems occurred.


Task 4. Pilots were asked to think back to the original


problem-solving task. They were asked to describe their impression of


the plane's physical orientation while they were trying to diagnose the


problem.


Task 5. Pilots were asked whether they formed a visual (mental)


image of an instrument panel while performing Task 1. If the answer was


yes, they were asked what they visualized.


Task 6. Pilots were asked to provide the following biographical


information:


1. 	 Whether they had ever personally experienced problems


with icing or the vacuum system while flying


2. 	 Age
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3. Total hours of flying experience


4. Highest airman's certificate


5. Ratings in addition to instrument rating.


RESULTS AND DISCUSSION


Before presenting summary statistics for the results of the


experiment, three full verbal protocols will be presented:


Subject #17


Query 1: 	 "What if I open my alternate static source?"


[Why?] "To see if I have a clogged port.".


Query 2: 	 "You said the airspeed was increasing and the altitude


was decreasing?"


[Why?] "That suggests that you're descending."
 

Query 3: "What is the outside air temperature?"


[Why?] "Because there could be ice on the wings


causing descent."
 

Query 4: "What is the RPM?"


[Why?] "To see if there's a loss of engine power."


Query 5: "Can you see ice on the wings?"


Conclusion: "I can't tell."


Subject #3


Query 1: 	 "Steadily decreasing altitude. Then I would also assume


that that also includes then a showing a descent on the
 

vertical velocity indicator?" [Why?] "Is the vertical


speed indicator having a reading consistent with the


altimeter. To try to narrow down is it a pitot-static


system problem."


"That indicates to me that the vertical speed indicator is


consistent with the altimeter."


Query 2: "To clarify. Is my, the altitude'indicator also going


down?"


Query 3: 	 "At this point, then, I would then change my attention


away from the, no I take that back. The airspeed


indicator is indicating an increase in airspeed. Is that


correct?"


"At this point, I will rule out the pitot-static system.
 

Those instruments all seem to be consistent."
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Query 4: 
 
Query 5: 
 
Query 6: 
 
Query 7: 
 
Query 8: 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Subject #i1


Query 1: 
 
"With an increase in airspeed, then, the next question is,


is the manifold pressure, what is the trend of the


manifold pressure gauge?" [Why?] "To try to narrow down


is it an engine problem of some sort, am I losing engine


power."


"Also with regard the engine just to get information as


to whether the engine and prop in this case is working


correctly, what is the RPM reading?"


"At this point it seems that the pitot-static system is


correct. The engine seems to be functioning correctly.


The engine seems to be running, producing power."


"My next line of thought would be some sort of control


problem. I was going to ask a question about the trim,


but I'm assuming the trim hasn't been played with. I


just, a new thought came to mind and the new thought is


that if I am decreasing altitude and zero pitch change, in


other words, I haven't evidently put in any control


input to affect the elevator. Well, let me phrase it as a


question. Is there ice, am I receiving ice on the wings


of any sort?" 
"That takes care of that problem." 
"Then let's go back to the controls. Is the pitch trim 
operating correctly, the trim wheel? Has the trim wheel 
changed position?" 
"At this point I'm becoming stumped. Let me ask another 
question which maybe clarifies the initial conditions.


That is, I have zero pitch, meaning that indicates that I


haven't had a forward deflection in the control wheel. I


haven't added down elevator. I'm losing altitude, gaining


airspeed, but have not had a, is the nose pitched over is


what I'm trying to determine at this point. I'm in the


clouds. The only way to determine that is either through


the altitude change, which obviously is down, but the next


thing to check would be the attitude indicator and I'm


assuming that the attitude indicator is indicating level


because the initial condition saying there was no pitch
 

change. Ah! I have just rung a bell! Next question: Is


the vacuum, what is the reading on the vacuum gauge?"


"My problem is with the vacuum system and I'm losing


pressure to my gyroscopic instruments."­

"The first thing I would think about is with the


decreasing altitude and increasing airspeed, that for some
 

reason the plane is starting to go down and I would look


to confirm that right away with the attitude indicator.


There is zero pitch in there. It should show down pitch.


So the first instrument I would look at since it runs off


of suction, would be over at the suction,, to see if it's


producing any vacuum. What does the suction gauge show?"
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Conclusion: 	 "You have a nose-down attitude and the vacuum pump's


gone."


These three protocols illustrate the apparent heterogeneity of the
 

subjects' performances. Subject #1 asked one question while Subject #3


asked eight, yet both arrived at the same conclusion. Subject #17 made


five queries, none of which matched the query made by Subject #1, and


decided he could not determine the cause of the problem with the


available information.


Although data were collected for twenty-six subjects, the following


analysis will be based on only twenty of these pilots. Since the


objective of this study was to model the way pilots use their knowledge


structures (as 	 opposed to whether they have the necessary knowledge),


any subject demonstrating knowledge errors (Task 3) that would prevent


him from solving the problem was deleted from the data set. Four


subjects were deleted for this reason. All four thought the vacuum


system was connected to the static port. One of these-four thought the


altimeter and airspeed indicator were vacuum driven instruments. Another


did not know which instruments were part of the vacuum system and which


were part of the pitot-static system.
 

Not surprisingly, three of these four subjects concluded that it was


impossible to determine the cause of the problem. The fourth decided
 

that the problem was a malfunction of the artificial horizon.


All four of these pilots had between 500 and 2000 hours of flying


experience and were between the ages of 41 and 70. Three had private


pilot licenses and one a commercial license. (All subjects in the


experiment were current instrument rated pilots.)
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A fifth subject was deleted for failing to follow instructions. He


insisted on trying to fly the plane in order to halt the descent, rather


than attempting to determine what was causing the problem.


A sixth subject was eliminated because he misinterpreted the meaning


of the scenario. He interpreted zero pitch to mean that the vertical


speed indicator showed zero and the artificial horizon indicated the


plane's nose on the horizon. This misinterpretation was corrected when


it was discovered (after his first query). He was then allowed to


proceed, and concluded that the cause of the problem could not be


determined.


His comments after hearing the solution to the problem at the end of the


experiment are worth noting:


"I had it [the scenario events] happen. It's interesting that I had


it happen and I didn't relate to it. But, so you were getting a


correct indication from the airspeed and the altimeter. You were


incorrect from the attitude indicator and you were actually in a


turn. If I'd checked my heading, I'd have been alright .. When I
s. 
 
lost the attitude indicator [in the actual flight], it didn't feel


right in the airplane. I felt almost like I was getting vertigo


because I was in IFR conditions and kind of in and out of the clouds


and things just didn't feel right. I was still following that dumb


attitude indicator. Then I noticed I was off my heading, there was


something wrong, and I looked and the suction gauge was showing


zero."


So, the scenario can happen.


Summary Statistics


Of the twenty final subjects, eleven concluded there was a vacuum


system failure (Group A), four stated that the problem was a


malfunctioning artificial horizon (Group B), one decided the problem was


a downdraft (Group C), and three concluded that the problem could not be


diagnosed with the available information (Group D). A final pilot (Group


E) detected the faulty artificial horizon but then concluded that he
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could not diagnose the problem (for reasons that will be explained


later). Certain characteristics of these pilots are summarized in Table


3-1 (by group).


The conclusions of the four groups are summarized in Table 3-2,


along with the pilots' confidence ratings.


In Task 4, pilots were asked what their final conclusion was


regarding the plane's physical orientation (at the end of the Scenario


Task). Fourteen reported that they thought the plane was in a straight


nose-down descent. Five (all in Group A) thought the plane was


descending in a left-bank with the nose down. The pilot in Group C


thought the plane was in a straight and level descent, with the nose on


the horizon.


In the recall task, the question of interest is whether the


pilots remembered the three instrument indications given in the scenario.


Assuming that the probability of retreiving information from memory is


related to the amount of attention it was given during the problem


solving task, this provides evidence of the salience of these three


instrument readings. The results are summarized in Table 3-3. Note


that none of the subjects in Group D recalled the zero pitch


indication. Below is the full response of one pilot in Group D to the
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recall task. He failed to recall the pitch indication despite his


overall high recall performance.


"You were first cleared from Augusta, Maine to Neets intersection


via Victor 23 to Lebanon, New Hampshire at 6000 feet in instrument


conditions at 9:00 a.m. You explained that we were showing an


increase in airspeed, an airspeed of 140 and increasing, an


altitude of 5600 and decreasing and a vertical speed decreasing at


600 feet per minute. I then asked what the manifold pressure was


and you said 22.5 inches, and I asked RPMs. You said it was 2300


RPMs. I asked about the control column and what position it was and


you said it was in the neutral position. I also asked about the


trim tab and he explained to me that the trim tab was set for level
 

flight. I asked him if he could see any icing on the wings and he


said we couldn't see any. I also asked, I think that's basically


all I asked."


A more detailed presentation and discussion of results is given below.
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Table 3-1a. Biographical Data. 
Total Hours of 
Group Flying Experience 
(number of pilots in each category) 
21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 101-300 301-500 501-1000 1001-2000 2001-3000 >20,000 
A 6 2 2 1 0 1 I 5 2 1 1 
B '2 1 1 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 
LO 
(A 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
O0 
D 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0-00 
E1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 * 00 
Group 
Table 3-lb. Biographical Data (continued) 
Hig et Airman Certificate 
Private Commercial Air Transport 
Pilot Flight Instructor 
in Addition to Instrument 
Rat ings nAdao oIsrmn 
.Ratcing and Airplane Singlo-Engitie Land 
Arrflante and 
irplane Powerpiant 
Multi-Engine lnd Mechanic 
A 3 7 1 6 7 1 
3 2 2 0 2 [ 0 
C10 0 0 0 
- 00 
70 
D 0 3 0 3 2 0 r 
E 0 0 1 1 0 
Table 3-1c. Biographical Data (continued) 
Vacuum System 
Fail While Flying? 
Structural icing 
While Flying? 
Piltot Tube 
Icing While Flying? 
Group Yeb No Yes No Yes No 
A 2 9 8 3 4 7 
B 0 4 4 0 1 3 
C 0 1 1 0 0 ! 
0 
E 
1 
0 
3 
1 
3 
I 
1 
0 
0 
0 
4 
I 
00 
-LO 
Lo 2 
Table 3-2. Conclusions at the End of the Scenario Task.


Conclusion


Group Vacuum System Mjlfunccion Artificial Horizon Downdraft Can't Tell 
 
Milfunction 
 
A 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 
0 o 0 3 
2 00 01


*10 indicates the highest level of contidence in a conclusion. I indicates the l9 weC level


of confidence. No rating was stated if the pilot concluded he could not tell what the


problem was. The dashes indicate that no confidence rating was given because the pilot


failed to arrive at a diagnosis.


Confidence 
Rating* 
6 7 8 9 10 2 
1 4 6 
000 1 0 
0­
-
Table 3-3. Recall of the Three Original Instrument Indications (Task 2). 
Group Increasing Airspeed Decreasing Altitude Zero Vitch Number of Subjects 
Ai 10* 11 11 
B 
U 
s 
4 4 4 
I  I I 
3 3 0 
0 
*The other subject did recall a descent indicated-on the vertical speed indicator. 
4 
I 
3 
1 00 
."I 
0 
__mr L0 
Preview


In the analysis to follow, verbal protocols have been used to help


identify patterns in the pilots' information requests and diagnoses.


These patterns have then been used to make inferences about the


underlying mental processes and structures (Gentner and Stevens, 1983).


Some strong assumptions have been made in order to map out a


parsimonious general model of performance. When made, they will be


explicitly stated. The impact of these assumptions upon the final model


will be evaluated at the close of the discussion.


Initially Activiated Frames-

Before asking how frames are activated in the memory of a pilot, we


must first determine what frames are being activated. Three sources of


data are relevant to this question:


1. 	 The spontaneous comments made by the pilot


before making his first query.


2. 	 The first query made by the pilot.


3. 	 The statements made by the pilot immediately


after his first query (either spontaneously or in


response to the experimenter's prod: Why are


you interested in that information?).
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The following assumptions will be made to infer the existence of


particular frames:


1. 	 Frames are prototypes (Aikens, 1983; Sowa, 1984) representing


states of nature (e.g., the plane is descending or


the static port is blocked).


2. 	 Queries (e.g., What does the altimeter show?) are generated


by activated frames. Thus, the questions a pilot asks


should provide insights into states of nature


represented by the activated frames.


3. 	 The activated frame provides the answer to the question:


Why are you interested in that information? (See Schank


and Riesbeck, 1981; Winston, 1984.)


Suppose there exists a frame labeled DESCENT that has a slot


indicating an expected reading on the altimeter. When activated, this


frame directs the pilot to determine whether all expectations are met


(see Figure 3-1). Thus, the instructions for use (Minsky, 1975) direct


the pilot to ask: What does the ALTIMETER show? If the pilot is then


asked why he is interested in this information, he looks at the label for


the activated frame and responds: Because I want to see whether the


plane is in a DESCENT. In this manner,frames are used to generate and


to respond to questions.
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Frame Label: DESCENT


Expectations: DECREASE SHOWN ON ALTIMETER


Instructions for Use: CHECK TO SEE WHETHER


EXPECTATIONS ARE MET


Figure 3-1. Sample Frame.
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Consider 	 the following verbal protocol.
 

Pilot:


"Steadily decreasing altitude. Then I would also assume that


that also includes then a showing a descent on the vertical


'velocity indicator. What does the vertical speed indicator


show?"


Experimenter:


"Why are 	 you interested in that?"


Pilot:


"Is the vertical speed indicator having a reading consistent


with the altimeter to try to narrow down is it a pitot-static


problem?"


From this data, we would infer the existence of a frame labeled


RITOT-STATIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.


Table 3-4 shows the initial queries for the 20 pilots studied.


Based on an analysis of the associated verbal protocols, labels for ten


frames were identified:


1. 	 The Plane is in a DESCENT.


Three subjects appeared to generate their first queries using


this frame. Two asked what the vertical speed indicator was


showing. The other asked about the tachometer reading.


Comments supporting this inference included:


"If it's [the vertical speed indicator's] reading correctly


it'll read whether you're descending."
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"Is it [the plane] going down?"


"We seem to be in a descent."


2. 	 There is a POWER LOSS.


Four pilots activated this frame, three inquiring about the


manifold pressure gauge and one about the tachometer.


Associated comments indicating that the POWER LOSS frame had


been activated included:
 

"What's happening to my power? Very definitely we have a


situation where we seem to be losing power."


"Let's find out what the engine is doing."


"I'm going down and what I have to do is figure out why I'm


going down. I'd look for power."


3. 	 There is ICING.


One subject used this frame to generate a question about the


presence of visilile moisture "because it might be in regards to


icing".


4. 	 There is a PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.


Two subjects requested the reading on the vertical speed


indicator after activating this frame. A third asked about the


outside air temperature.


Consistent statements included the sample subject discussed


earlier who wondered:
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"Is it a pitot-static problem."


Other comments were:


"It appears it could be a problem with the pitot-static


system."


"My first thoughts are that there's definitely going to be a


problem with the pitot-static system."


5. 	 There is STATIC PORT ICING.


This subject inquired about the reading on the outside air


temperature gauge, stating:


"The first thing I would think of would be a problem with the


static port because I'm thinking it could be a possibility of


something freezing."


6. 	 There is a BLOCKED STATIC PORT.


Both of these pilots wondered what would happen to the
 

instrument readings if the alternate static source was opened


because they were concerned with a blocked static port:


"There may be a blockage in the static system that's causing


faulty instrument readings."


[There may 	 be a] "clogged port."


7. 	 There is PITOT TUBE ICING.


This subject asked if the pitot heat was on, saying:
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"I was wondering if there might be in that area [the pitot


tube] icing. Picked up some icing."


8. 	 There is an AIRSPEED INDICATOR MALFUNCTION.


This pilot checked to see whether there was in increase in air


stream noise as:


"This would indicate an increase in airspeed, would back up


that instrument indication."


9. 	 There is a VACUUM SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.


Two pilots asked for the suction gauge reading to:


.see if it 	 is producing any vacuum."


10. 	 My MEMORY may be in ERROR.


Two subjects seem to have a frame dealing with beliefs about


their own limitations and abilities (Norman, 1983). This frame


is concerned with the possibility that the pilot has not


recalled the scenario information correctly. The first query


is intended:


"to make 	 sure I'm right on the scenario."


One subject asked whether the airspeed indicator showed an


increase (it did). The second subject asked whether his


airspeed indicator was showing a decrease.


44


Table 3-4. Initial Queries


What is the reading on the:


Vertical Speed Indicator? 
 
Airspeed Indicator? 
 
Manifold Pressure Gauge? 
 
Tachometer? 
 
Outside Air Temperature Gauge? 
 
Suction Gauge? 
 
What happens if:


The Alternate Static Source is Opened? 
 
Is:


The Pitot Heat On? 
 
There Visible Moisture in the Air? 
 
There an Increase in Wind Noise Outside


the Plane? 
 
Number of Subjects


Asking


4


2


3


2


2


2


2


1


I


1
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The above cited evidence indicates that a variety of frames exist in


pilots' memories. Furthermore, it suggests that the same "stimulus"


(reading of the scenario) can lead to the activation of different frames


in different pilots' memories. In some cases the frames that have been


activated are very similar to one another (e.g., STATIC PORT ICING and


BLOCKED STATIC PORT). In other cases, however, they are radically


different (e.g., VACUUM SYSTEM MALFUNCTION versus 'POWERLOSS).


Initial Activation of Frames


The above analysis identified ten frames that werie used by the


twenty pilots to generate their initial queries. (Not all pilots


activated the same frame.) This subsection addresses the next question:


How were these frames activated? The goal is to better understand the


mental processes that occurred between the time the experimenter began


reading the scenario and the time at which the pilot made his first


query.


By its very nature, protocol analysis provides only fleeting


glimpses into the mental processes occurring within any one subject.


Subjects do not report all of their thoughts. Furthermore, even if two


subjects activate the same set of mental processes, their comments may


provide evidence relevant to different portions of these processes.


Thus, in order to construct a model that is even somewhat complete, it is


desirable to make an assumption:
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Unless evidence to the contrary exists, assume that if two pilots ask the


same question (e.g., What is the reading on the manifold pressure


gauge?), the same mental processes (at least in terms of important


characteristics) produced that query. This assumption is based on an


objective of developing a parsimonious explanation of performance (a


desire to introduce individual differences only when necessary). Its


implications and applications will be made clearer in the following


analyses.


The scenario that was read can be thought of as a set of cues or


clues indicating what the problem was. The first questions to be


addressed are:


1. 	 What are the cues that subjects are attending to?


2. 	 What frames are being activated by these cues?


(Pauker, Gorry, Kassirer and Schwartz, 1976.)


Evidence that a cue has been given attention is the fact that
 

the pilot repeats it out loud. There may, of course, be other cues that


have received attention, but that the pilot has not repeated. Consider


the following comments made by pilots after hearing the scenario:


S#1. 	 "The first I would think about is with decreasing altitude and


increasing airspeed, that for some reason the plane is


starting to go down."


S#2. "It would appear that he's descending."


S#5. "If increasing airspeed, altimeter unwinding, those are pretty


good clues he's descending."


S#6. "I'm going down and what I have to do is figure out why I'm


going down. I'd look for power."
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These protocols contain evidence regarding the activation of two frames


(DESCENT and POWER LOSS) resulting from attention to two cues (increasing


airspeed and decreasing altitude). Based on this data alone, the most


parsimonious model is one in which:


1. 	 Two cues, an increase shown on the airspeed indicator and


a decrease shown on the altimeter, activate the DESCENT frame.


2. 	 The Instructions for Use in the DESCENT frame direct the pilot


to look for possible causes of descent, resulting in activation


of the POWER LOSS frame (see Figure 3-2).


The comments by Subjects #1 and #5 both provide evidence regarding


their attention to these two external cues and the activation of the
 

DESCENT frame. For the purpose of developing a genetal model, it is


assumed that Subject #2 also attended to both cues and activated the


DESCENT FRAME, even though complete evidence to support this is lacking.


(There is no contradictory evidence.) Subject #6 provides evidence that


two frames were activated, the DESCENT frame followed by the POWER LOSS


frame. It is assumed that he attended to the two external cues shown in


Figure 3-2, even though he provides no evidence of this (i.e., it is


assumed that his behavior was like that of the other subjects since no
 

evidence to the contrary exists).


This type of analysis will now be applied to the data for all twenty


subjects. The data to be used for the following analysis will be the
 

spontaneous comments of a pilot before his first query, his first query,


and his comments immediately after the first query (spontaneous or in
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response to the prod: Why are you interested in that information?).


Thus, the data to be used consists of all statements made after the


reading of the scenario, but before the asking of a second query by the


pilot.


Nose-Down DESCENT. Figure 3-3(a-d) shows the model constituents


supported by the data for each of seven subjects. Associated comments


are also quoted to indicate the support for model constituents. When the


data for a given subject provides no evidence in support of a given model


constituent, that constituent has not been filled in.


Figure 3-3 indicates that these seven subjects activated


three types of frames (DESCENT, POWER LOSS and VACUUM SYSTEM


MALFUNCTION). A total of six variants on these three types of frames


was observed.
 

The general model of performance assumes that all seven subjects


activated the DESCENT frame first because they focused their attention on


two cues, a decrease on the altimeter and an increase on the airspeed


indicator. When asked later (Task 4) what they believed the plane's


orientation to be at the beginning of the scenario task, all seven


subjects stated that it was in a straight, nose-down descent. Comments


included:


"Descending like this [straight descent shown with hand] in a


nose-down attitude."


"Descending straight ahead, slight nose-down."


"Straight, nose-down."
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External Cues 
Increase on 
Airspeed Indicator 
Decrease on 
Altimeter 
Frame Label: DESCENT 
Causes: POWER LOSS 
Instructions for Use: 
CHECK TO SEE WHETHlER 
CAUSE IS PRESENT 
Frame Label: POWER LOSS 
Expectations: DECREASE ON MANIFOLD 
PRESSURE GAUGE 
Instructions for Use: 
CHECK TO SEE WIETHEIR 
EXPECTATIONS ARE MET 
C> 
00 
00 
0 
Figure 3-2. A Partial Model of the Frame Activation Process. 
External Cues* 
Frame Label: 
Expectations: 
Instructions: 
DESCENT 
DESCENT INDICATED ON VERTICAL SPEED INDICATOR 
CHECK TO SEE WHETHER EXPECTATIONS ARE MET 
00 
Un Supporting Comments: S02 
S10 
-
-
"It would appear that [the plane's 1 descending.What does the vertical spned indicator show?" 
"*What does the vertical speed indicators show?" [Why?) 
"If it's reading correctly it will read whether you are 
descending." 
0 
'0­
0 
Figure 3-3a. Subjects #2 and #10. 
(Note: No evidence was present regarding external cues. 
Therefore, this part of the system was not filled in for 
Subjects 02 a6d #10). 
* External Cues 
Frame Label: 0Ecewr Frame Label: POWER LOSS 
Causes: [OWER LOSS 
Instructions: CHECK TO SEE 
WHETIER CAUSE 
IS PRESENT 
Expectations: 
Instructions: 
DECREASE ON 
MANIFOLD PRESSURE 
GAUGE 
CHECK TO SEE WHETHER 
EXPECTATIONS ARE MET 
_____ ____ ___0 0 
n ;X3 
Supporting Comments; S#4 - "I'm going down and what I have to do is figure out why 
I'm going down. I'd look for power. What is the manifold 
pressure?" 
C)' 
r­
S#6 - "What's the manifold pressure read?" 
"Find out what the engine is doing." 
[Why?] 
Figure 3-3b. Subjects #4 and #6. 
Externl Cues


Frame Label: DESCENT 	 Frame Label:


Expectations; CMANGE 	 IN TACIHOMETER 
READING


Instructions: CHECK TO SEE WHETHER 
EXPECTATIONS ARE NET


Supporting Comments: 	 "What is the RPM?" (Why?] 
 
"We seem to be in a descent."


rFigure 3-3c. Subject #18. 
Art is probable that this subject has activated the POWER LOSS


frame as a possible cause of DESCENT. There is no direct evidence


of this In the verbal protocol, however. Consequently, these


portions of the frames have been left blank.
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External Cues 
Decrease Frame Label: 
On> 
Altimeter Expectation: 
Increase 
On Instructions: 
Airspeed 

Indicator 

Supporting Comments: 

-_nincreasing 

DESCENT 

PITCH DOWN 

ON ARTIFICIAL 

HORIZON 

CHECK TO 'SEE WHETHER 
EXPECTATIONS ARE MET. 

IF NOT, ACTIVATE THE 

ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENT 

MALFUNCTION FRAME 
Frame Label: 
Expectations: 
Instructions: 
VACUUM SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 
LOW READING ON SUCTION 
GAUGE 
CHECK TO SEE WHETHER 
EXPECTATIONS ARE MET 
00 
Op 
"The first Itwould think about is with the decreasing altitude and 

airspeed, that for some reason the plane is starting 

to go down and I would look to confirm that right away with the 

attitude indicator [the artifical horizon]. There is zero pitch 

in there. It should show down pitch. So the first instrument I F­

would look at, since it runs off of suction, would be over at 

the suction gauge, to see if its producing any vacuum." 

"If increasing airspeed, altimeter unwinding, those are pretty good 

cues he's descending and that he's got a nose-down attitude. But 

since it's not being indicated on the gyro horizon there's a pretty 

good chance that he's lost his vacuum. What does the vacuum gauge show?" 

Figure 3-3d. Subjects #1 and #5. 

Figure 3(a-d). Activation of Initial Frames for Seven Subjects Focusing on a Nose-own Descent. 

0 
This assumption makes sense in terms of the DESCENT frame as defined. If


the plane is in a straight nose-down descent, the airspeed will


increase and the altitude will decrease.


Having activated the (nose-down) DESCENT frame,, four subjects
 

elected to "test the hypothesis" that this was the correct frame (was a


valid model of the state of nature) by checking to see whether the


instrument indications were consistent with this model. A descending


plane should show a DESCENT INDICATED ON VERTICAL SPEED INDICATOR, so two


subjects checked this expectation (see Figure 3-3a). The other two


subjects checking for instrument indications looked for an


indication of PITCH DOWN ON ARTIFICIAL HORIZON (see Figure 3-3d). Since


this information was available in their (short-term) memories, they


answered the question without requesting this information from the


experimenter. This expectation was found to be invalid (the artificial


horizon showed zero pitch), suggesting the possibility of an instrument


failure (specifically, a failure of the artifical horizon). As a result,


the frame labeled VACUUM SYSTEM MALFUNCTION was activated, since such a


problem could cause a false reading on the artificial horizon. This


frame instructed them to CHECK TO SEE WHETHER the associated EXPECTATIONS


ARE MET producing their first query: What is the reading on the


suction gauge?


The remaining three subjects (Figures 3b and c) took a different


approach. They assumed the plane was in a (nose-down) DESCENT and started
 

looking for possible causes of such a descent. They therefore activated


the POWER LOSS frame, which instructed them to test for power loss,


checking for expected readings on either the manifold pressure gauge or


the tachometer.
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Figure 4 summarizes the alternative questions considered by


these seven subjects during their efforts to generate an initial query.


Thus far, then, we have developed the following model:


1. 	 Frames represent prototypical states of nature. (Labels for


ten such states have been identified.)


2. 	 A frame is activated either by data that has been collected or


by another frame that has been activated (i.e., by some set of


enabling events). A number of such enabling events have been


identified for particular frames.


3. 	 Once activated, a frame can be used to generate a query in


order to seek additional information.


4. 	 An activated frame can be used to answer the question: Why are


you interested in that information?


5. 	 The Instructions for Use in frames are based on three lines
 

of reasoning:


a. 	 If a frame is a valid representation of the state of


nature, (e.g., nose-down DESCENT), then the expected


readings on certain instruments (listed by that frame)


should be present. To assess that frame's


validity, the pilot should ask for the readings on


those instruments.


b. 	 If an instrument reading is inconsistent with the


hypothesized state of nature (i.e., the activated frame),


that instrument may be malfunctioning.


c. 	 If a frame is a valid representation of the state of


nature, then something must have caused that state of
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Actual First Query

Change in Reading

on Manifold pressure

timterChange 
in Reading 
(Nose-Down) 
 Power Loss?
 on Tachometer?
 
Low Reading on 
Pitch- Dow Va uu 
Suction Gauge? 00 
"on W4 syte 
Increase oHorizon? 
 Descent Indicated

Airspeed Indicator 9 	 on Vertical Speed

Indicator? 
 I 
Initial Queries for Seven Subjects Activating the (Nose-Down) DESCENT Frame.

Figure 3-4. Alternate Paths Leading to 
 
nature to occur. Assume the frame is valid and look


for possible causes.


6. 	 Subjects differ in terms of:


a. 	 The instructions contained in particular frames.


b. 	 The slot-fillers within a frame that are (first) acted


on when following an instruction (check manifold pressure


for expected reading vs. check tachometer).


In addition, the frame system developed thus far indicates that subjects


may not use all of the available cues or data in order to activate an


initial frame. The scenario that was read stated twice in a row:


"The instruments indicate an increase in airspeed,


a steadily decreasing altitude, and zero pitch."
 

Yet the evidence reviewed above indicates that these pilots initially


focused their attention on the indicated increase in airspeed and


decrease in altitude. These two cues are both indicative of a nose-down


DESCENT. The third instrument indication (zero pitch) is inconsistent


with this hypothesis. (If the plane is descending with increasing


airspeed, the nose should be pitch down. If the pitch is zero and the


airspeed is increasing, the plane should not show a decrease in


altitude.)


What, then, were the determinants of attention for these subjects?
 

What made the airspeed and altitude information more salient initially?


Three possible causes come to mind:


1. 	 Studies of human perception and attention suggest that:


"the perceptual system actively attempts to


reconstruct the external environment in an effort to cope


with the massive volume of information it continually
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encounters ... the 'match-mismatch' notion clearly 
identifies the unexpected as a, if not the, crucial 
determinant of attention" (Dember and Warm, 1979, 
p. 131).


Extending the same concept to the "perception" or comprehension


of text (the scenario), it is predictable that, in this


problem, the indications regarding airspeed and altitude should


be more salient than that of pitch. Prior to hearing about


these instruments indications, the subject was told that the


plane has been cruising for 15 minutes at a constant altitude.


Thus, a mental model or reconstruction of the situation would


indicate a constant airspeed, no change in altitude, and zero


pitch. This means that two of the cues, an increase in


airspeed and a decrease in altitude are unexpected and hence


predicted to be highly salient. The third cue, zero pitch, is


consistent with the constructed mental model, and therefore not


as likely to attract attention.


2. 	 Studies of human word recognition suggest that specific


feature detectors (letters, shapes, etc.) are activated when a


word is presented and that these feature detectors in turn


activate word detectors (Morton, 1970; Rummelhart and Siple,
 

1974). Meyer, Schvaneveldt, and Ruddy (1975) have suggested


that 	 when a word detector is activated, it may prime its


associated feature detectors. The net result is that if a new


word with some of the same feature detectors is presented,


these feature detectors will fire faster than usual (i.e.,
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these features will be noticed more rapidly, will be more


salient) and the new word will be identified sooner.
 

The same type of process could occur during the reading of


the scenario.- The -pilot has teen tod that a problem exists


and that he must diagnose its cause. It is quite plausible


that, before listening to the scenario, the pilot speculates on


possible problems. An unplanned descent is a common problem


(relatively speaking) that is also very serious. Hence, it is


a problem that the pilot is likely to conjecture about prior to


hearing the scenario. Such a conjecture about DESCENT could


prime associated triggers (such as decreasing altitude),
 

increasing their salience.


3. 	 Bower, Black and Turner (1979) state that:
 

"according to schema theory the understander must commit


himself to some initial schema in order to understand


sentences; yet the most diagnostic information may not


appear in the text until later. That is, one can be lead


down 'garden path' stories" (p. 340).


Given the predicted salience of the increasing airspeed and


decreasing altitude (the unexpected events) and the fact that
 

these two cues are presented first, the pilot may already have


been in a DESCENT down the "garden path" before hearing about


the zero pitch.


If the activated frame (DESCENT) instructed him to


consider the reading on the vertical speed indicator (Subjects


#2 and #10) or to consider a possible power loss (Subjects #4,


#6, and #18), the information about zero pitch might


easily have been ignored as irrelevant.
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If, on the other hand, the activated frame instructed the pilot


to consider the reading on the artificial horizon (Subjects #1


and #5), the salience of the third instrument indication, zero


pitch, would be increased and the cue would likely be noticed.


In order to avoid information overload, then, the pilots may have


used these types of mechanisms to focus attention selectively on some


subset of the cues available in the scenario.


Nose-Level DESCENT. The seven pilots discussed above reported


that they thought the plane was in a nose-down descent. Subject #16,


on the other hand, thought the plane was in a:


"straight and level descent, nose on the horizon"


(Task 4).


He proceeded to check for possible causes of descent after activating­

the frame for Nose-level DESCENT (see Figure 3-5).


Subject #13 also activated the DESCENT frame as evidenced by his
 

comment that "we are basically in a situation where we are losing


altitude." The evidence indicates that he, like Subject #16, activated a


frame representing Nose-Level DESCENT. When asked about his impression


of the plane's physical orientation (Task 4) he stated that initially he


thought:
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External Cues


Frame Label: DESCENT (NOSE-LEVEL)* Frame Label; POWER LOSS


Causes: POWER LOSS Expectations; CHANGE IN TACHOMETER
~READING 
CHECK TO SEE

Instructions: 
WHETHER CAUSE Instructions; CHECK TO SEE WHETHER 
IS PRESENT EXPECTATIONS ARE MET 
Supporting Comments: "Start checking the power instruments.


What does the tachometer show?"


AThis label is supported by the data from Task 4 (see text).


Figure 3-5. Subject #16.


"the plane was descending in a straight and level


cruise situation but that I'm losing altitude. Nose on the


the horizon."


This recollection is consistent with his statements at the beginnning of


the problem solving task:


S#13: "What is the manifold pressure?"


Experimenter: "Why are you interested in that?"


S#13: "Very definitely we have a situation where we seem to be


losing power. The fact that we're decreasing in altitude
 

and our airspeed is remaining steady indicates to me that


we are basically in a situation where we are losing


altitude. I would expect the airspeed to stay fairly


constant if we're coming down."


These three conditions (losing power, decreasing altitude and constant


airspeed) are consistent with the behavior of a plane that is in a


nose-level descent due to a loss of power.


These data would suggest, then, that this pilot activated a frame


for Nose-Level DESCENT by attending to two cues: a decrease shown on the


altimeter and zero pitch shown on the artificial horizon. Having


activated this frame, an associated default value (constant airspeed) was
 

also activated, in spite of the fact that it contradicted information


given in the scenario (see Figure 3-6).


What is even more interesting is the fact that immediately before he


asked for the reading on the manifold pressure gauge (see the quotation


above), Subject #13 said:
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External Cues 
Decrease Frame Label: DESCENT (NOSE-LEVEL) Frame Label; POWER LOSS 
on 
Altimeter Causes: POWER LOSS Expectations: DECREASE OF MANIFOLD 
PRESSURE GAUGE 
Expectations; CONSTANT AIRSPEED 
Instuctions; CHECK TO SEE WHETHER 
Instructions: CHECK TO SEE EXPECTATIONS ARE NET 
Zero Pitch WHETHER CAUSE IS 
on PRESENT 
Artificial 
Horizon 
Figure 3-6. Activation of Initial Frames for Subject #13. 
"Let me get this straight now. Increasing airspeed, decreasing


altitude and you mean pitch as far as being above or below the


horizon based on the attitude [artificial] horizon." [This was a


statement, not a question. No response was given.]


Thus, this pilot heard all three cues initially. Then, paying
 

attention to the pitch and altitude information, he activated the


Nose-Level DESCENT frame. He also activated this frame's default value


for the reading on the airspeed indicator (constant airspeed), distorting


his memory. He believed (stated) at this point that the scenario


indicated a constant airspeed. All of this occurred in a time period of


less than one minute.


Having activated the Nose-Level DESCENT frame, Subject #13 then


followed its instructions and checked for a possible cause of descent.


This resulted in the activation of the POWER LOSS frame, which generated


his first query: "What is the manifold pressure?" (See Figure 3-6.)


Subject #11 also initially activated the Nose-level DESCENT


frame. His recollection (Task 4) that:


"my first impression was level descent"


is consistent with his statements immediately after hearing the


scenario:


"The first thing he should do is check his power. ... If power has


not changed, then in level flight his airspeed wouldn't change. To


make sure I'm right on the scenario, what does the airspeed indictor
 

show?"


Unlike Subject #13, this pilot did not distort his memory when the


Nose-Level DESCENT frame was activated. He noted the possible


inconsistency between the expected airspeed and his recall of the
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scenario-given airspeed, and checked to make sure his recall was correct


before continuing (see Figure 3-7). (After learning that the airspeed was


in fact increasing he rejected the Nose-Level DESCENT frame in favor of


the Nose-Down DESCENT frame.)


MEMORY ERROR. Subject #9 also activated a MEMORY ERROR frame. He


asked:


"You say he's decreasing airspeed?"


How he distorted his recall (the indicated airspeed was increasing) or


how he arrived at the MEMORY ERROR frame cannot be determined from his
 

data. After asking the above question and correcting his memory


error, he activated the Nose-Down DESCENT frame.
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External 
Cues 
Frame Label: DESCENT (NOSE-LEVEL) 
Expectations: CONSTANT AIRSPEED 
Instructions: CHECK TO SEE WHETHER 
EXPECTATIONS ARE MET. 
IF NOT, CHECK FOR A 
POSSIBLE RECALL 
(MEMORY) ERROR. 
Frame Label: 
Instructions: 
MEMORY ERROR 
DETERMINE WiIETHER 
THE INSTRUMENT IN 
QUESTION REALLY HAS 
TilE RECALLED READING. 
00 
Figure 3-7. Initially Activated Frames for Subject #11. r k 
£ITOT-STA-TIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION. The subjects discussed above


activated a DESCENT frame. The seven subjects to be discussed next,


however, initially focused their attention on the possibility of a


PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.


Figure 3-8(a-e) shows the frame system constituents supported by the
 

data from these seven subjects. 'Again, comments are provided to indicate


the data supporting the proposed model.


The evidence suggests that these subjects activated the PITOT-STATIC


SYSTEM MALFUNCTION frame because they noticed an unexpected change in the


readings on two pitot-static system instruments, the altimeter and the


airspeed indicator. Their attention appeared to focus on the fact that


there was an unexpected change. They did not appear to consider whether


the stated changes were actually consistent with a pitot-static system


malfunction (they were not).


There is again evidence of memory distortions once the PITOT STATIC


SYSTEM MALFUNCTION frame was activated:


"To be honest with you, at first I thought you said the airspeed was


decreasing and the altitude was showing a decrease, you know, a loss


of altitude. So I was thinking that those were exactly backwards."


"When we first started the problem, I misunderstood the


indications... I thought you said the opposite, like the airspeed


was increasing, and the altitude was increasing. That's what made


me go to the static source at first" (data from Task 4).
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External


Cues


Change 
 
on 
 
Airspeed 
 
Change 
 
on 
Altimeter 
 
Zero 
 
Pitch on 
 
Artificial.A> 
 
Horizon


Frame Label: PITOT- Frame Label; BLOCKED Frame Label: 
STATIC SYSTEM PITOT TUBE 
ALFUNCION Expectations: 
Iit Causes: ICING Instructions; 
Causes: BLOCKED 
PITOT TUBE Instructions: CHECK TO 
SEE WHETHER 
Instructions: CHECK TO CAUSE IS PRESENT 
SEE WHETHER 
CAUSE IS 
PRESENT 
Supporting Comments: 
 
"The airspeed and the altimeter are both part of the pitot-static system and if he's 
 
been using a constant power and a constant attitude, power plus attitude is equal to 
 
there should have been no change in performance. Is the pitot heat on?"
performance so 
 
[Why? "I was wondering if there might be in that area icing. Picking up some icing." 
 
Figure 3-8a. Subject #14.


PITOT TUBE ICING


PITOT HEAT OFF


CHECK TO SEE WHETHER


EXPECTATIONS ARE NET


00
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0
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External 
Cues 
Frame Label: PITOT-STATIC 
SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 
Causes: BLOCKED PITOT 
TUBE 
Instructions: CHECK TO SEE 
WIIETIHER CAUSE 
IS PRESENT 
Frame Label: BLOCKED PITOT 
TUBE 
Ca s IAIRCauses; ICING 
Instructions: CHECK TO SEE 
WHETHER CAUSE 
IS PRESENT 
Frame Label; 
fExpectations; 
Instructions: 
PITOT TUBE ICING 
LOW READING ON OUTSIDE 
TEMPERATURE GAUGE 
CHECK TO SEE WHETHER 
EXPECTATIONS ARE MET 
)O 0 
o 
Supporting Comments: 
C "My first thoughts are that there's definitely going to be a problem with the pitot-static system.Wat's the outside air temperature reading?" (Answer given: 370F.J "There's still a possibility 
of icing build-up so part of the way to determine that would be to flip on the pitot heat." 
Figures 3-8b. Subject #20. 
External


Cues


Frame Label: PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 
Decrease 
on Ext Expectations: INCONSISTENT READING ON VERTICAL 
Altimeter SPEED INDICATOR


Instructions: CHECK TO SEE WHETHER EXPECTATIONS


ARE MET 
Supporting Comments: 
 0O 
S113 - "Steadily decreasing altitude. Then I would also 
-0


assume that includes then a showing a descent on the 0


vertical speed indicator having a reading consistent 0


with the altimeter. To try to narrow down is it a PO


pitot-staric system problem." to a


S#19 - "Number one, look at the vertical speed indicator. 40 
It appears that it could be a problem with the 
- re 
pitot-static system." 
Figure 3-8c. Subjects #3 and #19.


External


Cues


Frame Label; 	 PITOT-STATIC Frame Label: BLOCKED Frame Label; STATIC PORT ICING


SYSTEM STATIC PORT


MALFUNCTION Expectations: LOW READING ON


CD> Causes: ICING 	 OUTSIDE AIR
Causes: BLOCKED STATIC PORT 	 TEMPERATURE GAUGE 
Instructions: CHECK TO 
Instructions: CHECK TO SEE SEE WHETHER Instructions: CHECK TO SEE 
WUETHER CAUSE CAUSE IS PRESENT WHETHER EXPECTATIONS 
IS PRESENT ARE MET 
Supporting Comments: 
 0 0


"My first thing that I would think of would be something to do with either the static port ­
or the pitot tube since those instruments, the airspeed and the static port are different, O 
so I would think, also, the altimeter I know is getting its reading from the static port O 
so the first thing I would think of would be a problem with the static port. What is the 	 ;U 
outside air temperature?" [Why?) "'Cause I'm thinking it could be a possibility of something 
 
freezing."


Figure 3-8d. Subject #8.


0 
External 

Cues 

Frame Label: 	 Frame Label: BLOCKED STATIC PORT 

k 
Expectations: 	 INSTRUMENT READINGS RETURN TO 

NORMAL IF ALTERNATE STATIC SOURCE 
OPENED 

Instructions; 	 CHECK TO SEE WHETHER EXPECTATIONS ARE 
MET 
Zero Pitch on _ 

Artificial 

Horizon 

Supporting Comments; 

S#12 - "What happens if I open the alternate static source?" [Why?! "I suspect from 
what is happening, since there is no pitch change, that there may be a blockage 
in the system that's causing faulty instrument readings. I don't know yet what 
but that's my first indication." 
S#17 - "What if I open my alternate static source?" [Why?) "To see if I have a clogged port." 

Figure 3-8e. Subjects #12 and #17. 

*To be consistent with subject #8 (see Figure 8d) the frame for BLOCKED STATIC PORT should be 

accessed through another fram (PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION). 

Figure 8(a-e). Activation of Initial Frames for Seven Subjects Focusing on a Picot-Static 

System Malfunction. 
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Thus, because they had activated the PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION


frame, the pilots reconstructed their memories (Zechmeister and Nyberg,


1982) to be consistent with such a state of nature.


Figure 3-9 summarizes the alternative mental processes exhibited


by these seven pilots while selecting their initial queries.


ICING. Like three of the pilots who activated the PITOT-STATIC


SYSTEM MALFUNCTION frame, Subject #7 thought that icing was causing the


problem. We cannot tell, however, whether he was concerned with icing of


some particular part of the plane:


"You're in IFR conditions, so was there any visible moisture


outside?" [Why?] "Because it might be in regards to icing."


AIRSPEED INDICATOR MALFUNCTION. Subject #15 asked:


"Is there an increase in noise outside the plane?" [Why?]


"That would indicate an increase in airspeed, would back up that


instrument indication."


These comments make it clear that the pilot was attending to the


indicated increase in airspeed, but provide little other insights into


his mental processes.


Summary. The goal of this subsection on the Initial Activation of


Frames was to describe the mental processes that generated pilots' first


queries. If we look at the information requests above, we see one
 

"stimulus" (the scenario plus associated instructions) resulting in ten
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different initial responses (first queries) from a total of twenty


subjects (see Table 3-4). Two general questions arise:
 

1. 	 Why does a particular subject request a given piece


of information?


2. 	 Why do not all subjects ask for the same piece of information?


The frame system model outlined thus far indicates that there is a


substantial amount of information processing that occurs before a pilot


makes his first query. Individuals differ in the cues to which they


attend while listening to the scenario, in the lines of reasoning that


they apply once a frame has been activated, and in the slot-fillers


contained in a given frame (Expectations: DESCENT INDICATED ON VERTICAL


SPEED INDICATOR vs. Expectations: PITCH DOWN ON ARTIFICIAL HORIZON).


They may also distort their memory to be consistent with the activated


frame. These differences canaccount for the great heterogeneity found


in the initial queries.


Subjects activating the Nose-Down DESCENT frame (see Figure 3-3)


were attending to two cues, an indicated increase in airspeed and


decrease in altitude. Those activating the PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM


MALFUNCTION frame (see Figure 3-8), on the other hand, appeared to focus


on the information that there was some unexpected change in the readings


on the airspeedindicator and the altimeter. They did not attend to the


specific directions of these changes when activating this MALFUNCTION


frame. Such differences in cue selection led to radically different


questions, ranging from queries about a POWER LOSS to tests for a BLOCKED


STATIC PORT.
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Figure 3-9. 	 Alternative Paths Leading to Initial Queries for


Seven Subjects Activating the PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM


MALFUNCTION Frame. 
Even when two pilots activated the same initial frame (such as


Nose-Down DESCENT) they sometimes applied different heuristics to further


evaluate that frame. Subjects #2 and #10 activated the DESCENT frame and


tested its validity by looking at the vertical speed indicator for the


expected reading. Subjects #4, #6, and #18 also activated the DESCENT


frame, but checked for a possible cause of DESCENT, a POWER LOSS. Thus,


the application of different "Instructions for Use" resulted in


significantly different queries.


Finally, even if two pilots activated the same frame and applied the


same instructions, they still sometimes asked different questions.


Subjects #6 and #18 were both concerned with POWER LOSS, but one checked


the manifold pressure gauge for the expected reading while the other


checked the tachometer. (The reading on the tachometer is actually


uninformative since the Cherokee Arrow has a constant speed prop.)


Organization of the Knowledge Structures
 

The previous analysis identified ten different frame labels, based


on the pilots' first queries and associated statements. Applying the


same form of analysis to the remainder of the verbal protocols, we find


evidence for eight additional frames:
 

1. ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION


"Because there could be a malfunction with the artificial


horizon."


"I'm thinking that the artificial horizon's not working."
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2. STRUCTURAL ICING (WINGS)


"Is there ice on the wings?" [Why?]


"It gives you more drag and it adds weight."


"Is- there ice, am I receiving ice on the wings?"


3. TRIM WHEEL MISPOSITIONED


"Let's check trim to see if had disturbed it, although I should


see something on the pitch attitude indicator if I did have a


problem with trim. What is the position of the trim tab?"


4. DOWNDRAFT


"At 6000 feet you could have turbulence which would cause a


problem with maintaining altitude ... could indicate whether


it's turbulent air, downdrafts."


5. GEAR DOWN


"If the landing gear's down for some reason..."


"Is the gear extended?"
 

6. FLAPS DOWN


"Are the flaps down? If the plane is trimmed for cruise


flight, clean, then if you induce any drag that could take care


of your airspeed and start a descent for us."


7. BANKED PLANE
 

"What does the artificial'horizon show?" [Why?] "Are we in a


bank?"


8. YOKE MISPOSITIONED


"If the pilot has decreased backpressure, pushed the elevator


forward.. .which causes the nose to go down... What is the yoke


position currently?"
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All of the queries made by the twenty pilots can be accounted for in


terms of attempts to access or to test the validity of the eighteen


frames that have been defined. Below is ai exhaustive mapping of the
 

interrelationships among these frames and the queries they generated.


This 	 mapping is consistent with all of the data. Not all pilots that


activated a given frame made all of the queries listed. Also, the


ordering is arbitrary in the listings of slot-fillers. Note that there


are seven high-level frames (indicated by Roman numerals) in this frame


system. (V and VI may not be high-level frames, but the available


evidence did not establish at which lower levels they would belong.)


I. 	 NOSE-DOWN DESCENT


A. 	 Causes:


1. POWER LOSS


Queries: Check for Expected Readings From:


a. 	 Manifold Pressure Gauge


b. 	 Tachometer


c. 	 Oil Pressure Gauge


d. 	 Oil Temperature Gauge


e. 	 Effect of an Increase in Power Using the Throttle.


2. 	 STRUCTURAL ICING


Queries: Check for


a. 	 Visible Ice on Wings


b. 	 Visible Ice on Windshield


c. 	 Visible Ice on Temperature Probe


d. 	 Reading on Outside Air Temperature Gauge


e. 	 Visible Moisture in Air.


3. 	 DOWNDRAFT


Queries: Check


a. 	 Weather Reports


b. 	 Whether Air (Ride) Feels Rough


c. 	 Outside Air Temperature Gauge


d. 	 Mountainous Terrain.


4. 	 GEAR DOWN


Queries: Check


a. 	 Gear Down Light.


5. 	 TRIM WHEEL MISPOSITIONED


Queries: Check


a. 	 Trim Wheel Position


b. 	 Artificial Horizon.
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6. 	 YOKE MISPOSITIONED (DECREASED BACKPRESSURE)
 

Causes:


a. ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION
 

Queries: Check


a. 	 Yoke Position.


7. 	 FLAPS DOWN


Queries: Check


a. 	 Flap Switch Position
 

b. 	 (Visible) Position of Flap.


8. 	 BANKED PLANE


Causes:


a. 	 YOKE MISPOSITIONED (LEFT TURN)


Causes:


1. ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION
 

Expectations/Queries:


a. 	 Bank shown on turn and bank indicator


b. 	 Bank shown on artificial horizon.
 

B. 	 Expectations/Queries: Check for


1. 	 Nose-down on artificial horizon


2. 	 Descent shown on altimeter


3. Descent shown on vertical speed indicator


4., Increase shown on airspeed indicator


5. 	 If backpressure applied to yoke, instrument indications
 

of descent will cease or be reduced in magnitude.


II. 	 NOSE-LEVEL DESCENT


A. 	 Causes:


1. 	 POWER LOSS


Queries: Check for Expected Readings From:
 

a. 	 Manifold Pressure Gauge


b. 	 Tachometer


c. 	 Oil Pressure Gauge


d. 	 Oil Temperature Gauge.


2. 	 STRUCTURAL ICING


Queries: Check for


a. 	 Visible Ice on Wings
 

b. 	 Reading on Outside Air Temperature Gauge.


3. 	 GEAR DOWN


Queries: Check


a. 	 Gear Down Light.


4. 	 FLAPS DOWN
 

Queries: Check


a. 	 Flap Switch Position.


5. 	 BANKED PLANE


Queries: Check


a. 	 Artificial Horizon.


B. 	 Expectations/Queries: Check for


1. 	 Zero pitch on artificial horizon


2. 	 Descent on altimeter


3. 	 Descent on vertical speed indicator
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4. 	 Constant airspeed
 

5. If 	 backpressure applied to yoke, instrument


indications of descent will cease or be


reduced in magnitude.


III. 	 PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION


A. 	 Causes:


1. 	 BLOCKED STATIC PORT


a. 	 Causes: 1. ICED STATIC PORT


Expectations/Queries: Check


a. 	 Outside air temperature


gauge.


b. 	 Expectations/Queries: Check


1. 	 To see if instrument readings return to normal


after alternate static source is opened.


2. 	 BLOCKED PITOT TUBE


a. 	 Causes: 1. PITOT TUBE ICING


Expectations/Queries: Check


a.. To 	 see if pitot heat is off
 

b. 	 Outside air temperature


gauge.


B. 	 Expectations/Queries: Check


1. 	 To see if the readings on the altimeter, vertical


speed indicator and airspeed indicator are


inconsistent with one another.


IV. 	 ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION
 

A. 	 Causes


1. 	 VACUUM SYSTEM MALFUNCTION


a. 	 Expectations/Queries: Check for


1. 	 Low reading on suction gauge


2. 	 (Possible) Inconsistent readings on the


artificial horizon and directional gyro as


compared with the turn and bank indicator,


magnetic compass and course deviation indicator.


B. 	 Expectations/Queries: Check


1. 	 For the effect of a left turn input (with yoke)


on the artificial horizon.


V. AIRSPEED 	 INDICATOR MALFUNCTION


A. 	 Expectations/Queries: Check


1. For an increase in air stream noise outside cockpit.


VI. 	 ICING


A. 	 Expectations/Queries: Check for


1. 	 Visible moisture in the air


2. 	 Visible ice'on the wings


3. 	 Visible ice on the temperature probe.


VII. 	 MEMORY ERROR


A. Expectations/Queries: Check the accuracy of recall for:


1. 	 The airspeed indicator.
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It is clear that such a frame system could be expanded to include


more levels (POWER LOSS is caused by FUEL STARVATION, INDUCTION ICING,


etc.) And additional hierarchies. These additional frames are


unnecessary, however, to Account for the data from this experiment.


Each frame contains two slots, one for causes of that state of


nature and one for expected instrument readings and observable


conditions (visible ice on wings, etc.) if that state of nature exists.


Each of these slots contains one or more entries (a list of possible


causes or expected readings). Figure 3-10 summarizes this basic frame


structure.
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Figure 3-10. Frame Structure. 
Searching for Goal-States


In this experiment, the pilots were told that:


1. 	 There is a problem.


2. The goal is to determine the cause of the problem.


In terms of the proposed knowledge structures, this goal can be


translated as follows: Complete the sentence:


1. 	 The problem is X;


2. The cause of the problem is Y;


where X is a Frame Label belonging to some "Problem" set:


Problem = [NOSE-DOWN-DESCENT,


POWER LOSS, etc.]


and Y is one of the slot-fillers for the "Causes" slot in the frame with


label X.


Fault diagnosis can be described as a task of:


1. 	 Hypothesizing the presence of a particular problem


(e.g., NOSE-DOWN DESCENT).


2. 	 Deciding whether this problem exists
 

(e.g., checking the vertical speed indicator for a descent,


etc.).


3. 	 Determining the cause of this problem (e.g., checking for


POWER LOSS, DOWNDRAFT, etc.).


Because the problem may actually be a causally-connected chain of events


it may be necessary to repeat this task in a recursive fashion until the


initiating cause is discovered.
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This problem-solving process can be illustrated by looking at the


data for Subject #1. (See the beginning of the Results and Discussion


section for his verbal protocol.)


Step 1.


Hypothesized Problem: Unexpected decrease in altitude and increase


in airspeed.
 

Possible Cause: NOSE-DOWN DESCENT
 

Step 2.


Hypothesized Problem: NOSE-DOWN DESCENT
 

Test of hypothesis: Check for pitch down on artificial horizon
 

Conclusions: Either the plane is not in a NOSE-DOWN DESCENT or


there is an ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION
 

Step 3.


Hypothesized Problem: ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION


Possible Cause: VACUUM SYSTEM MALFUNCTION


Step 4.


Hypothesized Problem: VACUUM SYSTEM MALFUNCTION


Test of hypothesis: Check for low reading on suction gauge.
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Subject #1's conclusion was that:


"You 	 have a nose-down attitude and the vacuum pump's gone."


Although no direct evidence is available to substantiate it, it is


plausible that this statement implies the activation or development of a


script (Schank and Riesbeck, 1981) describing the following set of


events:


VACUUM SYSTEM FAILURE


caused


ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION
 

caused


YOKE MISPOSITIONED (DECREASED BACKPRESSURE)
 

caused


NOSE-DOWN DESCENT.


Fault diagnosis then, can be described as a process of recursively


identifying problems and their causes until the person decides he has
 

found the initiating cause. The data indicate that, in order to drive


this process, subjects attempt to answer six types of questions:


1. 	 Is the currently activated frame a goal-state? (Have I


achieved the goal of finding the (initiating) problem X and its


cause Y?)


2. 	 What is the cause of the state of nature represented by this


frame?


3. 	 Is this frame a valid representation of the state of nature?


Are the expected instrument readings and conditions present?
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4. 	 If the currently activated frame has been rejected as a


possible state of nature, can I find another frame to


activate?


5. 	 Is there a recall (memory) error?


6. 	 Is there an instrument malfunction?


The performances of the twenty pilots in terms of pursuing these


fundamental questions (asking about causes, expectancies, etc.) are


summarized in Figures 3-11 to 3-15. A path from a high-level frame


(e.g., NOSE-DOWN DESCENT) to a node labeled "Expectations" means that the


pilot checked for presence of one or more of the instrument readings and


conditions predicted to be present by that frame (e.g., DESCENT SHOWN ON


VERTICAL SPEED INDICATOR). A path from a high-level frame to a node


labeled "Causes" indicates that the pilot tested for the presence of one


or more of the possible causes associated with that frame. A path to a


new high-level frame means that that frame was activated (and the


originating frame de-activated). Paths leading from "Expectations" or


"Causes" back to a high-level frame indicate that the pilot proceeded to


ask another one of the six questions listed above with respect to the


same high-level frame.


The number next to a link indicates the number of pilots who


followed that path at least once (no pilot followed a path more than


twice, and even this was unusual). The dotted arrows indicate special


cases, where the pilots went directly from a violation of an expectation


(the artificial horizon showed nose-level when it was expected to


indicate nose-down) to a new frame (artificial horizon malfunction),
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or from checking for possible causes directly to a conclusion. The only


result not shown on these figures is the finding that Subject #7


discovered the vacuum system failure, then checked for another possible


failure in the pitot-static system (rejecting this possibility), finally
 

returning to vacuum system failure as his conclusion.


Note that Group A (Figure 3-11) consists of the eleven subjects who


diagnosed the problem as a vacuum system failure. Group B (Figure 3-12)


pilots concluded that there was an artificial horizon malfunction. Group


C (Figure 3-13) concluded the problem was a downdraft. Group D pilots


(Figure 3-14) concluded the cause of the problem could not be determined


with the available information.


Group E (Subject #20) discovered the presence of the artificial


horizon malfunction. At that point he thought the plane was in a


straight, nose-down descent that was not being indicated on the


artificial horizon. He asked what would happen if he applied
 

backpressure on the yoke to arrest the descent. When the expected


response did not occur (because the plane was actually in a left spiral),


he decided there must be some other problem. He failed to discover the


left bank and concluded that he could not determine what the problem was


(see Figure 3-15).
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Patterns of Performance


The flow chart shown in Figures 3-11 to 3-15 is a high-level


description of all the paths taken by one or more pilots. Groups A, B, C
 

and D divide the subjects into four classes according to their final


conclusions. (Group E is really a special case of Group B.)
 

The most apparent differences among the groups are the contexts in


which the six alternative questions (check for goal state, check for


causes, test expectations, look for new frame, check for memory error,


or consider instrument malfunction) are addressed. Group B, for


instance, differs from Group A by the failure to check for possible


causes of the artificial horizon malfunction.


Cognitive Narrowing. The failure of Group B to determine whether a


vacuum pump failure was causing the ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION can be


explained by a faulty ordering of the six questions in terms of


application priority. Use of a simple rule would have almost certainly
 

caused all the Group B pilots to discover the vacuum pump failure:


Always check for possible causes of the state of nature represented


by the currently activated frame before asking whether it is a


goal-state.


(During Task 3, all of the pilots in Group B demonstrated that they had


knowledge of the relationship between the vacuum system and the


functioning of the artificial horizon.)


This explanation of Group B's failure to seek a deeper cause is


consistent with pilots' explanations at the end of the experiment as to


why they stopped without asking about the suction gauge:
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"I just narrowed my vision down to one area, tunneled my vision


down and stopped."


Activation"of Default Values. All three pilots in Group D activated


the NOSE-DOWN DESCENT frame. They then proceeded to check for possible


causes of the descent. When they failed to find a cause they stopped and


concluded the cause of the problem could not be determined with the


available information.
 

Given the plane was in a nose-down descent, what accounts for this


failure to find the cause? The answer lies in the activation of a


default value. All three of these pilots reported that they thought the


plane was in a straight nose-down descent (Task 4). Subject #18 even


reported visualizing the turn and bank indicator, that the:


"Turn and bank indicator showed straight and level."


(In actuality he had been given no information about the turn and bank


indicator, which showed a left bank.)
 

This data suggests that the pilots in Group D activated a default


value for the direction of the NOSE-DOWN DESCENT, that the descent was


straight ahead. They did so in the absence of any data to support this


assumption. (On the other hand the plane had been cruising straight


ahead, and they had not received any information clearly indicating a


turn.)


The activation of this default value rules out the actual cause of


the DESCENT, a BANKED PLANE. None of the subjects in Group D considered


this as a possible cause of the descent.
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Similarly, none of the pilots in Groups A and B considered a BANKED


PLANE as a possible cause of the NOSE-DOWN DESCENT when they started


looking for such a cause (see Figures 3-11 and 3-12). These pilots also


assumed the plane was-descending straight ahead when checking for a cause


of the descent. The five subjects in Group A who ultimately concluded


the plane was in a left-bank did so only after they discovered the vacuum


system malfunction.


Changing Focus. Like the pilots in Group D, many of the subjects in


Groups A and B checked for possible causes of a NOSE-DOWN DESCENT (see


Figures 3-11, 3-12, and 3-14). They all failed to find the cause, a


BANKED PLANE, because of a faulty assumption. Yet the pilots in Groups A


and B continued and discovered the ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION, while


those in Group D stopped and concluded the cause could not be determined.


The difference in performance was that, after failing to find a


cause for the NOSE-DOWN DECENT, the pilots in Groups A and B checked to


see whether the "Expectations" for this frame were present. In


particular, they checked to see whether the artificial horizon showed


nose-down. When they found it did not, they began to investigate a


possible ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION.


Why did some pilots (Groups A and B) think about expected


instrument readings in this context (failing to find a cause of DESCENT)


while others (Group D) did not? One possible answer lies in the
 

functions that checking expectations could serve. Addressing this


question would help the pilot discover that he has:
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1. 	 Activated the NOSE-DOWN DESCENT frame based on insufficient


information (such as increasing airspeed alone).


2. 	 Activated the NOSE-DOWN DESCENT frame based on faulty


information due to a recall error (memory distortion).


3. 	 - Activated this frame based on faulty information due to an 
instrument malfunction. 
4. 	 Activated this frame based on faulty assumptions (activation of


incorrect default values).


Thus, asking this question could help the pilot discover that he is


focusing his attention on the wrong frame(s).


Unlike the subjects in Groups A and B, the pilots in Group D never


considered the possibility that they were addressing the wrong question.
 

They assumed that the state of nature was a straight NOSE-DOW4N DESCENT


and tried to determine the cause. Subject #18 for instance, checked for:


POWER LOSS


STRUCTURAL ICING


GEAR DOWN


FLAPS 	DOWN


DOWNDRAFT


Upon finding that none of these causes were present, he immediately


concluded that he could not diagnose the problem.
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Slot-Fillers. If Subject #18 and the other pilots in Group D had


switched their attention from the "Causes" slot of the NOSE-DOWN DESCENT


frame to the "Expectations" slot, this could have focused their attention


on the inconsistent reading on the artificial horizon and, consequently,


on the ARTIFICIAL HORIZON MALFUNCTION. This assumes, of course, that the


pilots looked at the right slot-filler in the "Expectations" slot.
 

In general the "Causes" and "Expectations" slots in a frame have


multiple slot-fillers. When a question is addressed by focusing on one
 

of these slots, it can be asked with respect to one or more of the


slot-fillers. If it is not applied to the right siot-filler, critical


information may be missed.


In this problem, five slot-fillers were identified for the


"Expectations" slot in the NOSE-DOWN DESCENT frame. In terms of solving


this particular problem the critical expectation is that of "Nose-down on


artificial horizon." Two pilots in Group A activated the NOSE-DOWN


DESCENT frame, and then checked the "Expectations" slot. The slot-filler


they checked was "Descent shown on vertical speed indicator." When that


expectation was met, they concluded that the correct frame had been
 

activated and looked at the other slot (checked for possible causes)


immediately, rather than considering all of the slot-fillers in the
 

"Expectations" slot of the NOSE-DOWN DESCENT frame. Had they not tested
 

additional expectations upon failing to.identify a cause, they would not


have solved the problem.


This suggests that another general rule should be followed:
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Check all of a frame's "Expectations" slot-fillers before looking


for possible "Causes". Otherwise, the pilot may fail to detect


memory and activation errors, instrument malfunctions, and faulty


(default) assumptions.


Cross-Checking Instruments. The proposed fault diagnosis process


relies very heavily on the contents of the frames in order to achieve


various goals. If those contents are inadequate, then checking all of


the slot-fillers in the "Expectations" and "Causes",slots may not be


sufficient to ensure detection of instrument malfunctions, incorrect


assumptions, etc. Subject #16 (Figure 3-13) illustrates this point.


This pilot was the only subject to consider a BANKED PLANE as a possible


cause of DESCENT. He activated the NOSE-LEVEL DESCENT frame and checked


for possible causes of DESCENT, including a BANKED PLANE. To check for a


left bank, he asked for the indication on the 'artificial horizon (which
 

showed straight and level flight). He did not check anything else to


rule out a BANKED PLANE, and therefore falsely concluded that this was
 

not the cause of the DESCENT.


This suggests that the slot-fillers for frames must be selected so


as to ensure detection of instrument malfunctions. In this example, the


"Expectations" slot of the BANKED PLANE frame should have directed the


pilot to check both the artificial horizon and the turn and bank


indicator to avoid reliance on a single instrument (system). Similar


consideration is needed in selecting slot-fillers to ensure detection of


activation and memory errors and incorrect activation of default values.
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Selecting the Right Question. In an earlier section, the


determinants of attention to certain cues were discussed. A similar


issue can be raised with respect to the six fundamental questions that


pilots aske&:


How does a pilot decide which question to ask in a given context?


It has been suggested that these questions are addressed in order to


achieve certain objectives (in which case we could ask how objectives are


selected). It has been implied, for instance, that a pilot tests for the


presence of a frame's expectations in order to discover:


1. Activation of the wrong frame based on incomplete information.
 

2. Memory distortions.


3. Instrument malfunctions.


4. Activation of incorrect (default) assumptions.


Thus, asking a question about "Expectations" represents a plan (Wilensky,


1983) for achieving an objective such as finding a new frame upon which


to focus attention. This type of question selection processs can be


modeled as a production system, as illustrated by the following example.


If none of the possible causes associated with a frame are present,


check to see whether the wrong frame has been activated (based on


incomplete or erroneous information).


To see whether the wrong frame has been activated, check for the
 

presence of that frame's "Expectations."
 

Pilots activating the PITOT-STATIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTION frame might


check for two possible causes, PITOT TUBE ICING or STATIC PORT ICING, by


checking the outside air temperature gauge. These would be rejected as
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possible causes because the temperature is too high for icing. The pilot


should then check the "Expectations" associated with a PITOT-STATIC


SYSTEM MALFUNCTION. Finding no inconsistencies on the airspeed


indicator, altimeter and vertical speed indicator, the pilot would reject


this MALFUNCTION frame.


Goal-Directed vs. Data-Driven Processing. The previous subsection
 

suggested that information such as "Expectations" is used in order to


achieve an objective. The implication is that the objective is selected


by the pilot and that this directs the selection of an appropriate plan,


which then focuses on a particular slot.


An alternative (or additional) explanation is that focusing


attention on a particular slot, like the initial activation of some


frame, is a data-driven process. Thus, a pilot might consider whether


the reading on the artificial horizon is consistent with a NOSE DOWN


DESCENT not because he feels it will help him achieve some objective, but


because:


1. He remembers getting information about the plane's pitch.


2. Pitch information is relevant to one of the "Expectations"


slot-fillers in the NOSE-DOWN DECENT frame.


This type of data-driven processing could be accomplished by some type of


intersection search (Anderson and Bower, 1980) in which data activates


both frames and slot-fillers. Questions are generated by looking at


the activated slot-filler within the currently activated frame.
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Such a data-driven process can still achieve objectives. Its


success in doing so, however, depends upon the way in which the knowledge


structures are organized and activated.


This concept of data-driven selection of questions offers an


alternative explanation for the failure of the Group D pilots to discover


the artificial horizon malfunction. Previously, it was suggested that


these pilots failed to check the "Expectations" slot of the NOSE-DOWN


DESCENT frame because they failed to identify appropriate objectives


(e.g., discover instrument malfunctions or activation of incorrect


default assumptions). The proposed data-driven processor, however, would


account for this failure in terms of an attentional error: The pilot
 

failed to attend to the indication of zero pitch in the scenario. As a


result there was no activation of instruction to check the artifical


horizon, which was contained as a slot-filler in the "Expectations" slot


of the NOSE-DOWN DESCENT frame.
 

This explanation is consistent with the fact that none of the pilots


in Group D recalled the indication of zero pitch in Task 2. (All of the


other pilots in the experiment recalled this indication.)


A Normative Model.


Based on a comparison of the processing strategies of successful and


unsuccessful pilots on this task, recommendations for a high-level


control structure can be made. Since only one problem has been studied,


however, it is impossible to determine how widely applicable these


recommendations are.


This control structure must decide what questions to


address in a given context. One alternative, of course, is to put


explicit "Instructions for Use" in each frame as was done earlier
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in this paper. To the extent that the same questions are to be asked


repeatedly, however, this becomes a less desirable approach.


The proposed control structure consists of an ordered list of


objectives, along with a set of plans designed to attain these


objectives. The plans act upon the contents of various knowledge-bases


and a working memory (see Figure 3-16).


The first knowledge-base contains the eighteen frames identified


earlier. The second contains objectives and associated plans for


attaining them. The third contains the pilot's world knowledge and


recall of past experiences related to aviation (episodic memory). The


working memory serves to store the pilot's (episodic) memories of the


scenario, the sequence of frames he has activated and objectives he has 
achieved, the information he has requested, the currently activated
 

frame, etc.


The pilot's objectives, in order of priority, are:


I. 	 Activate a frame representing the plane's physical activity and


orientation (e.g., NOSE-DOWN or NOSE-LEVEL DESCENT). This is


primarily a data-driven process that occurs as the pilot
 

listens to the scenario. The control structure can influence


this 	 process by priming certain cues, as discussed earlier.


This 	 priming involves accessing general aviation knowledge


concerning common problems, and then activating the relevant


frames. This would be done before listening to the scenario


(or possibly while listening to it).
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Figure 3-16. System Architecture


II. 	 Make sure the correct frame has been activated.


A. 	 Ensure that the frame was not activated because of


attention to the wrong cues.


B. 	 Be certain that the frame was not activated based on


insufficient data.


C. 	 Make sure the frame was not activated based on incorrect


data due to:


1. 	 a memory distortion.


2. 	 an instrument malfunction.


D. 	 Determine whether any default values have been activated


incorrectly.


This goal can be achieved by checking all of the "Expectations"


for the activated frame (assuming the right slot-fillers are


present). Do not rely on the contents of working memory for


these checks. It is important that the list of slot-fillers


for the "Expectations" slot contain cross-checks for the


various instruments in order to ensure detection of instrument


malfunctions.


II. 	 If an expectation is not met, either an instrument has


malfunctioned, the wrong frame has been activated, or an


incorrect default value has been activated. Check for an


instrument malfunction first by activating the associated


instrument malfunction frame. Objectives II and IV should be


applied to use the contents of this malfunction frame.
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If the instrument is malfunctioning, revise the contents of the


working memory appropriately and return to Objective I. Use


the 	 contents of the working memory as cues for triggering a


frame or replacing default values. Do the same thing if the


instrument is not malfunctioning, since this implies the wrong


frame or default value was activated originally.


IV. 	 Once it has been established that the correct frame has


been activated, try to determine what is causing this state of


nature. Activate the "Causes" slot for the frame, checking all


of the slot-fillers until a cause is found or the list has been


exhausted. Test each possible cause, activating the associated


cause frame and testing its expectations.


V. 	 Repeat Steps lI-1V in a recursive fashion, using as the


activated frame the cause that has just been identified.
 

Continue until no more causes in the chain of events can be


identified.


Those pilots who failed to fully diagnose the problem appeared to


have the necessary frames at their disposal. Their high-level control


processes, however, deviated from this normative model in significant


ways. The organization of their processes failed to reflect the


objectives of:


1. 	 Avoiding memory distortions.


2. 	 Detecting instrument malfunctions.
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3. 	 Avoiding incorrect activation of a frame due to attentional


errors and use of insufficient information.


4. 	 Avoiding false inferences due to activation of incorrect


default values.


5. 	 Avoiding cognitive narrowing (failure to detect a causally­

related chain of events).


This normative model could be realized as an expert system (Barr and


Feigenbaum, 1981; Davis, 1982; Nilsson, 1980; Nan, 1983). It is not


clear, however, whether it is compatible with the cognitive processes


observed in these pilots. If the attainment of these objectives is


normally an implicit, data-driven process in human fault diagnosis,


resulting from well-designed knowledge structures and attentional


processes, then familizarizing pilots with such a control structure might


have little impact on performance.


Criticality of Assumptions


Certain assumptions were made in order to permit the development of


a parsimonious general model of performance. The primary effect of these


assumptions was to model pilots as accessing all frames through the


higher-level frames. It is possible, of course, that any frame at any


level in the hierarchy can be activated directly by external cues. This


experiment does not permit an evaluation of this alternative.
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Representation of Knowledge


A frame system using (verbal) symbol manipulations was used to model


performance. It is possible that another representation using some


analog process (a qualitative or quantitative simulation) as a mental


model of flight could account for the same data.


Extrapolation to a General Aviation Setting


The objective of this study was to better understand the manner in


which knowledge structures are used in fault diagnosis. The problem


context was "similar" to a vacuum pump failure in a light plane. Can we


make any inferences about performance in an actual aircraft?
 

The major difficulty with making such an inference is the lack of


similarity between our problem setting and an actual flight in terms of


information input. The visual displays normally available to pilots


provide a much different form of data-gathering. Our problem setting is


much closer to that of a pilot conversing with an intelligent computer


that is flying the plane. We might expect much more data-driven


processing with the availability of the normal visual displays.


Nevertheless, the knowledge structures and cognitive processes studied in


this experiment probably play some role in actual on-board fault


diagnosis. Thus, some of the concepts identified may provide insights


into performance in a realistic setting. Some speculations are provided


below:
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1. 	 Attention is attracted to unexpected events. If, in a real


flight, the vacuum pump fails and our scenario becomes reality,


the pilot's attention may not be attracted to the artificial


horizon. Instead, it will probably be drawn to instruments


that show an unexpected change. If that instrument is the turn


and bank indicator, he will probably detect the artificial


horizon malfunction quickly. On the other hand, if attention


is drawn to the unexpected changes on the altimeter, vertical


speed indicator or airspeed indicator, the pilot may be very


slow to note that it is the failure of the artificial horizon


that is causing his problems. Thus, from the standpoint of


detecting vacuum system failures, the artificial horizon is a


poorly designed instrument. Its failure to (always) give an


unexpected change in reading when the vacuum system


malfunctions could contribute to slow or even unsuccessful


attempts to diagnose the problem. This design problem is


exacerbated by the fact that the artificial horizon sometimes


does 	 tumble when the vacuum pump fails. This could generate an


expectancy that would further reduce the pilot's tendency to


focus attention on the artificial horizon.
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2. 	 Pilots behave as though activated default values are based on


actual data (are not assumed values). If a pilot assumes he is


flying straight because he is unaware of making any yoke


movements (while tracking the failing artificial horizon), he


may not look at the turn indicators very quickly (or at all).


He may instead attend to the instruments relevant to the


perceived problem (descent). An activated default value in a


frame may also influence other values in the same or other


frames via some inheritance process. Thus, BANKED plane may


not be considered as a possible cause of DESCENT because the


pilot "knows" he's flying straight.


3. 	 Pilots tended to assume that their instruments were functioning


properly, accepting this by default rather than by


cross-checking the appropriate instruments. Thus, pilots may


activate a frame based on incomplete or inaccurate information
 

(due 	 to memory distortion or instrument malfunction). They may


then 	 assume it is the correct frame (e.g., DESCENT) and proceed


to look for causes of the associated state of nature, instead


of first making sure their understanding of the plane's


activity is correct. This "cause chasing" may use up valuable


time.
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Future Issues


A general model of fault diagnosis has been proposed. This model raises


a number of issues about how people perform such tasks, and about how


performance can be improved. These questions can only be addressed by


designing additional experiments to collect converging and supplementary


evidence.


The next section describes alternative approaches to modeling fault
 

diagnosis without benefit of verbal protocol analysis. The models discussed


there are based upon PLATO® data which is nearly experimenter free. In that


situation one must base all of his conclusion on observed behavior without


benefit of discussion and/or rationalization about why particular information
 

may or may not be important to a particular subject. The combination of frame


models with more traditional graphical aids and stochastic process


representations will hopefully provide a rich picture of how pilots respond to


critical in-flight events.
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IV. Modeling Instrument Scan Patterns
 

During the course of this research project and its predecessors, a


wealth of data on information search patterns was collected for over 100


pilots. Each pilot/subject was asked to diagnose from one to five


critical event scenarios. Some did this by paper and pencil techniques,


some by PLATO® computer graphics displays, and some by protocol analysis.


This section describes modeling attempts directed toward discerning


common solution strategies among subgroups of pilots.


Order of Inquiry


Early descriptive models for paper and pencil subjects were reported


by Rockwell and Giffin (1981). Subjects participating,in the PLATO®


experiments were discussed by Rockwell and Giffin (1982)._In both cases


heavy emphasis was placed upon statistical analysis of data which


attempted to relate diagnostic performance to pilot experience, knowledge


and biographic information. Some broad generalizations about diagnostic


behavior were made from these data, but no model which could predict how


a given pilot might behave when confronted with a new scenario was


obtained.


One tool developed in this early research was the Pilot.Information


Plot (PIP). These PIP charts permitted one to see graphically how any


particular subject searched for information on any given scenario. The


PIP charts offered a convenient way to conjecture the hypotheses and the
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method of testing being pursued by a subject but were not helpful in


discerning global strategies across many subjects. Each trajectory
 

appeared to be unique for that subject and that scenario.


Figure 4-1 is a prototype PIP that one might conjecture would


generated by a knowledgeable, efficient pilot. This trajectory was


generated after studying the entire pool of subjects and is put forth as


a subjective composite for "good" subjects. The scenario, which involves


a vacuum pump failure, provided the subject with the following


situational data:


1) Increasing airspeed


2) Decreasing altitude
 

3) Level flight attitude indication


4) Instrument meteorological conditions.


From these data, the better subjects appeared to deduce the following:


1) The instrument readings are contradictory.


2) One or more of the instrument readings is in error.


3) Two are static system instruments, one is a vacuum


instrument.


A confirmation of static system performance often involved checking


the VSI and alternate static source. A confirmation of vacuum system


performance might include checking vacuum instruments against independent


information e.g. turn and bank or magnetic compass. Finally, the key
 

element of suction gage reading offered confirmation of the vacuum pump


failure hypothesis.
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VACUUM PUMP SCENARIO


P-ITOT 
STATIC - AS ALT OAT PIT PITO 
START 
ENGINE TACH MP MIX THROT PROP OIL T. OIL P. MAG 
ICING WdC CC WC FC AC SC FR 
VACUUM AH DC SC OKE 
END 
OTHER 
Figure 4-1. Sample PIP Chart 
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Frequency versus order of inquiry diagrams were also prepared for


successful and unsuccessful groups of subjects in an attempt to isolate


apparent hypothesis generation and preferred groupings or "tracks" of


information inquiry. The clustering of inquiries looked remarkably


similar across groups relative to incorrect hypotheses with the


distinction between successful and unsuccessful subjects being mostly one


of which group generated the proper hypothesis to test. These diagrams


and their analysis appear in the 1982 report.


Script Norms


The concept of "script norms" as discussed by Bower, Black and


Turner (1979) was modified for use in analyzing the entire group of PLATO


subjects. Bower, Black and Turner asked subjects to write a list of


actions describing what people generally do in some common situaiton e.g.


attend a lecture. The question was whether people agree in the actions


they mention. They tested this by examining the distributions of how


many actions were mentioned by varying numbers of subjects. They


designated the group's script to be those events mentioned by more than


25 percent of the subjects.


In the context of the CIFE scenarios, script norms are developed by


tabulating distributions for the number of items of information requested


by varying numbers of subjects. Here the pilot/subjects are being asked


to recognize script relevant information from a large pool of potential


information rather than being asked to generate a script from a
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completely unstructured environment. The resulting distributions reveal 
both the level of agreement among subjects about which data are important 
aiid an indication of what groups of data belong together. 
Figures 4-2 through 4-6 are the script norms for the five scenarios


administered to the computer aided testing (CAT) PLATO® subjects. These


graphs show the explicit items of information requested by different


fractions of subjects.


The general shape of the distributions is the same for all five


scenarios. As was the case with Bower, Black and Turner, there appears


to be a sharp difference at the 20 percent point for all scenarios except


scenario five. Scenario five involved a broken muffler baffle leading to


reduced power available and was considered by most subjects to be


"unsolvable". This caused many subjects to search the panel without any


strong hypotheses about the problem diagnosis. Consequently the script


norms for that scenario show many more items requested by a large


portion of subjects as compared to the simpler scenarios.


For purposes of this discussion we will arbitrarily define,the


group's script to be those items requested by more than 40 percent of the


subjects. Since scenario five was different from the rest and was


administered to only a small number of subjects, it will not be


considered in the rest of this discussion.


Scenario one, an oil pressure gage leak, and scenario three, a


magneto drive gear failure both concern obvious engine related symptoms.


As expected, the group scripts for both scenarios are heavily laden
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with engine health symptoms. The triumverant of oil temperature,


cylinder head temperature and oil pressure was sought by nearly every


subject in both scenarios. The key elements, fluid leaks for scenario


one and left magneto for scenario three, were selected by at least 60


percent of the subjects. The fact that these elements provided


conclusive information for solution is reflected by the 52.4 percent and


63.6 percent of the subjects who correctly diagnosed one and three
 

respectively.


Scenario two, the vacuum pump failure, and scenario four, the frozen


static port were apparently much more perplexing. Only 23.8 percent of


the subjects correctly identified the vacuum failure and only 43.2


percent identified the frozen static port. In examining the script norms


for those scenarios, it appears that ice is of prime concern to both


groups. Alternate static questions, pitot heat, VSI and wing condition


show up in both scripts. Since suction gage reading is not in the 40


percent script cutoff for scenario two, it is obvious that the number who


correctly solved that problem should be small.


It is noted that pilots as a group seem to agree on the importance


of a relatively small number of information items in problem diagnosis.


The script for scenario one had only 7 items of information which were


requested by over 40 percent of the subjects, scenario two had 8 items,


scenario three had 13 items and scenario four had 11 items. These are


only small percentages of the some 110 items of information which were


available to the CAT subjects.
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Figure 4-2. Oil Pressure Gage
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OF POOR QUALITY 
Figure 4-3. 
-
Vacuum Pump 
Scenario 02 
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ORIGINAL PAG -

OF POOR QUALITV


Figure 4-4. Magneto Failure 
Scenario #3 
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ORIGINAL PAGE jqlOF POOR QUALITY 
Figure 4-5. Frozen Static Port 
Scenario #4 
37 CAT Subjects 
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ORIGINAL PAM 0' 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Figure 4-6. Broken Baffle


Scenario #5
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Distance Measures


Another attempt to determine the existence of a common frame system
 

for pilots involved calculation of the average distance between


information items as a measure of closeness in memory structure.


Clusters of information defined by short distances and high frequency of


occurrences were sought as an alternative to the earlier ad hoc


definitions of "tracks" used in the PIP charts. Distance is defined as


the number of requests between any two items of information.


For this analysis a consolidated state list containing 34 items was


generated. Here closely related requests, e.g., yoke, yoke foreward and


yoke back, were combined into a single state. The resulting list of


states is shown in Table 4-1.


Scenario two, vacuum pump failure, and scenario three, magneto drive


gear failure, were analyzed across all computer aided testing subjects.


Pairs considered significant were limited to those with an average


distance measure of less than or equal to 3 as calculated from at least 3


subjects. The pairs of items meeting these requirements for scenario two


are listed in Table 4-2. Similar pairs for scenario three are listed in


Table 4-3.


By reading horizontally one can determine the most likely neighbors


for any given information inquiry. For example, in the vacuum pump


scenario a request for outside air temperature (OAT) is likely to be


followed by airspeed, altimeter, vertical speed, pitot heat and yoke.
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1. BKR 
2. RAD 
3. COM 
4. SUC 
5. OAT X X X X XX 
6. FUEL 00 
7. AS X xX 
S8. AH 
N 9. ALT 
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- x 
xX 
. 
X 
: ii W 
11. MP x. X X 
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X1 I 
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15. TANK 
16. OP xx -
17. CHT-x- X 
18. OT x 
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20. TB 
. 7x-- I ---­
,- 21.DG 'X 
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.-
X 
24. PH x x. X X 
L 25. yoKE - -- I-­
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27. FLAP 
28. THROT X 
29. PROP X XX 
30. MIX xx-­
31. ALT STAT X X 
32. CAB 
33. ATC 
34. EXT X 
Table 4-2. Vacuum Pump Scenario; Distances <-3 Inquiries; Number of Observations 
> 3 Subjects. 
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EXT 
X 
x 
X 
XX 
X 
X1 
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X 
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Table 4-3 . Magneto Gear Scenario; Distance < 3 Inquiries; 
Observations > 3 Subjects. 
Nuber of 
Since OAT relates closely to an icing hypothesis one might conjecture


that the rest of the members of this cluster indicate how this group of


subjects might continue to test that hypothesis.


By reading vertically one can determine from what elements subjects


are likely to enter any given state. For example, in the vacuum pump


scenario, inquiries about the altimeter may result from information about


outside air temperature, airspeed, artificial horizon, manifold pressure


and vertical speed.


The vacuum pump scenario had the lowest successful diagnosis rate


(23.8%) of the four main scenarios tested. The clusters shown in Table


4-2 may therefore be reflecting a mix of hypotheses. Most subjects


seemed to entertain an icing hypothesis at least sometime during their


diagnosis, but jumped around somewhat when that could not be supported.


The magneto -drive failure scenario on the other hand had the highest


success rate with 63.6% of the subjects solving it. Consequently the


clusters in Table 4-3 may be more indicative of the true closeness in


memory structure among items. For example, oil temperature is close to


oil pressure, cylinder head temperature and ammeter readings all of which


related directly to engine health. Similarly, requests for cylinder head


temperature are likely to follow tank selector, oil pressure, oil


temperature, throttle and exterior condition inquiries. Tank selector


and exterior condition inquiries leading to CHT suggest a switch in


tracks. The other requests are consistent with an engine health track of


inquiry.
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Markov Models


The theory of Markov chains offers an intriguing model for


diagnostic information gathering. It seems reasonable to ask whether or


not there is a multi-stage dependence among inquiries, e.g. does the next


inquiry depend upon the last 1, 2, ..., n inquiries? The model to be


examined is that of an .nth order Markov chain in which a transition into


state j on the kth inquiry depends upon the states occupied on inquiries


k-i, k-2, ..., k-n. When n 1, the process is 
 a common first order
 
Markov chain and when u = 0 it is an independent process. A first order


process has one state dependence expressed as


Pr[iklil, i2 , ... , ik-1I = Pr[iklik-l] 
Independent trials on the other hand carry no historical information from


inquiry to inquiry, expressed as


Pr[iklil,i2,...,ik-l] = Prlik]


Hypotheses concerning the order of Markov chains which might be-used


to model information search trajectories were tested on five different


groups of pilots on each of three scenarios. Scenario one was eliminated


because not all subjects took it. The groups were selected from those


which proved significantly different in the t-tests previously reported


by Rockwell and Giffin (1982). The groups tested were


1. All CAT (PLATO) subjects - 39 pilots


2. Successful subjects with high correctness scores - 11 pilots
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3. Non-private pilots - 22 pilots


4. Private pilots - 16 pilots


5. Subjects with high knowledge test scores - 10 pilots


Three different sets of state definitions, representing various


consolidations of inquiries were tested. These sets of states are listed


in Table 4-4.
 

The hope was to find a homogeneous group of pilots and a properly


descriptive set of state variables so that search trajectories could be


combined in order to test hypotheses. Ideally, one pilot should be


subjected to repeated exposure to the same decision-making problem in


order to compute the frequencies with which he would move between
 

inquiries. However, because of the nature of the scenarios given it was


not reasonable to repeat trials for the same individual once he had been


exposed to the true solution. Fot that reason the (tenuous) assumption


of homogeniety among pilots within a group was made. The relative


frequency of moving from state i to state j.was then calculated by


pooling the number of inquiries across all pilots in a group who followed


i with j and dividing by the total number of i-inquiries observed within


the group.


The statistical tests performed were those suggested by Anderson and


Goodman (1957). They assumed repeated observations of the same chain and


based their analysis on asymptotic distributions. Their approach for an


N-state chain is to:
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39-STATE SET 23 STATE SET 16-STATE SET 
1. Breaker Panel 21. Oil Pressure 1. Magnetic Compass 1. Airspeed 
2. Com 1 22. Cylinder Head Temp. 2. Suction 2. Vertical Speed 
3. Mag Compass 23. Oil Temp 3. Outside Air Temp 3. Altimeter 
4. Com 2 24. Ammeter 4. Airspeed 4. Alternate Static 
5. Transponder 25. Turn and Bank 5. Artificial Horizon 5. Pitot Heat 
6. Suction 26. Directional Gryo 6. Altimeter 6. Outside Air Temp. 
7. Outside Air Temp 27. Magnetos 7. Vertical Speed 7. Structural Ice 
8. Left Fuel Quan. 28. Master Switch 8. Turn and Bank 8. Air Traffic Control 
9. Right Fuel Quan. 29. Pitot heat 9. Directional Gyro 9. Engine Gages 
10. Airspeed 30. Yoke 10. Pitot Heat 10. Artificial Horizon 
11. Artificial Horizon 31. Gear 11. Yoke 11. Directional Gyro 0 0 
12. Altimeter 32. Flaps 12. Alternate Static 12. Suction "nE 
13. VORI 33. Throttle 13. Tachometer 13. Yoke u 
14. Manifold Pressure 34. Prop RPM 14. Manifold Pressure 14. Turn and Bank 0 
15. Tachometer 35. Mixture 15. Mixture 15. Magnetic Compass Xr. 
16. ADF 36. Alternate Static 16. Throttle 16. Other 0 -a 
17. Vertical Speed 37. Inside Cabin 17. Propeller 
18. 
19. 
VOR2 
Exhaust gas Temp. 
38. 
39. 
Air Traffic Control 
External Conditions 
18. 
19. 
Oil Temp. 
Oil Pressure T 
20. Fuel Selector 20. Magneto 

21. Structural Ice 

22. Air Traffic Control 

23. Other 

Table 4-4. State Definitions for Markov Tests 

1) obtain 1, 2, ..., k stage transition frequencies 
2) calculate transition probabilities for a total of 
n observations. 
4) compute a likelihood ratio statistic
 

5) test the significance of the result.
 

Transition probabilities are computed as follows:


nk Total inquiries for element k


Pk = - Total inquiries 
^ njk Number of inquiry sets (j,k)


-
Pjk = j Total number of j inquiries


nijk Number of inquiry sets (i,j,k)
rijk - nij Total number of (i,j) inquiries 
The likelihood ratio is given by
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N. [j...k,9 ] i,j,. ..k, 
The test is for a chain that is of order (r-1) against an


alternative of r. That is


H0 : Chain is of order (r-1)


Hl: Chain is of order r


The test statistic - 2Zn X can be shown to be Chi square distributed


(X2) with Nr-l(N-r)2 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis.
 

The procedure is to begin with r-1 and continue testing with increasing


order of r until H0 cannot be rejected. At that point one can conclude


that the chain is of order r.


The above tests were applied to the previously described


-combinations of subjects and scenarios. The results are noted in Tables


4-5 through 4-9. Summary conclusions are contained in Table 4-10.
 

If taken at face value these tests offer some surprising


conclusions. They suggest that for the groups of pilots tested, these


scenarios can evoke no stronger dependence than that of a first order


Markov chain.
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Table 4-5. All Pilots. Tests for Order of Chain (39 Pilots, 39 States max)


First Test Second Test


Ho: Independent Trials Ho: First Order Markov


Hl: First Order Markov HI: Second Order Markov


2 2


-2 kn X .95 Conclusion -2 Zn X X .95 Conclusion


Scenario 2


(33 States) 1778 1099 Reject 906 34200 Cannot Reject


Scenario 3


(30 States) 1590 909 Reject 817 25600 Cannot Reject


Scenario 4


(34 States) 1840 597 Reject 673 37474 Cannot Reject


Table 4-6. Successful Pilots. Tests for Order of Chain (11 Pilots, 16 States max) 
First Test Second Test 
HO: Independent Trials 
HI: First Order Markov 
2 
-2 Zn X .95 Conclusion 
Ho: First Order markov 
HI: Second Order Markov 
2 
-2 Zn X X .95 Conclusion 
Scenairo 
(16 States) 389 261 Reject 226 3740 Cannot Reject 
Scenario 3 
(10 States) 182 103 Reject 60 877 Cannot Reject 
Scenario 4 
(15 States) 296 229 Reject 121 3067 Cannot Reject 
Table 4-7. Non-Private Pilots. Tests for Order of Chain (22 Pilots, 23 States max)


First Test Second Test


HO: Independent Trials First Order Markov
H0 : 

HlI: First Order Markov Hl: Second Order Markov


2 Co c in2 2

-2n Conclusion ­2 Zn x .9 Conclusion 
Scenario 2


(22 States) 777 491 Reject 476 9932 Cannot Reject


Scenario 3


(16 States) 456 261 Reject 233 3511 Cannot Reject


Scenario 4


(21 States) 844 447 Reject 374 8614 Cannot Reject


Table 4-8. Private Pilots. Tests for Order of Chain (16 Pilots, 23 States max)


First Test Second Test


H0 : Independent Trials H0 : First Order Markov


HI: First Order Markov HI: Second Order markov


2 2


-2 £n X X .95 Conclusion -2 Xn X X .95 Conclusion


Scenario 2


(22 States) 717 491 Reject 249 9932 Cannot Reject


Scenario 3

(16 States) 505 261 Reject 340 3511 Cannot Reject


Scenario 4


(22 States) 660 491 Reject 253 9932 Cannot Reject


Table 4-9. High Knowledge Pilots. Tests for Order of Chain (10 Pilots, 23 States max)


First Test Second Test 
H0 : Independent Trials H0 : First Order 
Hl: First Order Markov HI: Second Order 
2 2 
-2 Zn X x .95 Conclusion 
-2 Zn X x .95 Conclusion 
Scenario 2


(19 States) 377 367 Reject 140 6339 Cannot Reject


Scenario 3 272 200 Reject 118 2480 Cannot Reject


(14 States)


Scenario 4


(20 States) 421 406 Reject 110 7418 Cannot Reject


Table 4-10,. Summary of Search Patterns. 
39 States Max 16 States Max 23 States Max 23 States Max 23 States Max 
All Pilots (39) Successful Pilots (11) Non-Pvt (22) Pvt (16) High Knowl (11) 
Scenario 
2 (Vac Pufip) Ist Ord 1st Ord ist Ord ist Ord ist Ord 
(33 States) (16 States) (22 States) (22 States) (19 States) 
3 (Mag Fail) ist Ord Ist Ord ist Ord Ist Ord ist Ord 
(30 States) (10 States) (16 States) (16 States) (14 States) 
4 (Static ist Ord ist Ord ist Ord 1st Ord 1st Ord 
Sys) 
(34 States) (15 States) (21 States) (22 States) (20 States) 
Such a conclusion is counter-intuitive and is not supported by an


analysis of PIP charts for individual pilgts. The PIP charts indicate


strong evidence of sequential information seeking with very few returns
 

to previously tested states. Yet the high order Markov chain model does


not appear to be appropriate for the data at hand.


In retrospect one might postulate several reasons for the failure of


the Markov model to adequately describe the observed information seeking


behavior of pilots.


1) Observed trajectories across many subjects cannot 
be combined. In spite of attempts to define 
homogeneous groups, one is left with the conclusion 
that individual differences are too great to treat 
observations from n subjects as though they represented 
n realizations of the same Markov chain. 
2) Sample sizes are too small. The statistical tests 
used are based on limiting distributions. The 
sample sizes ranging from 10 to 39 in the PLATO 
data are simply too small to provide an adequate 
test of the theory. 
3) The unfamiliar task of collecting individual pieces 
of information one at a time is inhibiting to the 
memory processes of expert pilots who normally 
"chunk" familiar patterns of stimuli from an 
aircraft instrument panel. Larken et al (1980) 
observed that experts are reduced to the level of 
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novices in chess playing when pieces are arranged


in random order on a chess board as opposed to


being in an arrangement from a game. A similar


problem may exist in the form in which pilots


retain knowledge in long term memory. The awkward


isolated search may in fact destroy what otherwise


might be a highly structured n-state process.


Table 4-11 shows one example of a first order Markov process. The


frequencies (both absolute and relative) shown are for the number of


observations of inquiry i followed by inquiry j tabulated for the 22


non-private pilot subjects who took scenario three. The high frequency


cells are caused by combining several unique inquiries into a single


state. For example, state 20, magneto, includes mag left, mag right, mag


both and mag off inquiries. Hence there is a high probability that


successive inquiries will return to that state.


The next chapter returns to analysis of individual search patterns
 

as opposed to the aggregated descriptions of this chapter in hopes of


better characterizing how "good" pilots search for information.
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.TO 
FRCM 2 3 4 10 11 12 13 14 
1 1 
2-SUCTION 
3-OAT (0.143) 
(0.5) (0.5) 
(0.143) 
4-AIRSPEED 
10-PITOT HEAT 
11-YOKE 
12-ALT. STATIC 
13-TACH 
1 
(0.077) 
'3 
(0.6 
1 
(1.0) 
3 
(0.75) 
1 
(0.2) 
14- IANIFOlD 
PRESSURE 
3 ) 
(0.273)3 
15-MI RE 
(0.097) 
1 
17-PROPELLER 
18-OIL TEMP 
1 
(0.11) 
(,0625) 
1 
(0.1Ii2) 
19-OIL PRESS 1 
20-MAGNETO (0.016) (0'. 016) 
21-ICE 21-ICE (0.05) (0.05) 
1 
(0.'05) 
22-ATC 
23-OTHER 20.026) (0.026) 
2 
4 

(0.308) 

3n 

2 

(0.'125) 

1 
(0,091)

1 
1 
2 
(0.026) 

0 0 
O 
0
M 

C: 

> 

Absolute and Relative Frequencies of Single Stage Transitions for Non-Private Pilots
Table 4-11. 
 
(Relative frequencies representing transition probabilities are

in Scenario Three. 
 
shown in parenthes6s.) 
TO 
FRa4 	 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23


3-SUCTION 
1 1 	 23-OAT 	 1 (0.143) 	 (0.143) (0.143) (0.285) 
14-AIRSPEED 
1 
10-PITOT HEAT ((0 .2) 
11-YOKE 
1 OO0 
12. ALT. STATIC 	 (0.25) ­
1 1 	 6 O0
13-TACH] 1 
13-TACH (0.077) (0.077) (0.461) O 
14-MANIFOLD 1 1 1 1 4 t-
PRESSURE (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.363) > 
17 2 1 3 	 5 -15-MIXTURE 	 1(0.548) (0.064) (0.032) 
 (0.097) 	 (0.161)


1 	 117-PROPELLER 2 7 	 1 (0.125) (0.4375) 	 (0.0625) (0.0625) (0.0625) (0.0625) 
118-OIL TEMP 	 1 
(0.111) 	 (0.111) (0.111) (0.444)


19-OIL PRESS 1 2 1 	 6 
(0.091) 	 (0.182) (0.091) (0.545)


1 4
20-MAGNETO57 20-MAGNETO (0.890) (0.016) (0.062) 
2 12 221-ICE (0.05) (0.10) (0.60) 	 (0.10)


1
22-ATC 
 
6 4 5 2 1 42
23-OTHER 	 7 4 
 23-OTHER (0.091) (0.052) (0.078) (0.052) (0.065) (0.026) (0.013) (0.545)


Table 4-11. (continued). Absolute and Relative Frequencies of Single Stage Transitions for Non-Private 
Pilots in Scenario Three. (Relative frequencies representing transition probabilities are 
shown in parentheses.) 
V. Evaluation of Subject Information Seeking Strategies


By a Panel of Expert Pilots


Recognized expert pilots were utilized in an attempt to distinguish


patterns within past PLATO® and current protocol subject data. It was hoped


that such an analysis would further add to the descriptive model of pilot CIFE


diagnosis and validate earlier scores on diagnostic performance.


A. Purpose


Six well-known aviation experts ranked two groups of ten pilots each


on the basis of the pilots' information requests. A separate scenario


was used for each pilot group. The purpose was to:


a) validate a previously developed grading system that


measured individual pilot performance on a scenario;


b) ascertain the basis for the expert rankings; and


c) determine if PIP templates of expert performance could be


inferred which might lead to an optimum information seeking


strategy.


B. Expert Selection
 

Experts chosen for the study included past and current chief flight


instructors and department of aviation chairmen, all from The Ohio State


University, as well as an FAA GADO inspector. Table 5-1 shows the total


flight hours and pilot certificates of each expert. All have their CFII


certificate and except for one, all have an ATP certificate.
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C. 	 Scenario/Subject Selection


Subject data from two separate scenarios were chosen for


presentation to the experts. Scenarios were selected which


could provide wide ranges of performance in existing subject data. The


vacuum pump failure scenario was selected because of its familarity to


the researchers through protocol and other analyses. The static port


blockage scenario was chosen because, like the vacuum pump scenario, it


also provided an instrument conflict as part of the problem.


Individual subject data were chosen for each scenario to represent a


full range of pilot performance. For the static port scenario, at least


one past PLATO® subject was chosen to fit into each possible combination


of correct/incorrect diagnosis and low/medium/high number of total flying


hours. The vacuum pump scenario subjects were selected from the protocol


analysis experiment, which at that time had 12 valid subjects. Two were


eliminated to allow for an even mixture of correct/incorrect diagnosis


and total number of observations.


Table 5-1. Expert Characteristics


Expert Total Flying Hours Certificates


A 8,000 ATP, CFII


B 2,500 ATP, CFII


C 
 8,700 ATP, CFII, A & P
 

D 14,090 ATP, CFII


E 20,000 Comm., CFII, A & P
 

F 	 8,000 ATP, CFII


144


D. Procedure


Because the PIPs preorganized each subject's information requests


into tracks, their presentation to the experts would have -likely biased
 

the rankings. To eliminate this, each PIP was converted to a list of


numbered questions showing information requests as they were typically
 

asked.


Experts were presented with a tape recorder and blank tape along


with a packet (see Appendix F) containing:


a) instructions which had been presented to the subjects; 
b) the vacuum pump and static port scenario descriptions; 
c) one sheet of subject information requests for each subject 
in each of the scenarios (20 sheets total with the order in 
each group of ten being determined by a table of random 
numbers); 
d) the preferred diagnosis of each scenario;­
e) a complete list of responses to pilot information requests 
for each scenario; 
f) a blank ranking sheet for each scenario numbered from 
one to ten; and 
g) instructions for the expert.


Experts were instructed to rank the pilots within each scenario from
 

best (1) to worst (i0). "Best" referred to a pilot whose information


seeking behavior most clearly resembled that of an expert. in the


process of ranking, the experts were told to describe their thoughts out


loud,'making certain they described their reasoning for rating one pilot


better than another. This entire procedure was completed at the expert's


convenience without an experimenter present (but with the tape recorder


running). 
JA9 
E. Results


Data collected from the experts consisted of:


a) a rank sheet for each scenario;
 

b) criteria used by experts in deciding on the rankings (as


derived from the tapes);


c) the criteria used by a particular expert.


Tables 5-2 and 5-3 shows the subject rankings made by each expert


for each of the scenarios. Subject 4 of the vacuum pump scenario was


eliminated from analysis since the experts were uncertain whether he had


made a single lucky guess.


For each of the two scenarios, a Spearman Rank Correlation was run


between the ranks of each expert and each expert against the rank of


scores assigned the subjects by the experimenters following the PLATO or


protocol runs.


"Within expert" agreement was very high for the static port


scenario. Five of the 6 experts had ranks correlated with each other at


a significance level of .05 or less. Four of the six experts were


significantly correlated on the vacuum pump scenario.


In terms of ranking agreement with the experimenter scores, all were


correlated with the experimenter on the static port scenario and five out


of six were correlated with the experimenter scores on the vacuum pump


scenario.


F. 	 Criterion Selection


Table 5-4 shows the derived criteria, which ones were utilized by a


particular expert, and the proportion of experts making use of each


criterion.
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Table 5-2. Vacuum Pump Scenario


Subject Number Rankings


Expert 
Rank A B C _ D E F 
1 1 13 13 1 13 1 
2 6 1 6 13 1 7 
3 13 6 1 7 6 9 
4 3 9 12 6 10 12' 
5 12 12 7 11 9 6 
6 7 7 9 12 3 13 
7 10 3 11 9 12 11 
8 9 10 10 3 7 10 
9 11 11 3 10 11 3 
Table 5-3. Static Port Scenario 
Subject Number Rankings 
Expert 
Rank A B C D E F 
1 51 43 43 51 51 46 
2 43 50 50 46 50 43 
3 50 51 51 50 43 50 
4 44 44 46 43 59 44 
5 46 46 59 54 52 51 
6 59 57 44 45 44 59 
7 45 45 45 44 46" 57 
8 54 54 54 59 54 45 
9 57 59 57 57 45 54 
10 52 52 52 52 57 52 
NOTE: 	 The numbers in Tables 2 & 3 are subject identification numbers


corresponding to the files generated during protocol and PLATO


testing respectively.


From the recordings, a criterion was counted each time an expert either:
 

a) used a particular factor to differentiate subjects or groups


of subjects from one another; or


b) explicitly stated the criterion he was or would be using to


make the ranking decisions.
 

Even defining the criteria selection carefully as was done, the


frequencies remained limited on two counts. First, experts varied


considerably in levels of analysis they applied to this study. Some experts


would consistently give one or more reasons for each rank assigned while


others would not give any. It was a problem of getting the expert to both


compare in detail the subjects' responses and to verbalize what they


discovered. Second, when the criterion was not explicitly stated by the


expert, it often became necessary for the researcher to be subjective and


infer whether or not it was a criterion. For example, one expert while


ranking subject 46 in the static port scenario supported his rank by stating,
 

"he asked about ice, outside air temperature, pitot heat and opening the


alternate static source. He suspected propeller ice when he asked about
 

vibration and unusual noise." The problem here is determining whether these


are criteria or merely summarizations to aid the expert in his recall and
 

ranking of a particular subject. For the above reasons, the most accurate


representative measure of criterion usage is the proportion of experts who


made use of a specified criterion at least once. Thus, Table 5-4 lists the


proportion of experts using each criterion rather than the frequency of each


one.
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Table 5-4. Expert Criteria Mentioned in Both Scenarios


CRITERIA: 
(+) = positive factor 
(-) = negative factor 
Suction gauge inquiry (+) 
Alternate static port open 
inquiry (+) 
Many relevant inquiries (+) 
Many irrelevant inquiries (-) 
Logical sequence of inquiries (+) 
Exhibit lack of knowledge about 
 
aircraft systems (vacuum


and static) (-)


Cross-checked instruments (+)X 
 
Random sequence of inquiries (-) 
 
Inquire about unknown primary 
 
flight instruments (+) 
Made too few inquiries (-) 
Did not inquire about 
suction gauge (-) 
Total number of inquiries 
Many (+) 
Many -) 
Few (+) 
Engine power inquiry (+) 
Structural ice inquiry not 
made (-) 
Inquired about unknown primary 
flight instruments (-) 
Too much control testing C-) 
Too many separate paths taken (-) 
Did not cross-check instruments (-) 
 
Repeated inquiry (-) 
 
Structural ice inquiry made (+) 
 
A 
X 
X 
EXPERT 
 
B C D 
 
X X X 
 
X X X 
 
E 
X 
X 
F 
X 
X 
PROPORTION OF EXPERTS 
REQUESTING THE 
PARTICULAR CRITERION 
1.00 
1.00 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1.00 
.83 
.67 
.67 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
.67 
.67 
.5 
X X 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
.5 
.33 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
 
X X 
.33 
.33 
.33 
.33 
.33 
X 
 .17 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
X 
.17 
.17 
.17 
.17 
.17 
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As critera 	 were selected it became useful to distinguish between positive


and negative criteria. A criterion was considered positive if the expert


spoke of it as a factor beneficial to the subject's rating. A negative


criterion was detrimental; that is, the subject could have performed better if


this factor had not appeared.


G. 	 Analysis


From analysis of the tapes and the criteria in Table 5-4, several


conclusions can be drawn:


a) 	 Experts usually used the presence of keyword


requests to make the initial broad cuts (i.e. top 5 and bottom


5) in performance. The keyword was the suction gage in the
 

vacuum pump scenario and the alternate static source opening in


the blocked static port scenario. The keyword did not
 

necessarily lead to a high rank. Some of the experts were more


concerned about how the subjects arrived at the keyword (i.e.


their 	 information seeking strategey).


b) 	 Relevancy of a request seemed to weigh heavily in the experts'


minds yet there was a great variation among experts in what


constitutes relevancy.


c) 	 Experts often categorized as "poor" those pilots who made


random illogical requests.
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d-) An expert often used a set of personal criteria which


few others even considered.


e) All experts appeared to be concerned with efficiency (making


as few requests as possible and making them relevant).


f) There appeared to be some disagreement as to whether many and


few inquiries are positive or negative features of the search.


Although the experts did not totally agree on a best and worst pilot for


each scenario, there was considerable agreement if the top two and bottom two


are considered alone. Tables 5-5 and 5-6 represent the pilot information


requests of the best and worst subjects in the vacuum pump scenario while


Tables 5-7 and 5-8 do the same for the static port scenario.


H. Expert Comments


Experts often provided useful commentaries after ranking the subjects.


By far, the most frequent concern was the poor performance of the IFR rated


pilots. One expert stated, "I must confess at how surprised I am at lack of


systematic search strategy or information seeking behavior exhibited by these
 

pilots .... It would appear we ought to do a better job in training pilots in


both aircraft systems and in troubleshooting when presented with information


that is inconsistent."
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Table 5-5. Information Requests of Two Pilots Ranked Best


By the Experts on the Vacuum Pump Scenario


Subject #1


Vacuum Pump Scenario


1. What's the manifold pressure reading?


2. Is there any ice on the wings?


3. Is there any ice on the windscreen?


4. What's the outside air tempefature?


5. Can you notice any precipitation?


6. What's the suction gauge reading?


7. What's the magnetic compass reading?


8. What's the directional gyro reading?
 

Subject #13


Vacuum Pump Scenario


1. What are the original readings, again?


2. What's the vertical speed indicator showing?


3. What's the tachometer reading?


4. What's the manifold pressure reading?


5. What does the artificial horizon show?


6. What's the suction gauge reading?
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Table 5-6. Information Requests of Two Pilots Ranked Worst


By the Experts on the Vacuum Pump Scenario


Subject 	 #10 
Vacuum Pump Scenario


1. What happens when I open the alternate static source?
 

2. 	 What were the original indications for the airspeed indicator and
 

altimeter?


3. What's the outside air temperature?


4. What's the tachometer reading?


5. Is there any ice on the wings?


Subject #11


Vacuum Pump Scenario


1. What's the manifold pressure reading?


2. What's the tachometer reading?


3. What's the oil pressure reading?


4. What's the oil temperature reading?


5. What's the current weather report?


6. What is our origin and destination?


7. What is our terrain clearance?


8. How far are we from any mountain ranges?


9. What's the outside air temperature?


10. What's the surface temperature?


11. What's the vertical speed indicator showing?


-12. Were any thunderstorms forecast?


13. What type of clouds are in the 	 vicinity?


14. What do the gear indicator lights show?


15. 	 What are the flaps set at?
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Table 5-7. Information Requests of Two Pilots Ranked Best


By the Experts on the Static Port Scenario.
 

Subject #51


Static Port Scenario


1. What's the forecast freezing level?
 

2. Are there any PIREPS, SIGNETS, or AIRMETS in my area?


3. Is there any ice on the wings?


4. What's the outside air temperature gauge show?


5. What happens when the alternate static source is opened?


6. What happens when the pitot heat is turned on?


7. What's the reading on the suction gauge?


8. Is there any ice on the cowling or wings?


9. What happens when the alternate static source is opened?


Subject #43


Static Port Scenario


1. That's the reading on the vertical speed indicator?


2. What's the reading on the altimeter?


3. What's the outside air temperature gauge show?


4. Is the pitot heat on?


5. What happens when the pitot heat is turned on?


6. What is the artificial horizon showing?


7. What's the tachometer reading?


8. What's the manifold pressure reading?


9. What happens when the alternate static source is opened?
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Table 5-8. Information Requests of Two Pilots Ranked Worst


By the Experts on the Static Port Scenario


Subject #52


Static -ort Scenario


1. 	 Is there any ice on the windscreen or wing?


2. 	 Are there any PIREPS, AIEIMETS, or SIGMETS in my area?


3. 	 What's the forecast freezing level?


4. 	 At what altitude are the cloud tops?


Subject #57 
Static Port Scenario


1. 	 Have any circuit breakers popped?


2. 	 What's the suction gauge reading?


3. 	 What's the airspeed reading?


4. 	 What does the artificial horizon show?


5. 	 What's the altimeter reading?
 

6. 	 What's the turn and bank indicator show?


7. 	 What's the directional gyro reading?,


8. 	 What's the vertical speed indicator show?


9. 	 What's the manifold pressure reading?


10. 	 What's the tachometer reading?
 

11. 	 What's the exhaust gas temperature reading?


12. 	 What tank is the fuel selector set at?


13. 	 What's the oil pressure reading?


14. 	 What happens when the magneto switch is changed to left, right, both, and


off?


15. 	 What happens when the pitot heat is turned on?
 

16. 	 What happens when the prop RPM is advanced?


17. 	 What happens when the prop RPM is decreased?


18. 	 What's the mixture set at?


19. 	 Is there any ice on the cowling, windscreen, wing, flap, aileron, or


stabilizer?


20. 	 What is the door condition?


21. 	 What is the panel temperature?


22. 	 What is the cargo condition?


23. 	 What is the cabin temperature?


24. 	 Is there any smoke in the cabin?


25. 	 What's the housekeeping condition of the cabin?


26. 	 Are there any noticeable fluid leaks in the cabin?


27. 	 Is there any unusual noise or vibration in the-cabin?


28. 	 What's the vertical speed indicator show?
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Another expert commented, "This indicates that pilots, in general, have


an almost unlimited faith in instruments when they're flying." Commenting on


the vacuum pump scenario in particular, this expert described the development


of this classic situation as follows': "Even an expert pilot flying a


single-engine airplane, primarily, with instruments vacuum powered,


1) Is probably not aware of the failure until the instruments have 
begun to lead him astray; and 
2) When this situation does occur, almost in a classic sense the 
graveyard spiral develops and by the time a pilot recognizes 
what the problem is, the attempted recovery frequently results in 
either an unscheduled impact with the terrain or an inflight 
airframe failure." 
As a solution to this problem he suggests, "We might need to look into the
 

possibility of requiring a large red vacuum system failure light or some sort
 

of an annunciator that would provide the pilot, who apparently doesn't


suspect these sorts of things, with an audible or strong visual alerting
 

system."
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I. 	 Conclusions


From the use of an expert panel we-were able to conclude:


1) 	 There was a strong consistency among experts in their ranking of


pilot diagnostic performance. This was especially apparent at


the high and low ends of pilot performance. 
2 The experimenters previously developed grading scheme 
produced a ranking of subjects which correlated strongly with the 
expert rankings. 
3) 	 Without exception, experts were concerned with the


efficiency of subject requests (i.e. requests should be relevant and


few in number);


4) Ranking criteria of experts were variable except at the extremes of


subject performance.


5) Experts were in general appalled that IFR rated pilots could do so


poorly in diagnostic performance.


6) The expert ranking criteria confirmed earlier researcher conclusions
 

about optimal or idealized information seeking strategies; in


particular, the need to:


a) confirm symptomatic problems,


b) 	 establish the orientation of the aircraft (i.e. was the


aircraft in a descent?),


c) cross check to verify instrument accuracy,


U) use minor control inputs to check the aircraft orientation.
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VI. Summary and Conclusions


The tasks set forth in the proposal for continued work "Research on


Computer Aided Testing of Pilot Response to Critical In-Flight Events" (Grant


NAG 2-112) have been accomplished. This project concludes a series of


contracts and grants (NAS 2-10047, NAG 2-75, NAG 2-112 from NASA Ames)


directed toward a fuller understanding of how pilots collect information and


make decisions in the face of critical in-flight events.


The effort reported here focused on developing models of pilot decision


making. 1) New data were obtained from some twenty instrument rated pilots by


a lengthy protocol analysis. These data led to a frame system representation


of how pilots organize a fault diagnosis task. 2) Previously collected
 

computer data were used to describe collective behavior in terms of script


norms, distance between inquiry measures and Markov processes. 3) Recognized


expert pilots were used to rank both new and old subject performances and to


suggest a rationale for good information seeking strategies.
 

By-products of this research effort over the duration of the three grants
 

include 3 M.S. theses, 1 Ph.D. dissertation, 4 conference presentations and 3


journal articles. Additional publications are anticipated. Appendix G lists


these research outputs found in the open literature.


A. Frame System Representation


A frame system has been developed which can account for theperformances


of twenty pilots in diagnosing a vacuum system failure in a light aircraft.


Eighteen frames, all having a common structure are necessary to explain the


data. These frames represent prototypical states of nature. Each frame,
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with the exception of the memory error frame, has an associated set of


triggers,_ a label and two slots.


These frames are organized into a set of hierarchies with seven


high-level frames. All other frames are linked to these high-level frames as


slot-fillers in "Causes" slots. High level frames are activated as a pilot


listens to the scenario. Activation typically uses only part of the


information available in the scenario. The information selected for attention


appears to be caused by 1) occurrence of unexpected events, 2) priming, or 3)


frame-directed attention.


Pilots who identified the problem as an artificial horizon malfunction,
 

but did not reach the root cause of vacuum pump failure, failed to check for


possible causes at the appropriate time. Pilots who never reached a


conclusion failed to ask about expected instrument readings. Those


experiencing difficulty in solving the problem often suffered from memory


distortions and activation of default values.
 

By comparing strategies of successful and unsuccessful pilots


recommendations for a high-level control structure to address the vacuum pump


failure problem can be made. The proposed control structure consists of an


ordered list of objectives along with a set of plans designed to attain these


objectives. The plans act upon the contents of three knowledge-bases and a


working memory. The knowledge bases include 1) the eighteen frames identified


among the test subjects, 2) a set of objectives and plans for attaining them


and 3) the pilot's aviation knowledge and episodic memory of aviation


experiences. The working memory stores the pilot's episodic memories of the
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scenario, the sequence of activated frames, the objectives achieved, the


information requested and a record of the currently activated frame. Such a


normative model could be realized as an expert system.


Pilots who fail to diagnose the problem appear to have the necessary


frames at their disposal, but their high-level control processes deviate from


the suggested normative model. Their processes failed to recognize the


objectives of:


1. 	 Avoiding memory distortions


2. 	 Detecting instrument malfunctions


3. 	 Avoiding incorrect activation of a frame due to inattention


or use of insufficient information


4. 	 Avoiding false inferences due to activation of incorrect


default values


5. 	 Avoiding cognitive narrowing.


B. 	 Grouped Data


Three different approaches were investigated in the search for


descriptions of how pilots as a group search for information in critical


in-flight events. These included script norms, distance measures and Markov


chains.


Script norms were developed by tabulating distributions for the number of


items of information requested by varying number of subjects. The general


shape of the distributions was the same for all five scenarios tested, with


all but one showing a sharp difference at the 20 percent point. A group's


script norm was arbitrarily defined as those items requested by more than


40 percent of the subjects.
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From analyzing these norms it is apparent that group scripts are highly


scenario dependent with traditional instrument clusters showing up as high


frequency items (e.g. oil temperature, cylinder head temperature and oil


pressure were all sought by nearly every subject in scenarios with engine


health overtones). It is also apparent that pilots as a group agree on the


importance of a relatively small number of information items in problem


diagnosis. In the four principal test scenarios the number of items requested


by over 40 percent of the subjects ranged from 7 to 13. These are only small


percentages of the 110 items of information available to CAT subjects.


Clusters of information defined by short distances (i.e. number of


inquiries separating the acquisition of two pieces of information) and high


frequencies of occurrences were identified for past PLATO® subjects in both


the vacuum pump and magneto malfunction scenarios. The purpose of this study


was to sharpen the definition of "tracks" used in earlier flow-graph charts


(PIPS) of pilot information seeking strategies.


By examining the resulting tables it is possible to identify popular


hypotheses about the system failure and the information considered important


to test those hypotheses. The clusters for the more difficult problem (vacuum


pump failure) often contain logically disjoint information reflecting a mix of


hypotheses as subjects jump around in search of supportive information. The


clusters in the magneto drive gear failure scenario may be more indicative of


the true closeness in memory structure among items.


161


Markov chain representations of several groups of pilots were attempted


with limited success. Although groups were selected according to what


appeared to be criteria related to homogeniety among members, the anticipated


multi-stage dependence among inquiries could not be substantiated by the


data. For the groups of pilots and scenarios tested, no stronger dependence


than that of a first order Markov chain could be statistically identified.
 

The failure of the Markov model to adequately describe observed


information seeking behavior is believed to be related to three possible


causes. 1) Individual differences among subjects are too great to permit


grouping observations as though they represented multiple realizations of the


same Narkov chain. 2) The unfamiliar task of collecting information one piece


at a time is inhibiting to the memory processes of expert pilots who normally


"chunk" familiar patterns of stimuli from an aircraft instrument panel.


3) The sample sizes are inadequate to test the model.


C. Panel of Experts


Six well-known aviation experts were used to rank two groups of ten
 

pilots each on the basis of the pilots' information requests. A separate


scenario was used for each pilot group. The groups were selected to include a


mix of pilot experience levels and diagnostic performance. In addition to


ranking pilot performance each expert was asked to verbalize the reasons for


placing each pilot in his relative group position.


The expert rankings were highly correlated with each other as well as


correlated with earlier experimenter derived performance scores. Without


exception, the experts were concerned with efficiency of information requests
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(i.e. requests should be relevant and few in number.) The derived ranking


criteria used by this group of experts confirmed earlier researcher
 

conclusions about idealized information seeking strategy; in particular the


need to


1) confirm symptomatic problems


2) establish the orientation of the aircraft


3) cross check to verify instrument accuracy


4) use minor control inputs to check aircraft orientation.
 

D. Epilogue


The study of pilot response to critical in-flight events has been a


rewarding experience for these researchers. We feel that we have developed a


better understanding of the way pilots do and should organize their


information seeking tasks during problem diagnosis. Our major contributions


have been to document a variety of descriptive models, develop several useful


research tools and accumulate a large data base of pilot performance data for


future study.


Comments by subjects and our panel of experts plus experimenter


observation lead to the uneasy observation that IFR rated pilots generally do


rather poorly in diagnostic performance. The subject pilots were the first to


admit this. Many expressed the feeling that, although humbled by the


experience, participating in any of our experiments should improve their


future diagnostic skills if only by reminding them of the limits of their


knowledge. None thought the exercises, beginning with paper and pencil tests,
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running through GAT simulations, to computer aided tests and finally protocol


testing, were unrealistic. All seemed to agree that such tests were valuable


learning experiences.


The nature of subject comments and their demonstrated performance point


to what may well be the most useful future course for this research. The


research tools which have been developed and tested could easily be adapted to


the pilot training environment. Future support will be sought to accomplish


that goal.


It is also apparent that many pilots have weaknesses in their diagnostic


skills which could be allievated by on-board computer systems. The


development of expert systems to be used in a real-time setting could greatly


improve fault diagnosis performance by pilots'. Future research directed


toward such an electronic co-pilot is in order. Information concerning the


memory structure of pilots modeled in this research should provide a natural


lead-in for that research. Support will also be sought for that effort.


164


REFERENCES


Aikens, J. Prototypicalknowledge for expert systems-. Artificial


Intelligence, 1983, 20, 163-210.


Anderson, J. and Bower, G. Human Associative Memory: A Brief Edition.


Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1980.


Anderson, T. and Goodman, L. Statistical Inference About Markov Chains.


Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 1957, 28, 89-110.


Barr, K., Feigenbaum, E. and Cohen, P. The Handbook of Artificial


Intelligence, (3 vols.) Los Altos, CA: William Kaufman, 1981.


Bower, G., Black, J. and Turner, T. Scripts in memory for text.


Cognitive Psychology, 1979, 11, 177-220.


Davis, R. Expert systems: Where are we? And where do we go from here?


The AI Magazine, 1982, 3-22.


Dember, W. and Warm, J. Psychology of Perception, 2nd ed. New York: Holt,


Rinehart and Winston, 1979.


Gentner, D. and Stevens, A. (eds.), Mental Models. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum,


1983..


Larkin, J., McDermott, J., Simon, D., and Simon, H. Expert and Novice


Performance In Solving Physics Problems. Science, 1980, 208, 1335-1342.


Meyer, D., Schvaneveldt, R. and Ruddy, M. Loci of contextual effects on


visual word recognition. In Rabbit and Dornic (eds.), Attention


and Performance V. London: Academic Press, 1975.


Minsky, M. A framework for representing knowledge. In Winston, P. (ed.)


The Psychology of Computer Vision. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975,


221-277.


Morton, J. A functional model for memeory. In D. A. Norman (ed.), Models of


Human Memory. New York: Academic Press, 1970.


Nau, D. Expert computer systems. Computer, 1983, 16, 63-85.


Nilsson, N. Principles of Artificial Intelligence. Pal Alto, CA: Tioga,


1980.


Norman, D. Learning and Memory. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983.


Pauker, S., Gorry, G., Kassirer, J. and Schwartz, W. Towards the simulation


of clinical cognition. The American Journal of Medicine, 1976, 60,


981-996.


165


Rasmussen, J. and Rouse, W. (eds.) human Detection and Diagnosis of System


Failures. New York: Plenum, 1981.


Rockwell, T. H. and Giffin, W. C. An Investigation Into Pilot and System


Response to Critical In-Flight Events, Volume I and Volume II,


The Ohio State University Research Foundation, NASA Contracts


NAS 2-10047 and NAG 2-75, June, 1981.


Rockwell, T. H. and Giffin, W. C. Use of Computer-Aided Testing in the


Investigation of Pilot Response to Critical In-Flight Events,


Volume I and Volume II, The Ohio State University Research


Foundation, NASA Contract NAG 2-112, December, 1982.


Rummelhart, D. and Siple, P. Process of recognizing tachistoscopically


presented words. Psychological Review, 1974, 81, 99-118.


Schank, R. and Abelson, R. Scripts, Plans, and Goals and Understanding:


An Inquiry Into Human Knowledge Structures. Hillsdale, NJ:


Erlbaum, 1977.


Schank, R. and Riesbeck, C. Inside Computer Understanding. Hillsdale, NJ:
 

Erlbaum, 1981.


Sowa, J. Conceptual Structure. Reading, MA: Addision-Wesley, 1984.


Thorndyke, P. W. and Hayes-Roth, B. The use of schemata in the acquisition


and transfer of knowledge. Cognitive Psychology, 1979, 11, 82-106.


Wilensky, R. Planning and Understanding: A Computational Approach to


Human Reasoning. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1983. 
Winston, P. Artificial Intelligence. 
Wesley, 1984. 
2nd ed. Reading, MA: Addison-
Zechmeister, E. and Nyberg, S. 
1982. 
Human Memory. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 
166


Appendix A


Illustrations of PLAT® Displays


The attached exhibit depicts a small sample of the material


presented to the subject pilot by the PLATOO terminal. The


displays selected for presentation here represent different


facets of the program, e.g. sample biographical questions,


sample knowledge test questions or a representative diagnostic


scenario. The illustrations represent a sample of those


presented to the subject in his response to:


1) fifteen biographical questions


2) twenty knowledge questions


3) six scenarios
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F I T I


iNFLi :HT


E-V E 'S,


Develo:ped Evy: The Ohio 	 State University 
Department f Indutrial Engineerin 
urder a resera :h rant from NASA'RiNES 
Principal Pmesearchers: 	 Dr. T. HRckwell

Dr. I.C. Giif .n

Pr.ovrammer -Ana y-'s: effre, Lee 
H:l_isatant Pr-srammer: Steve S.:' -EleirI

PLATO C',:nLultant; Dave Pomer

I'Touc.Dh the screen an,','wher-e t0 eg'in.) 
ORIGINAL PAGE M 
OF POOR QUALITY, 
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I.NTRODUCTION


Thank /ou. -For i- a subject in this NASA 
supported research project. 
The scenarocs ,ou are about to-see .-
,ers 
devloed not as a device to test your +lyinQ 
espertlse, but rather as a mechanism tor uS 
to better understand how pi!o-ts mi-ht react 
to, certain situations. 
12'-or mrenv o,- the flyino situations presented 
f.,-st as in rea1 li-fe) there are no bo . Us 
ns-,-re. What -we w nt to -find Out s hot-w you 
approach problem s-olvnq. These are not games 
an the sense that ,. compete wath the 
corputer or any.one el=a. We a.u wi 
jndthe =canarics to be real istic situations 
a rdlct must occasionally conFront. For the 
notprt, '-he rflanrm'os are not dvnama c 
is. the instrument panel does not reflect 
chanoes over time. In efect the terminal acts 
not iL: a .Flight simulator.. but rather as a 
device, t, present in-formation ='-- ,,an 
u.nderstand pilot dapnost3.c end decE-r,. 
ORIGINAL PAGE MS


OF POOR QUALITY
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CIFE Rcu~ 
ORIGINAL PAGE ' 
OF POOR QUALITY 
i. irphica1 Dia.gOnostc 
-- Dest inat ion 
urve\ Scerar i o . I Di vers ion Test 
Kn.w I edge Di 4Ano ti. irp-ort Ranking 
Surve, Scenario Te s t 
VO­ iagnostic_ 
- utop i Iot Scenario -#9,3 
Diasnno.tic 
Scenario *!,.f(4 
Dia.t'no5t c 
Scenar io *IfS 
D i av--nosti 
Scenario #96 
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ORIGINAL PAGE I2OF POOR QUALITY, 
BIOGR'APHICAL DATA


Touc-h the screen anywhere to begin the biographical survey. 
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ORIGINAL PAGE K


OF POOR QUALITY


Question No. 1 
Enter Pilot Certificate by Touch Panel


Pilot
SalStudent 
 
b) Priate Pilot 
c) Commercial Pilot 
d) Air Transport Pilot 
When you have made your- final SELECTION:


ENTER 
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ORIGINAL PAGE 10 
OF POOR QUAUTV 
Quest ior No. 2


Erter Airman Ratings Held by Touch Panel


a) Repairman g) ASEL


b) Rir frame Mechanic h) AMEL


H Rotary Wing
Powerpant Medan ic 
d) Flight Engineer j) Inspection Author-W Instrurnt Rat ingt izat ion


k) 
 None of the above


f) Certified Flight


Instructor


FINAL finalizes 
 ERASE removes


above entries, last entry.


FINAL ERASE
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ORIGINAL PAGE M


,OF POOR QUALITY


KNOWLEDGE URVEY


Touch the screen anywhere to begin the kndwledge 5urvey. 
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ORIGINAL PAGE M 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Question No. 1 
Mihat is the standard ad abatic lapse rate? 
W 2°F per 1ZZ feet. 
b) 2.5 0 F per I ZEZ feet. ­
o) 3OF per iZz0 feet.. 
c) 3.5F per 1ZZZ feet. 
e) 4*F per fZZ feet. 
When you hay, made your final SELECTION: 
ENTER 
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ORIG!NAL PAGE F 
OF-POoR QUALM? 
Question 	 No. 2 
Do the indications of a normally operating


alternator system change during the course of a


flight? (Assume charge-discharge ammeter)


a) Yes: Ammeter shows more charge when electrical


equipment turned on.


b)] Yes: 	 Ammeter shows less charge when electrical 
equipment turned on. 
c) 	 After engine start, the ammeter shows a higher


than normal rate of charge and gradua1ly'


declines t6 normal rate.


d) 	 No, does not change.


When you 	 have made your final SELECTION: 
ENTER 
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ORIGINAL PAGE 0' 
OF POOR QUALITY 
OZCNOSfIC SCENARIO TEST 
Instruct ions: 
You. have a ma'ximum of' 4 minutes for each 
diagnostic scenario. Since these are 
potential emergency situations, please 
answer the question as soon as you feel 
that you have a solution. 
P 1ease press CONTINUE when ,ou are read,/ 
to start the test.


NTTJNUE
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ORIGINAL PAGEld


OF POOR QUALITY


fBrakr it] 
 
LW 
 
1lstr P; tot 
&wcb Heat 
MG I G1r Ca11 Tras i (Sue 
POip pondtiTC 
TzB OS) VS 
V R)D/O EC(T FuelI 
2 ~ Selc 
~TerP[j12 J 
H e a d 
 f o i l -I UGear Flaps Throt Prop Mix Alt j
ok RPN 3*ati j 
E FTCOi IPres: 
 
Intfo


Infoextremely Iow - near peg 
Info 
Ext 
Scen­
ario 
_GIVE 
ITime: 2:53jScenario: H ANSR 
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ORIGINAL PAGE 9 
OF POOR QUALITY 
IBreeCol1 C1o2 Trans j lPanel 
 oM 
 o /1St 
ADE OR EG ue l1 
Time_1_____Seario 
 2 t
, NS 
Hd Te:5 [ Fu7el
:WeTern 
rstr Pitot ti Gear Flap* Throt GIVProp [Mix AltS w eb H e a t ' , Y o k e 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _R P _M_ _ _ _ _ _ S__ _ _ c_ _ 
increase Prop increase RPM: ATC


RPMC-as normalI response n 
RPM Info 
EInfo 
ITime: 1:02FScenario; zi GV
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ORIGINAL PAGE W~OF POOR QUALITY 
.Information for External Condit ions


Cow Iing Windscreen Coindiir 
Conditionndition Condition 
Flap Aileron 
 Stabilizer 
Condition Condition Condit.ion

Cowling Condition: 

clean and secure 

Time:Z:15 Scenario: zi 
AT 

Info 

lnt 

Info 

Panel 

Scan­

ario 

GIVE 
RsR 

180. 

ORIGINAL PAGE W, 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Information for Inside Cabin Conditions


Condition Condition Conditi'on


Cabin Temp Housekeeping


Condit ion Condition 
Smoke Fluid Leaks Noise &
= Vibrat iorn 
Fluid Leaks: Instr
Panel


oil droplets on floor ITC


In fo
Ext 
I n fo, 
. Scen­
ario 
GIVE 
1 ANSRTime: 3: IZff Scenario:.­
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ORIGINAL PAGE F' 
OF POOR QUALITY 
ATC Information for Diagnostic Purposes 
D3Ceiing ViibiIity CIoud Tops


Winds Aloft Freezing


SPIREPS SIG[NETS AIRMETS


'NAVGround Speed AID 
In;tr
Freezing Level: 
Inf


area forecast-

Info 
.Scen­
ario


GIVE 
[Time: 2:131 Scenario: ZI I NSj 
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ORIGINAL PAGE U1' 
OF POOR QUALITY 
STC ____ 
Panel Ininfo 
Ext Scen- GIVE 
UInfo ario ANSR 
You have chosen GIVE ANSWER. 
If you are ready to give your 
diagnosis of the scenario,


please touch the GIVE FNSR


button; else touch an alternate


button to continue the test.


ITime: 1:57 Scenario: 01 
 
183 
1 
ORIGINAL PAGE 
 
OF POOR QUALITY


1 aileron 26 elevator 51 landing 76 rudder 
2 alternator 27 engine 52 latch 77 screen 
3 altimeter 28. exhaust 53 leaking 78 screw


4 baffle 29 failure 54 left 79 seal


5 battery 3Z filter 55 line 8Z seizure


6 belt 
 31 fire 56 loose 81 smoke


7 blocked 32 flap 571 los 82 starter


8 bottom 33 flow 58 lost 83 starvation


9 broken 34 fouled 59 magneto 84 satic


1H burst 35 frozen 6Z mixture 85 stuck


II cable- 36 
 fuel 61 motor 86 suction


12 cap 37 gasket 62 oil 87 switch


13 carburetor 38 gauge 63 partial 88 tank


14 C/5 fuse 39 gear 64 pedal 89 temp.


15 cock 4Z govenior 65 piston 9Z throttle


16 complete 41 gyro 66 pitot 91 tip


17 condenser 42 heat 67 plugs 92 top


18 control 43 hot 66 points 93 vacuum


19 cold 44 hydraulic 69 popped 94 valve


2H cowlir 45 ice 7H port 95 vapor


21 crankshaft 46. ignition 71 pressure 96 vibration


22 cylinder 47 induced 72 prop


23 door 48 induction 73 pump


24 drive 49 instrument 74 right


25 electrical 5Z jets 75 ring


oil gauge line


leaking 
 WWWE 
4 IF5]6]M 
EJwSESTOREZI 
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ORIGINAL PAGE 19 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Question No. 2


How long do you th-i-nk the a-irplane -wQid f15?


a) g - 5 minutes 
b) 5 - 3Z minutes 
fuel permitsF as long as 
 
When you have made your final SELECTION:


ENTER 
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ORIGINAL PAGE M'. 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Question No. 3


How critical do you judge this problem to be?


(I is the least critical and 7 i: the most criti-cal)


a) 1


c) 3


d) 4

e) S


f 6

g)7


When you have made your final SELECTION:


ENTER 
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ORIGINAL PAGt vU


OF POOR QUALITY


Question No. 4


-How -con-fidebt are you about your diagnosis? 
(i is the Ieast confident and I0 is tie most confident) 
a) I f) 6

b) 2 g) 7

c) 3 h) 8

d) 4 i) 9

e) 5

When you have made your final SELECTION':


ENTER 
187


Appendix B


Description of Diagnostic Scenarios


and Their -Answersfor Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6*


*Scenario -#5 is found in Figure 7 
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PRCEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMEfl 
Th-u are makiig a day trip fro--.m 
Al1bany, NY to Burl inrvton4 ,VT. Ycou 
fly, out Cf ,lbany at 9 :f'arn. cleaZ.red 
Victor-91, Burlingtor. You climb to a 
cruisirg altitude o&f 7gZft. Af+er 
2Z minutes of ro.tine I11C fly,ing 
t),, notice the smell of engine oil. 
How wou.ld 5)ou diagnose t.lie problem? 
ORIGINAL PAGE -M


OF POOR QUALITY


I| Panre I Inf:
EExt,t 
N~TC


,, 	 GIVE 
A'NSIRST e: 'enaric.: ­
190


Our diagna.=-.is of the problem was the follc*win: 
A smal I crack developed in the *:i 1 1 ine 
feeding the oi l pressure gau.ge. This 
crack reduced the oil pressure reading 
drast ic a I , but d id not .er iousl , 
a ffect the actual Tubri6at i'on of the 
engine. A 5mall pool of oil began to 
form on the floor of the cabin, pilot's 
side. Assuming that the cracked line 
would not deteriorate quickl, into a 
complete break, you were in no immediate 
danger of ensine seizure. 
ORIGINAL PAGE !9 
OF POOR QUALITY 
CONT i NUIE
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ORIGINAL PAGE If 
You are maiking a day) trip frori OF POOR QUALIT 
Hugus+a, ME to, Lebanon, NH. You 71'. 
out o f ftLuguata at 9: .Z am, ci ear,:d 
Victor 39 +o Neets intersection, 
Victor 496 to Lebanon. You climb to 
a cruisim altitude of 6.2"0 ft.fter 
IS minu.tes of routine IMC fl-ing in 
i-nstrument cond i-t ions, .,our nstrument ­
indicate an increase in airspeed and 
steadil V decreasing altitude while 
maintaining level flight attitude. 
How,,l ,1di.onousthewoul prt*lern?
 
Pane ![ Int 
Info 
_ __ I GI 'VE 
fZ ANSRTime: Scenario: 
192 
Our diagnosis cf the pr-oblem was the fcl!owing: 
Your vacuum pump fail eci as indicated bt) 
the low reading of the- suction gauge. 
The vacuum pump dr ives +he attitude ard 
directional gyros.As the artifi-:ial 
bsori zso.- -Lost i-ts -,dr-ive rt starte-to s-ag 
to the right and you compensated by,, 

turning left, level ing the artificial 
horizon and putting the plane in a .5low, 
descendin. left bank. The airspeed in­
crease was dcue to the .51ight no-e-down 
att+.itrude.


ORIGINAL PAGE W 
OF pOOR QUALITY 
fT 1[9 U.EJ
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ORIGINAL PAGE U 
OF POOR QUALITW 
You are making a da',., trip from 
Keene, NH to Montpe! iier, VT. You 
fly out of Keene at 10:30 am, cleared 
Victor-151 to Montpelier. You climb 
to a cruising altitude of 50Z9 ft. 
After 2. minutes of routine cruise in 
IMC your engine suddenl 5tarts 
running e>tremel , rough, shaking the 
whole plane and losing about 20. of 
its cruise power. 
How ould oc'u diagrose the probl em? 
Intrt 
Pane I 
I nt 
. 
InfoExt 
I n f-:, 
MATC­
____ __ ____ __ ____ ___G IVE 
Time: I . .NbR Scenari.:F3 
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Our diagnc,.si- of the problem was the f-,llowing:


Your engine suffered -a broken dr ive 
gear in the right magneto. The 
resultant u.ntimed ignit.ion conflic:ted 
with the remaining good inition and 
caused.+he ext-reme-l-y rough -engi-ne and 
backfirin. Switching from 'both' to 
the left magneto would have resulted in 
a smooth running engine with slightly 
less power than normal cruise.


ORIGINAL PAGE 10 
OF POOR QUALITY


'::c:r"'TTNLiE
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LSCenar i o ORIGINAL PAGE jOF POOR QUALITY 
You are making a dav trip from San­
ford, ME to Messena, NY. - You 'y/ ou.t 
of Sanford at 8:3Zam, cleared Victor­
496 to Lebanon, Victor-141 to P1-S,3ena 
You climb to a cruise altitude of 6 ,. 
Alfter 2. mi INC flk)in , Boston 
Center instructs Vou to climb and main­
tain 1Z..9j.Jft.You a.knowledge and begin 
your climb betujeen wIers. After 2 min 
of climbvou notice your indicated air­
speed dropping off vteadilyfrom 1ggkts. 
maintaining constant pitch attiude.


How cu-.l.d 'ou d iagnose the probler? 
Instr 
Pane I 
Info 
E-.,t­
in fo 
In f,:, 
GIVE 
'4 ANSRTime: Scenrio: 
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Our diagnosis of the problem was the fi Iowir 
As "ou climbed through 6Sf.zft, the 
static port froze over as the outside 
air temperature dropped beloj 32'F. 
This caused the airspeed indicator to


decrease as a-ituitude -increased and the 
VSI and altimeter to read low. 
Several ,corrective acticns iuere 
possible: return to ;our previous alti­

tude of 6fljfft; open the alternate


static source; break the VSI .las.


ORIGINAL PAGE 'g 
OF POOR QUALITY 
O4TI P'sIEI 
197


scanar3a o 
You are maiiMc a 
Plontpelier.VT t_­
day trip from 
_anoorjIE with ORIGINAL PAGE E 
two passengers on beard. YOU 51v oUt of OF POOR QUALITY 
Montpelier at i:0,)pm, cleared radar 
vectors to Wylie intersection. direct 
Auousta. Victor Z to Eanoor. You 
climb to a cruising altitude of 9,:YMft. 
Arter 30 minutes of routine flvinc in 
instrument conditions watn li.ht to 
moderate turbulence, one -f y.our 
passengers reoort=_ smellinq a faint 
burning odor. You are unable to detect 
the odor because VoLU have a head cold. 
What is the farst thin-, Vou Would do? 
Instr 
Panel 
Int 
Ext 
Info 
ATC 
Info 
GIVE 
Time: Scenario: 06 ANSR 
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C0 H T r N' U E 
Our di agnosi=s of the problem was the -fellowino


Rear seat carpeting was smoldering. 
The rear seat paseencer lit a 
cigarette shortly after takeoff. When 
he disposed o it in the ashtr-iv, it was 
not comletelv extincuished. The 
cigarette -ell down from the ashtray 
and was begnoin, to char upholstery 
material. The fire was easily 
eXtinguished. once recognized and posed 
no immediate danger to the flight. 
ORIGINAL PAGE S 
OF POOR QUALITY 
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Appendix C 
A Sample of Subject Data 
BUANK NOT, FILMEDPAGEPRECEDING 
201 
~~~siw ON XYstAR 
TEST version


ORIQINAL PAGE M


OF POOR QUALITY


DATA DISPLA"'


Th-s program-reports the data collected 
by the CRITICAL IN-FLIGHT EVENT program. 
Each display is a record of responses 
given by a student for each phase of the 
CRITICAL IN-FLIGHT EVENT program. 
Function keys provided:


CONTINUE will advance to the next display 
REVIEW will return to the previous display 
MENU will access the main menu display 
RESTART will start the program again


Please enter the student that you wish to view. 
(For example: studentZ4i) 
student75 
Press NET when entered.
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NHME: --CfenrZ75 
**ci fel Biographical Surve5I DATE: Z6/Z9/82


ORIGINAL PAGE 9, 
OF POOR QUALITY 
QUESTION ANSR QUESTION ANSR 
c (3)5 (7) 
2 1 e 
_________ 
2 h (8) 
2 g (7) 
3 f (6) 
4 b (2) 
5 d (4) 
6 f (6) 
7 f (6) 
a f (6) 
9 f (6) 
12" a (1) 
11 
12 
b 
b 
(2) 
(2) 
13 b (2) 
14 c (3), 
C'TT N EII MENU REV I E,,J
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DATA DISPLAY I NANE: st;dent07S 
**ci fe2 KnowlIedge.Survey DATE: Z6/09/82 
QUESTION ANSR 'AREA QUESTION ANSR AREA 
Cx= ir-crr-ectItIx= i nz--recf3I 
'I c 3 1i b 1 
2 c 2 12 b 3 
x 3 b 2 13 a 1 
4 b 2 x 14 e 3 
5 b 1 15 a 2 
6 C 2 x 16 b 3 
7 a 1 17 b 1 
8 a 3 18 C 3 
9 b 2 19 d I 
1." a 2 _ 29 ' 1 
SCORE =73.9% 
AREA TOTAL TOTAL 
MISSED IN AREA 
1) Engine and fuel systers 7 7 
2) Electrical zystems and 3 7 
cockpit instrumentation 
3) Wleather and IFR operations 4 6 
IC:ONTINIE I MEN UI IREV IE1,J


oRIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
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DATA DISPLAY NAME: .studentZ7 5 
*.,cif e3 Diagnostic Scenario "42 DATE: '6/0r9/82


I* *:cenejff2 
1,.:OJNT INUEI 
 
ORIGINA[L 
OF POOR QUALIW


ITEM CURRENT 
VALUE 
ai Ieron 
flap 
cowling 
windcreen 
wi n_ 
stab i izer 
panel ternp 
OAT 
breaker panel 
alt static 
alt static open 
alt static closed 
pitot heat 
pitot heat on 
pitot heat off 
freezing level 
cloud tops 
ceiling 
visibility 
PIREPS 
SIGNETS 
AIRIETS 
MENUIi IREV'IE LJ 
PAGE f 
TIME
c.ec] 

6 
19 
15 
17 

2kf 
22 
44 
62 

81 

89 

96 

lzi 

18 

117 

123 

15Z 

157 

162 
174 

18H 

183 

185 

ATIMEClaec] 
4 
2 
3 
2 
22 
18 
19 

8 

7 

5 

7 
9 

6 

27 

7 
5 
12 

6 
3 
2 

45 
DISPLAY 
Ext info 
Ext info 
Ext info 
Ext info 
 
Ext info 
E-xt info 
Int info 
intr pan 

instr pan 

irs5tr pan 

inatr pan 

instr pan 

instr pan 

instr pan 

instr pan 

ATC info 

ATC info 

ATC info 

RTC info 

ATC info 

FTC info 

FTC info 
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DATA DISPLAY NRAME: student.O7 5 
**cife3 Diagnostic Scenario 42 DATE: 06/09/82 
*\%ceneZ2 
1) LEXICON RESPONSE: static-
ORIGINAL PAGM V 
OF POOR QUALITY 
2) FLYING TIME LEFT: as long as fuel permits


3) HOW CRITICAL PROB(1-7): 5


4) HOW CONFIDENT OF OWN DIGC(1-i'): 5 
5) FLYING TIME LEFT(with our diag): 5-3Z minutes 
6) HOW CRITICAL PRO5(with our diag): 5 
CONT I HUE 1EN I REV I EW
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DATA DISPLAY INAIIE: student 275 
**cife4 Destination Diversion Test DATE: H/Z9/82 
ORIO ,4LpAGE I 
OF POOR QUALI17-Y 
Based on the information you. have received


so far, would you normal ly. attempt this flight? 
YES


rTCONSINUEI IENU I REV I EJ
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DATA DISPLAY INAME: stulentd 5 
**cife4 Destination Diversion Test DATE: f6/,Z9/'82 
TIME TIME ATiME" 
e] tgeCiIRPORT ea- sec3 RIPORTJ.. IL INFO QUERIED 'rINFO QUERIED
112 12 ! 
­
2 6 2 5 approach aids 
 (4) 
J26 -6 5 ATC services (5) [
41 15 1


44 3 1 approach aids (4) 
46 2 1 ATC serv ices (5) 
5H 4 1 ceii ing (2) 
53 3 1 vi-sibi 1ity (3) 
SCONTINUE MENU I REVIEWJ


ORIGINAL PAGE f9


OF POOR QUALITY 
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DATA DISPLAY jNAfIE: studentZ 75


**,%cife4 Destination Diversion Test DATE: 96/Z9/82


"studentff7" 'ha's chosen airport" 01 
ORIGINAL PAGE 5'


OF POOR QUALITY


CONTINUE1 1 MENU 1 REVIEW I­
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I 
DATA DISPLAY NAME: stude-nto7i S5 
cife Preyious CIFE Question DATE: 06/H9/82


questi on


Have vou ever had a CIFE in any of the areas?


Electrical


Ice 
ORIGINAL PAGE IU 
OF POOR QUALITY 
1CONTINUE I ENU REVIEIAJ
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Appendix D


Combined Destination Diversion and Diagnostic Scenario


A Sample of Comuuter Displays


211


ORIGINAL PAGE S 
OF POOR QUALITY 
TEST veLrsion 
DIAGNOSTIC SCENARIO TEST 
We are now going to present to you some 
Critical In-Flight Events requiring your


diagnosi5 of the problem. 
Assume that you are flying a fuel­
injected Cherokee Arrow (N1236) with the 
following performance speci ficat ions: 
Cruise Speed = 135 KTAS (65% pjar @ 7Z9H9 ft.) 
Fuel Flow (65Y pwr.) = 1Z GPH


Usable Fuel Capacity = 48 gallon:s 
Endurance = 4.8 hou.rs (no reserve) 
Range = 648 nautical miles (ro wind, no re-eserve) 
Press CONTINUE, when fini.-shed readirg. 
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ORIGINAL PAGE iS


OF POOR QUALITY


Consult attached simpli fied low altitude chart. 
You are on an IFR flight from Utah Municipal Airport 
to Hav-en Countyj Airport. You depart or V-Il0 at 6zZg ft 
in your Cherokee Arrow (N123B) which is equipped 
With a 3-axis autopilot. There is a NOTAM .out which 
reports that Colorado VOR is out of service during 
the period ,ou plan to ravigate. Navigate uirg Ohish 
and California VORs. You have been enroute 6 minutes 
from Utah Municipal Airport. You are on the gauges 
but the ride is smooth. Weather briefin.g indicated 
that winds at 6.Zm were expected tc. be light and 
Variable. 
You have one paa.senger aboard. 
Weather at: 
Haven Couty Airport= 2Z.ffJ & 5
 

Ohigh= izmz & 3 
Iird Falls= lMYff & 3 by a C-172 
(1Z minutes a.go) 
Cleve center calls and reports radar *:>.-nt act is lost. 
P lease report present posit ior. 
Whe:.n read press the CONTINUE bu-tto t,--.2>1so3
-',D.. . ho- VOR . i~pl-av. to ea--ablish posi--, ion. 
2U3


ORIGINOL 6V1 I


0F. POOR QUALITYC3000 
ES -.........LLSAPD 
a 2009 
S01 
oo 
PATTC 
11 
-_4oR 
j O 
WAY,7f/c 
0 
40o' 
4/ 
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ORIGINAL PAGE W 

OF POOR QUALITY 

DG 
HED ING ALTITUDE 
SELECTED SELECTED 
VOR 1 VOR 2 
\ ~, IFR~ K,fP 

OBS /'2 Q.--"" " 

AUTO 
1l VORI . VORZ CTFLS 
keypa
___h_ 
-
I 'iabo~x thenext to Jpres=OCONTINUE. 
A orvia he e )pd tothewhen tbrosh. 
T Time: Scenari -: DF I 
215 

POSITION REPORT


P1ease report, your pos it i on b,' pressing 
the TO or FR buttons-for the VOR of 
Vour choice. (Choose at least two VCPs) 
Ty.'pe in your po.-iti-or via-the- keyboard 
at the gi ven arrow, then press the 
NEXT key to enter it. 
Caiiforn ia M 40" ok 
VOR< 
Utah r'urir 26ok; 
Oh i -.1 
VOR


ORIGINAL PAGE 9 
OF POOR .QUALITYPress CONTINUE 
after ',-ou have 
made your report 
216


Last ClearanceP 
' ORIG1NAL PAGE 
T: Respon-se: OF POOR QUA LITY 
NI23B, thanks for the position report.


Here is yc,ur new c 1earance:


proceed direc;t California VOR direct


Haven C,-,unt, ' Airport at 6'0.Y.


There will be opposite traffic


at 59 .. main ain 6OZZ.


P1 ease con firm vusr new head in.


and altitude after y,our tu.rr.


STime: 7;3t1 Senario: f5! sM_2 
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ORIGINAL PAGE M~ 
OF POOR QUALITY 
SCENARIO CHANGE


While practicing,hand flying 
with your autopilot disengaged, 
you notice that increased nose-up 
trim is required to maintain a 
constant indicated altitude and 
that your IAS has decreased 2Zkt5. 
from normal cruise.


Your passenger notes this problem,


and suggests that you turn back


to Utah Municipal.


Determine the nature of the problem, 
and your destination decision. 
-Time: Scenario: I r 
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ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Ireaker 'NRG COM! C0112 Trans ISuc


Pane 1 %COMP/ pond ,tion/


OAT AT AS ,A--H ALT-" IO MP t/TCH.
, 	 ALTN y:p\ "pip ,
 
. M, 	 . _.
 \._,,TCHN
(-c	 I,-.
 
In 	 o
,\j,". \.K , J ',.... _.,
-

O 011 ~fERight 	 C 
Matr Pito 	 Gear Flaps Throt Prop Pih AIt
j
Sl,.ich He+. oe 	 RPM Saric 
ic 
 for,'Jard 	 Yoke:


ithere i-B backpressure,


back j 	 5 " 
left 
neu+ral 
Time: 2:iSceriari,: M 
219 
In format ion for Inside Cabin Cond it ions 
Cargo Door Pane Temp 
Condiiiti Condition Condition 
Cabi-n Temp Housekeep ing 
Condition Condition 
Fluid Leaks Noise &-. 
V ibr"ation


ORIGINAL PAGE 19


OF POOR QUALITY


Housekeep i ng Co-nd i t ion: 
no 
 loose 
 itemsM


Time: 4:?TDl Scenar i::t5____ 
220


Information for External Conditions 
Col1 ing indscreen Wi ng 
Condiion Conditior Cond it i on 
Flap ti leron Stabi lator 
CU,ndit i on Condition Condition 
ORIGINAL PAGE U, 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Cow I i ng Cond it i.tn:


:lean and secUre


Time: 4: 461 S;enar i o: 
221


REQUEST OF ATC INFO


Ceiling Visibility Cloud Tops Winds Aloft 
PIRPS SIGMETS AIPRMETS 
~'Ground NAV AIoD Free=zin-.-
Speed 
 Status 
 Level


Pio isl 
COMMUNICATION WITH ATC Pilot is


IPilot requests del ar i ng an emergenc,


deg chang ing heading 4H ol

m heading change 
 
I altitude change ft 0 changing altitude 55Z.9fa., 
Confirm new heading and altitude Heading: Pi deg 
after Your turn. Altitude: .Z ft 
Pilot would like to advise ATC of a problem and 
may need to make head ing arid altitude chang:es.


FTC response:


Understand dec lar i rig


emergency enter heading


or altitude change 
ORIGINAL PAGE 10 
OF POOR QUALITY 
222


ORIGINAL PAGE h 
OF POOR QUALITY 
Panel Comm Info 
SEtScen­
-O 
Info M ario M ,utopi lot 
- La st Deci-
ClIetar sion


You have come t, a dec is :r 
If you are ready to declare your aircraft 
dest i nat i or and di agnos is: 
+hen touch the Deciaion bu.tton above 
el5e touch an alternative buttoDn 
to continue the test. 
Time: 7T:5,-I Scenario: F._ 
223


Please enter /-our dest1nation decision


via the keyboard.


home port ok


Please enter the estimated time to .;our destination 
Ha Z 3Z minutes 
b) 3Z - 69 minutes


c) 6H - 9. minutes


d) -reater than 99 minutes


When you have made ,,our final! SELECTION: 
ORIGINAL PAGE 50 
OF POOR QUALITY 
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1 aileron 26 elevator 51 landing 76 ring 
2 alternator 27 engiine 52 leaking 77 rudder 
3 altimeter 28 e-xhaust 53 lean 78 screen 
4 baffle 29 fatiilure 54 left 79 screw 
5 battery 39 filter 55 line 8H seal 
6 belt 31 fire 56 loose 81 seizure 
7 blocked 32 flap 57 lost 82 smoke 
8 bottom 33 flow 58 low 83 starter 
9 broken 34 fouled 59 magneto 84 starvation 
1.f burst 35 frozen 69 mixture 65 static 
11 cabin 36 fuel 61 motor 86 structural 
12 cap 37 gasket 62 none 87 stuck 
13 carburetor 38 gauge 63 oil 88 suction 
14 C/5 fuse 39 gear 64 partial 89 switch 
.15 complete 4Z governor 65 pedal 90 tank 
16 condenser 41 g,.ro 66 p i 5ton 91 temp. 
17 cDontrol 42 heat 67 pitot 92 throttle 
18 co,ld 43 high 68 plugs 93 tip 
19 cowling 44 hot 69 points 94 top 
22 crankshaft 45 hydrau I i c 7H popped 95 vacuum 
21 cylinder 46 ice 71 power 96 valve 
22 don't kno, 47 ignition 72 pressure 97 vapor 
23 door 48 induction 73 prop 98 vibratioen 
24 drive 49 instrument 74 pump 99 wing 
25 electrical 59 jets 75 right 
don' t know 
Am~w~pI IWORD E 
ORIGINAL PAGE gg 
OF POOR QUALITY 
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Appendix E


Destination Diversion Test:


A.Sample of Computer Displays 

ORIGINAL PAGE M 
OF POOR QUALITY 
PRECEDING PAGE -BlANK NOT FIEMEIY 
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ORIGINAL PAGE IS


OF POOR QUALITY


Exhibit 1 
Exhibit A. is a simplified weather chart of the North­

eastern and Northcentral United States, and Southeastern


and Southcentral Canada. The hypothetical flight we will


consider will take place in the area surrounded by the


dashed lines. You can see this area includes Vermont,
 

New Hampshire, and parts of Maine, Massachusetts, New


York, and Quebec.


CONTINUE


228


ORIGINAL PAGE 15


OF POOR QUALITY


IV conditions prevail over most of our area of concern,


except over northeastern New York, where conditions are


slightly better. More detailed weather information will


be provided ,when appropriate.


ICONTINUE IREVIEUDJ 
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ORIGINAL PAGE 9 
OF POOR QUALITY 
SCENARIO 
You are at the Bangor International Airport .in 
Bangor,Maine, and desire to fly to Glens Falls, New 
York, for a 1:EZ p.m. business meeting (shown in Fig. 
i) . The current time is 9:ZZ a.m. and you feel you can 
be ready for departure by lZ:ZH a.m. after you conduct 
all necessary preflight activities. 
The plane you will be flying today is your company.s 
Cherokee Arrow (NBZ8WbD. You have flown this


particular plane several times before and regard it as


a reliable airplane. A brief list of the important


performance figures and IFR equipment on board is shown


in Table I.


CONT INUE! REVIEWJ
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ORIGINAL PAGE MS


OF POOR QUALITY


'TABLE-I 
Iport ant .Specs. and Per formarce_ Fiures 
Cruise Speed = 135 KTAS (65% pwr. @ 7Z20 ft.) 
Fuel Flow (65% pwr.) = 1H GPH 
Usable Fuel Capacity 48 gallons 
Endurance' = 4.8 hours (no rtserve) 
Range = 648 nautical miles (no wind, no reserve) 
IFR Equipment on 5oard 
2 NAV/COMMs 
2 VOR/ILS indicators 
I ADF


1 Three-light marker beacon receiver


1 Transponder (not encoding)


1 Single axis autopilot


ICONTINUEJ REVIEW
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ORIGINAL PAGE 9-
OF POOR QUALITY 
The aircra-t' s fuel tanks are- fu-l I, and a fter 
a very thorough preflight inspect ion, you conc 1ude 
that it is operationally and legally ready for the 
flight.


Now your attention turns to the weather and fil ing


a flight plan. You call"the nearest Flight Service


Station on the telephone and obtain the weather infor­

mation in Table II.


ICONTINUEJ IREVIEW
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ORIGINAL PAGE M 
OF POOR QUALITY 
TABLE II 
for Glenn FalIs (New York): The weather is currently 
"1909 feet overcast and 3 miles visibility in rained 
It is forecast to stay that way until 1:Z p.m., 
local time, when it should improve to 1SZ overcast 
and 5 miles visibility. 
for Bangor (Maine)- The weather is currently "Izgf 
feet overcast and 3 miles visibility in rain and fog." 
It is forecast to remain unchanged except for a chance 
of 5zi feet overcast and 1 mile visibility in rain, 
drizzle, and fog. 
for Albariy (New York): The weather is currently "IZE2


feet overcast and 4 miles visibility in light rain.


It is forecast to remain the same until 1:.HZ p.m., at


which time it should improve to "1500 feet overcast


and 4 miles.


Winds aloft: from the southwest(200) at 3H knots at 
all altitudes up to 9000 feet. 
Icing Level: 10,000 feet


No PIREPs reported


1CONTINUE IREVIEW
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ORIGINAL PAGE W 
OF POOR QUALITY 
TABLE III


FLIGHT PLAN


1. TYPE .AIRCRAFT .AIRCR.FTTE TRUE 5. DEPARTURE . DEPARTURE


TIME 
PT. 
AI RSPEE
OUFR NES 	 -. UIT/ P. 135 TS. BGR prop A± 	 OVFR OofAIRCRAF SPECAL E 
10.
V.R
.ROUTE OF FLGHT


V3 to Augusta V0R V39 t:o Neet5 inter-ction V,496


to Glenn Falls


9- DESTINATION ia'. ES.T. TIME" ENROUTE i i.REMARKS


GFA HOURS MINUTES


(GlIenn Fa Ills) 2 1 

1. FUEL ON BOARD 12. ALTERNATE R.T.RPORT (S] 14. PILOT'S NAME is- NUMER 
HOURS 	 MINUTES A I banV SA. 
4 1 5H" 
id- COLOR OF AIRCRAFT


Red 	n Wite
 CLOSE *vFRFLIGHT. WITH-.... FSS 
ON ARRIVAL


SCONTINUE] 	 REVIEW
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ORIGINAL PAGE 0 
-OF POOR QUALITY 
TN. ema-Qcr, AirportS
T. N.


VRiR= 150W 
LE114'CN VM 
Nests*~ Eber-t:t~ur 
rota! Disatancs- =9 "IGLE F74hIS "CR 
Gie Falls Airport 
DESCRIPTION OF THE FLIGHT:


You were cleared to the Glen Falls airport "as filed".


You lifted off from Bangor at 10:00 a.m., and your


departure was routine. At 1: 14 (14 minutes after


departure) you reached your cruising level of 800Z feet


and were established on V3 northeast of the Augusta


VOR.


!CONTINIJE
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ORIGINAL PAGE 
Op POOR QUALITY 
er-NR VCR 
Mar~cr Flirpcrt 
VAR= 15°W


qLabel


t t5 Lirrr 
Bsl


QS'LTRaS VCR rotal Distaj= 2S Ml 
Glen Palls Alirpcr-t 
At 11:21 (i hour 21 minutes after departure) you cross 

Grump intersection. One minute later you hear a short


static noise over your radio speakers. At the same


time you notice you VOR needles and their "on-off"


flags flicker unsteadilyo and return to normal
 

indicat ions.


CONT TNUEJ IREVIE7UJ,
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ORIGINAL PAGE E 
OF POOR QUALITY 
T.N. 
M.N. 
AJZLSTA M 
VAR= 150W I 
LEE R, N VR 
G--uzrpc 
Curious to know w~hat caused these events, you glanlce


over t:he instrument: panel and find a 'zero" reading on


t:he ammeer. You actuatce the landing light: and not.ice


no change in ammeter indications. From t:his


informat~ion you conclude the alt:ernat:or has rai led.


.CONT-z~ INU E E
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EPPlYR VOR 
.
T.N. e\rgt- fii -pr 
M.N.

VAR= 150W 
LEERl'O' WR 
Label 
Lirn 
Q.D4 FFLiS %RDstre:9M 
Gln~ Fals Ai-rortlD~tn z;N 
You follow the procedures in the manual but your


attempts to bring the alternator back into service are


unsuccessful. Therefore, you turn off the alternator,


minimize the electrical load, and operate solely on


battery power.


CONTINUE IREVIEW1
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ORIGINAL PAGE W


OF POOR QUALITY


EPIG:R VMR 
nar-cr-Airport 
M..T.N.


VAR= 150 W i 9. 
LEMRtN VCR 
-Z Lirner 
Kurstur;: Ebe 
Qfl'J rn-i-S VR Total Disatbnc49- n3 NM 
Glen Falls Airport 
The battery, by its<l f, can supply the required power


to operate your radios for only a limited time. The


amount of time 5ou have depends on the size and


condition of the battery, and the power requirements of


the essent ial electr ical equipment you use. Even under


ideal conditions batter; power is not expected to last


longer than 5Z minutes.


JCONTINUEI REVIEW
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ORIGINAL PAGE 04 
OF POOR QUALITY 
5ar o Airport 
T.N.


N.VAR= 15°W 
EMSS 
Eq Label 
21 1"l$ 
QD'4l FThLS v::R Total Disatna- =g !Z 
Glen F'alls Airport 
You are at an altitude of 80HZ feet, just west of Grump


intersection. The time is now 11:23 and ,.ou have been


airbourne for 1 hour and 23 minutes. Winds are out of

the southwest at 3H knots. 
•CONTINUE JREVIEWI
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ORIGINAL PAGE 5


OF POOR- QUALITY


eaQ--R VCR 
eergcr Airport 
M.N.T. N. 
k,VPR= 15°W 
4t 
LMMN VCR 
t Lime­
tia9 ills 76MR


Srm: Nests


iG-N rLaLS \CR Total Di-atarce= ZZ M1 
Glen Fells firor-t 
The following information is available from air traffic


control one piece at a time:


1) Bearing & Distance 4) Approach A icd 
2) Ceiling 5) RTC Services 
3) - Visibilit~ 6) Terrain 
CONTINUE REVIEW
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ORIGINAL PAGE i 

OF POOR QUALITY 

Time: 3:25 j TOUCH the 'x' symbol 
x 4 x 12 
x 3 
x I x 13 
,,c xI 
1, 16 
x2 x 15 
Bearing &t47i2Zs:2 2A Approach NOB 
L&Distance: 25 Aids; 
Ceiling: 50z0g TC 
Services: 
FSS 
Visibility: 1 Terrain: HILLY 
SUMMARY INFORMATION SELECT AIRPORT 
GIV 

GSIVE 

22NSWER 
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ORIGINAL PAGE t


OF POOR QUALrTY


Time: H: 12 You have requeste.d the following information: 
Air- Bearing; Approach ATC 
port Distance Ceil Visi Aids Services Terrain 
1 
2 7ZZ 1I_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ 
3_ 3300 
4 
6z 1ZZZ 3 VOR TWR (R) HILLY 
7' 5ZZ 2 "_ __ _ 
9 2ZZ 25 1 NDB FSS HILLY 
10 5zz 1 
12 
" 
 13 40 7Z" i. 2 ILS TWR (R) LEVEL


14


16


AIRPORT 1 SELECT an airport then touch ENTER. 
F IM, F 4 
 You will be able to fly to that 

and shoot one approach only.airportWWWW78I 
W W W12 AIRPORT: 03' 
, F4 115ENTERI 
243 
ORIGINAL PAGE:
F POOR QUALITY 
RfNKING EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS 
You have just finished choosing an airport to divert to 
in the face of a serious problem.. Now we would like 
you to consider yourself to be ii that same situation 
again. The next display will present a table of


airports and descriptions in terms of ATC services,


weather, the flight time from your present position to


the airport, and the approach facilities there.


We would like you to rank these airports from your

"most preferable" (i") to 
 "least preferable" ("16",


given the same situation. Recall that you have, at the


very most, 5H minutes of'battery time left.


You will use the touch screen to input your airport


selection ard assign it a rank. You will be able to


edit your ranking at any time. When you have ranked


all 16 airports ("xi thru xi6") you will be asked if


you want to submit the list or continue editing it.


CONT INUE 
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ORIGINAL 
 
PAGE
OF pOOR QUALW-
RTC Time Approach 
Port Services iCeil Viii (min) Rids Port RPNK 
xl 
x2 
xS 
TWR(R) 
TWR 
TWR(R) 
izzz 
Ioo f 
Ia 
3 
3 
1 
{ 15 15 
15 
ILS 
ILS 
ILS 
xi 
x2 
x3 
I 
2 
x4 TWR 500. 1 15 ILS x4 
x5 TWR(R) iZZZl 3 3Z ILS Jx5 
x6 TWR 1ZZZg 3 3Z ILS -x6 
x7 TWR(R) 500 1 30 ILS x7 6 
x8 TWR 500 1 30 ILS X8 
x9 TWR izzz 3 15 NOB -x9 
xlZ TWR i 10 3 15 NOB xl 
xll TWR(R){5ZZ 1 15 NDB xli 
x12 TWR 5ZH 1 15 NOB x12 
x13 TWR(R) izzz 3 3H NOB x13 
xi4 TIR 1Z0Z 3 3Z ND x14 
x15 TWR(R) 5__ 1 3. ND5 x15 
xI6 TWR 5__ 1 3H NDB x16 
If you knew airport "xZ" had maintenance facilities,


would you 'pass up" airport "xi" for airport "x2"?


F NO
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Appendix F


Expert Pilot Experiment


PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FlMEJY 
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EAGL2± JINM~NJJALL BLANK 
pilot Response to Critical-ln-Flight Events


Performance Ranking


Thank you for taking the time to rank the problem diagnosis strategies of
 

our test subjects. You will have the opportunity to rank order the


performance of ten subjects on each of two different problem scenarios.


Descriptions of the information provided to the subjects, problem scenarios


and our analysis of the problems are given below. Your ranking of subject


performance will be based on the items of information each subject requested


to solve his problem. An ordered list of inquiries for each subject on each


scenario is attached. An Appendix which lists our responses to each subject


query is included for your reference.


Please rank order these 10 performances from best to worst. By "best" we


mean the pilot whose infomration seeking behavior most closely resembles that


which an expert pilot should exhibit. Give the "best" pilot rank I and the
 

worst rank 10.


As you are rank ordering these performances, please describe your


thoughts out loud (with the tape recorder on). Be sure to describe the


reasons for rating one pilot better than another.


Please do not write on this booklet. Score sheets for each scenario
 

which you may use as support documents to accompany your tape recording will


be provided.
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Subjects (IFR Pilots) have been given the following instructions:


What we are going to do is have you describe what you think you as a


pilot should do to determine the cause of a problem that has developed while


flying a Cherokee Arrow, which is a 200 h.p. fuel-injected Lycoming. This


particular plane is not supercharged and does not have an autopilot.
 

Your purpose is to describe how a person should go about diagnosing the


problem, not to describe what remedial actions he should take. Do not tell us


how to correct the problem. Simply try to determine what is causing it. We


do not want you to fly the plane, we simply want you to try to diagnose the


problem.


If you think the pilot should gather some particular information, you can


ask for it and we will give you that information. For example, if you were to


ask whether communications radio number one is operating okay, we might tell


you that it is operating normally. You can ask for any information that might


normally be available when you are up in a Cherokee Arrow. That includes such


things as instrument readings, information that you could obtain visually


outside, or information you could obtain over the radio.


A few things to keep in mind: First we are going to give you a scenario 
and then we will be giving you any information you request. The conditions or 
instrument indications supplied all refer to a fixed point in time. Even if 
you ask a question 10 minutes after we have started, it still refers to the 
same point in time as when the scenario was read. The plane is not continuing 
to fly. 
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Second, you are allowed to make control movements but we will only give


you the immediate response to that movement You -willnot be allowed to fly


the plane. You cannot ask


"If I make this change, what will it indicate 5 minutes from now?"


We will simply tell you the immediate response of the instruments to that


particular movement.
 

Third, another constraint is that you cannot ask about the effect of


combining 2 control movements. You will only be allowed to adjust one control


at a time and see the response to it. You cannot adjust 2 controls at once.


Finally, we do not want you to try to correct the problem. Instead, we


want you to simply concentrate on determining what the cause of the problem


is.


Remember, what you want to do is tell us what a pilot should do in order


to determine the cause of a problem that has developed while flying a


fuel-injected Cherokee Arrow.- This particular plane is not supercharged and


does not have an autopilot. Once we start, it is important that you not stop


until you either diagnose the problem or decide that with the available


information you cannot determine the cause. So there are essentially 2


endpoints. Either you say "I believe the problem is such and such," or "given


the available information, I don't think it is possible to determine the


cause."
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Here is the scenario:


Imagine that this pilot is making a day trip from Augusta, ME to Lebanon,


NH. He flies out of Augusta at 9:00 a.m., cleared Victor 39 to Neets


intersection, Victor 496 to Lebanon. He climbs to a cruising altitude of 6000


feet.


After 15 minutes of routine flying in instrument conditions in the
 

clouds, the instruments indicate an increase in airspeed, a steadily


decreasing altitude and zero pitch.


So, the instruments indicate an increase in airspeed, a steadily


decreasing altitude and zero pitch.


How should this pilot go about identifying his problem?


Our Diagnosis of the Problem for the First Scenario Was the Following:


Your vacuum pump failed as indicated by the low reading-of-the suction


gauge. The vacuum pump drives the attitude and directional gyros. As the


artificial horizon lost its drive it started to-sag to the right and the pilot


compensated by turning left, leveling the artificial horizon and putting the


plane in a descending left bank. The airspeed increase was due to the slight


nose-down attitude.


Subject Response to First Scenario


The information requests made by 10 IFR pilots after hearing this vacuum


pump scenario are enclosed. After each such request sequence, the pilot


stated his conclusion.
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Please rank order the performances for the vacuum pump scenario now. Be


sure to comment on your reasons for rating one pilot better than another.


Here is our second scenario:


You are making a day trip from Sanford, HE to Messena, NY. You fly out


of Sanford at 8:30 a.m., cleared Victor - 496 to Lebanon, Victor - 141 to


Messena. You climb to a cruise altitude of 6000. After 20 minutes IMC


flying, Boston Center instructs you to climb and maintain 10,000 feet. You


acknowledge and begin your climb between layers. After 2 minutes of climb,


you notice your indicated airspeed dropping off steadily from 100 Kts.,


maintaining constant pitch attitude.


How would you diagnose the problem?


Our diagnosis of the second problem was the following:


As you climbed through 6500 ft., the static port froze over as the


outside air temperature dropped below 320 F. This caused the airspeed


indicator to decrease as altitude increased and the VSI and altimeter to read


low. Several corrective actions were possible: return to your previous
 

altitude of 6000 ft.; open the alternate static source; break the VSI


glass.


Subject response to the second scenario:


Information requests made by 10 pilots after hearing this scenario are


enclosed. After each such request sequence, the pilot stated his conclusion.
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Please rank order the performances for the static port problem now. Be


sure to comment on your reasons for rating one pilot better than another.
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Scenario:


Work Sheet for Ranking Subjects 
(To accompany remarks on tape recording) 
RANK SUBJECT # COMMENTS 
(Be sure to think out loud as 
you are trying to rate the 
subjects.) 
1. ("best") 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. ("worst") 
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Appendix F-I


Vacuum Pump Scenario


Responses given to subjects when


an item of information was requested
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Vacuum Pump Scenario Responses


ADF: 	 368 MHZ


2600 RB


Test normal


Aileron conditon: Clear of ice


AIRMETS: None


Airspeed: 145 Kts. and increasing, cruise is about 135 Kts.


Alternate Static: Closed


If opened no change in any instrument readings


Altimeter (non-encoding): 5600 ft. and decreasing


Ammeter: +2 amps (normal)


Artificial horizon: Level, no movement


Cabin temperature: 70OF


Cargo condition: secure


Circuit Breaker Panel: All Breakers closed


Cloud tops: Area forecast 14,000 Ft.


COMI: Normal


COM02: Normal


Cowling Condition: Clean and Secure


Cylinder Head Temperature: 3750F (Normal)


DG: 2500 and Steady


Door Condition: Secure


EGT: 1300OF and Steady (normal)


Flap condition: 
Flap position: 
Clear of ice

00

00; 
 00
 
100; 100

if reset to 200; then 200

300; 300
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Vacuum Pump Scenario Responses


Freezing level: Area forecast 7,000 ft.


Fuel Flow: 8 gal./hour (normal)
 

Fuel Quantity


Left; nearly full


Right; full
 

Fuel Selector: Left Tank
 

Change to left or right: no change in instrument readings


Gear: gear up lights on


If lowered down; gear down lights, airspeed decays


Groundspeed (ATC): 120 Kts.
 

Magnetic Compass: Rotating through 2300


Magneto: Both


left; 50 RPM drop


right; 75 RPM drop


off; engine quits


both; normal operation


Manifold pressure: 20.5 inches (normal)


Master switch: ON


Mixture Control: Leaned for cruise
 

if enrich; EGT drop, engine rough


if lean; EGT rise, engine rough


Noise and Vibration (cabin): Normal


Oil pressure: 40 p.s.i. (Normal)


Oil temperature: 140OF (Normal)


Outside air temperature gauge: 370F


PIREPS: None


Pitot Heat: Off


If turned on: surge in ammeter discharge then back to normal;


no effect other instruments
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Vacuum Pump Scenario Responses


Prop RPM: 2300 RPM (nromal cruise setting)


if increase; 2700 RPM, MP decreases 
if decrease: 1900 RPM, MP increases 
Season: Fall 
SIGMENTS: None 
Smoke: None 
Stabilizer condition: clear of ice


Strobe: Off


Suction gauge: Extremely low, near the peg


Tachometer: 2300 RPM and constant (normal cruise reading, constant speed


prop)


Throttle: Cruise power
 

If increase; increase in manifold pressure and airspeed reading,


little change in altimeter reading


If decrease; decrease in manifold pressure and airspeed reading,


little change in altimeter reading.


Note: If requested, artificial horizon remains level, turn/bank


shows left turn


Transponder: Code 4320, normal operation


Trim: Trimmed for level cruise
 

Turbulence: None


Turn/Bank indicator: left turn


Vertical Speed inidcator: 600 fpm down


VORI: 111.4 Mhz, Flag On


VOR2: 111.6 MHz, Flag On


Winds aloft forecast: 3000, 6000, 9000 westerly at 10 Kts.


Windscreen: clear of ice


Wing: clear of ice
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Vacuum Pump Scenario Responses


Yoke: Neutral position


If back pressure .applied: Airspeed indicator shows decrease,


altimeter continues to decrease but at a reduced rate.


If requested, artificial horizon remains level and turn/
 

bank shows left turn.


If forward pressure applied: Airspeed indicator shows increase,


altimeter continues to decrease but at a faster rate.


If requested, artifical horizon remains level and turn/


bank shows left turn.


If left pressure applied: Turn to left on turn/bank before


turn, steeper after turn.
 

If requested, artificial horizon remains level


If right pressure applied: Turn to left on turn/bank before


turn, turn to right after turn.


If requested, artificial horizon remains level.
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Appendix F-2


Static Port Scenario


Responses given to subjects when


an item of information was requested.
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Static 	 Port Scenario Responses


ADF: 	 Normal


Off; Off


On; normal


Check circuit breaker; normal response


test; normal response


Aileron condition: normal


Airspeed: Slowly decreasing from 100 Kts.


Alternate Static: Closed


open; airspeed suddenly increases


closed; VSI reads correctly but sluggish


Altimeter: Low, only 6300 ft.


Ammeter: Normal


Artificial Horizon: Normal climb


Cabin 	 Temperature: Normal


Cargo 	 condition: Secure


Circuit breaker panel: All breakers closed


Cloud 	 Tops: Area forecast 14,000 ft.


COXI: 	 Normal


off; normal response


on; normal


check circuit breaker; normal response


CO2: 	 Normal 
off; normal response 
on; normal 
check circuit breaker; normal response 
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Static Port Scenario Responses


Cowling condition: clean and secure


Cylinder Head Temperature: Normal


DG: N-3000


Door Condition: Secure


EGT: Normal response


Flap Condition: Normal


Flaps: 00


00; 00


100; 100 
200; 200


300; 300


Fluid Leaks: None


Freezing Level: Area Forecast 7000 ft.


Fuel Quantity:


Left; 3/4 full


Right; 3/4 full
 

Fuel Selector: Left


Left; no change 
Right; no change 
Off; engine quits 
Gear: Up 
Up; Up 
Down; Normal response 
Ground Speed (ATC): 100 Kts


Housekeeping condition: No Loose items


Magnetic compass: N-3000


Magneto: Both


Left; Normal RPM drop


Right; Normal RPM drop


Off; engine quites


Both; Normal


Manifold Pressure: Normal
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Static Port Scenario Responses


Master Switch: On


On; on


Off; electrical power lost


Mixture Control: Normal


Enrigh; Normal response


Lean; Normal response


Noise and Vibration: Normal


Oil pressure: Normal


Oil temperature: Normal


Outside air temperature: 300F 
PIREPS: None 
Pitot heat; no change


on; no chnage


off; no chnage


Prop RPM: Normal


Increase RPM; Normal response


Decrease RPM;- Normal response


Signmets: None


Smoke: None


Stabilizer Condition: Normal


Suction gauge: Normal


Tachometer: Normal


Throttle: Normal


Increase; Normal response


Decrease; Normal response


Transponder: Normal


off; Normal


On; normal


Check circuit breaker; normal response


Change; normal response


Turn/Bank Indicator: Normal level


Vertical Speed Indicator; Sluggish, low (100 ft./min.)
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Static Port Scenario Responses


VORI: Normal 
off; off 
on; normal 
check circuit breaker; normal response 
test; normal response 
Windscreen condition: clear 
Wing condition: Light rime ice


Yoke: Normal


up; airspeed decreases faster


down; airspeed stabilizes


left; normal response
 

right; normal response
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Enclosed are the information requests made by 10 IFR pilots after hearing this


scenario. After each such request sequence-, the pilots stated his


conclusion.


The actual problem used to generate this scenario (and the responses


given to pilots after particular information requests) is given below.


Our Diagnosis of the Problem was the Following:


Your vacuum pump failed as indicated by the low reading of the suction


gauge. The vacuum pump drives the attitude and directional gyros. As the


artificial horizon lost its drive it stated to sag to the right and the pilot
 

compensated by turning left, leveling the artificial horizon and putting the


plane in a desceding left bank. The airspeed increase was due to the slight


nose-down attitude.


Please rank order these 10 performances from best to worst. By "best" we


mean the pilot whose information seeking behavior most closely resembles that


which an expert pilot should exhibit. Give the "best" pilot rank 1 and the


worst rank 10.


As you are rank ordering these peiformances, please describe your


thoughts out loud (with the tape recorder on). Be sure to describe the


reasons for rating one pilot better than another.
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Subject # 1
 

Vacuum Pump Scenario


1. What's the manifold presssure reading?


2. Is there any ice on the wings?


3. Is there any ice on the windscreen?


4. What's the outside air temperature?


5. Can you notice any precipitation?


6. What's the suction gauge reading?


7. What's the magnetic compass reading?
 

8. What's the directional gyro reading?
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A Sample Response


to the Static Port Scenario
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Scenario 4


Subject 45


1. What happens when the pitot heat is turned on?


2. What's the outside air temperature gauge show?


3. Is there any ice on the windscreen?


4. What's the airspeed reading?


5. What's the altimeter reading?


6. What's the throttle set at?


7. What happens when I advance the throttle?


8. What's the prop control set at?


9. What happens when I advance the prop control?


10. What's the altimeter'reading?


11. What's the airspeed reading?


12. What's the mixture set at?­

13. What happens when I lean the mixture?


14. What's the throttle set at?


15. What happens when I advance the throttle?


16. What's the prop control set at?


17. What happens when I advance the prop control?


18. What happens when the pitot heat is turned on?


19. What happens if back pressure is applied to the yoke? 
20. What happens if forward pressure is applied to the yoke?


21. What's the throttle set at?


22. What happens if I advance the throttle?
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List of Publications and Proceedings Resulting from This Research


M.S. Theses:


Flathers, George W., Jr. A Study of Decision-Making Behavior of
 

Aircraft Pilots Deviating From a Planned Flight, The Ohio State


University, MS Thesis, 1980.


Lee, Jeffrey A., A Decision Support System For In-Flight Emergencies:
 

ACE, The Ohio State University, MS Thesis, 1982.


Thomas, Mark E., The Effect of Preparation on Pilot Diagnosis of


Critical In-Flight Events, The Ohio State University,


MS Thesis, 1984.


Ph.D. Dissertations:


Schofield, Jeffrey E. Aircrew Compliance with Standard Operating


Procedures as a Component of Airline Safety, The Ohio State
 

University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1980.


Journals:


Giffin, Walter C. and Thomas H. Rockwell. "Computer-Aided Testing


of Pilot Response to Critical In-Flight Events," Accepted for


Publication by Human Factors.


Flathers, George W., Jr., Walter C. Giffin and Thomas H. Rockwell.


"A Study of Decision Making Behavior of Pilots Deviating From


a Planned Flight," Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine,


October, 1982, V. 53, No. 10, p. 958-963.


Schofield, Jeffrey E. and Walter C. Giffin, "An Analysis of Aircrew


Procedural Compliance," Aviation, Space, and Environmental


Medicine, October, 1982, V. 53, No. 10, p. 964-696.
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Proceedings:


Two papers appearing in:


Jensen, R. S. (Editor), Proceedings of the Symposium on Aviation


Psychology, April 21 and 22, 1981, Technical Report: APL-1-81,


The Aviation Psychology Laboratory, The Ohio State University,


Columbus, Ohio.


i) Flathers, G. W. II, W. C. Giffin and T. H. Rockwell.


"A Study of Decision-Making Behavior of Aircraft


Pilots Deviating from a Planned Flight."


ii) Schofield, J. E. and W. C. Giffin, "An Analysis of


Aircrew Procedural Compliance."


Two papers appearing in:


Jensen, R. S. (Editor), Proceedings df the Second Symposium on


Aviation Psychology, April 25 - 28, 1983,-The Aviation


Psychology Laboratory, The Ohio State University,


Columbus, Ohio.


i) Giffin, W. C. and T. H. Rockwell. "Computer Aided


Testing of Pilot Response to Critical In-Flight


Events."


ii) Rockwell, T. H. and W. C. Giffin, "Combining Destination


Diversion,Decisions and Critical In-Flight Event


Diagnosis in Computer Aided Testing of Pilots."
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